Patriarch Partners, LLC v. Axis Insurance Company ( 2018 )


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  • 17-3022
    Patriarch Partners, LLC v. Axis Insurance Company
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
    SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
    FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
    CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
    EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
    “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
    ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
    the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 6th day of December, two thousand eighteen.
    PRESENT:
    JON O. NEWMAN,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    Circuit Judges,
    RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    District Judge.*
    _________________________________________
    PATRIARCH PARTNERS, LLC,
    Plaintiff–Counter-Defendant–Appellant,
    v.                                                          No. 17-3022
    AXIS INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant–Counter-Claimant–Counter-Defendant–Appellee.
    _________________________________________
    *Judge Richard J. Sullivan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting
    by designation.
    FOR APPELLANT:                                     FINLEY T. HARCKHAM, (Luma S.
    Al-Shibib on the brief) Anderson Kill, P.C.,
    New York, NY.
    FOR APPELLEE:                                      JOHN R. GERSTEIN, (Gabriela Richeimer,
    Elizabeth Jewell on the brief), Clyde & Co
    US LLP, Washington, D.C.
    Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District
    of New York (Caproni, J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on September 25, 2017, is
    AFFIRMED.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Patriarch Partners, LLC (“Patriarch”) appeals from a judgment
    entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Caproni,
    J.), granting summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in favor of
    Defendant-Appellee Axis Insurance Company (“Axis”) on Patriarch’s claims for breach of
    contract and declaratory relief. The central question presented to the District Court and on
    appeal is whether a lengthy Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) investigation into
    Patriarch ripened into a “claim” before the Axis insurance policy inception date, thereby
    excluding related defense costs from coverage under the terms of the policy and a related
    warranty provided by Patriarch to Axis. In an opinion resolving cross-motions for summary
    judgment, the District Court ruled that coverage was excluded under the Axis policy’s “prior
    or pending claims” endorsement. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
    facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to
    explain our decision to affirm the District Court’s decision in Axis’s favor. Because we
    conclude that Patriarch’s claims are foreclosed by the language of the warranty statement
    signed by its only officer, we need not reach the grounds relied on by the District Court. See
    Figueroa v. Mazza, 
    825 F.3d 89
    , 99 (2d Cir. 2016) (court of appeals may affirm district court
    decision on any ground supported by record).
    2
    We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment. Miller v.
    Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 
    321 F.3d 292
    , 300 (2d Cir. 2003). Summary judgment may be
    awarded only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Unless otherwise noted, the
    facts below are either undisputed, or the objecting party has not pointed to any contradictory
    evidence in the record. On review of an award of summary judgment, “all factual inferences
    must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” 
    Miller, 321 F.3d at 300
    . In this case, that
    party is Patriarch.
    I.
    Patriarch is a private equity investment firm that, among other things, bundles
    distressed loans to sell to investors as Collateralized Loan Obligations (“CLOs”). Patriarch
    employs numerous professionals, but Lynn Tilton (“Tilton”) is Patriarch’s founder, sole
    director, and sole officer.
    In December 2009, the SEC sent Patriarch a letter captioned “In the Matter of
    Patriarch Partners LLC (HO-11245),” notifying the company that the SEC was conducting
    an “informal inquiry” into the company and requesting that Patriarch voluntarily provide
    information and produce documents. App’x at 490. The December 2009 letter, addressed to
    Patriarch’s chief administrative officer, was accompanied by an SEC Form 1662—a standard
    agency form that provides information on the rights of persons subject to voluntary or
    mandatory information requests. Advised by Susan Brune of Brune & Richard, LLP—
    outside counsel retained in connection with the SEC inquiry—Patriarch voluntarily complied
    with the December 2009 request, as well as with follow-up requests received by it in June
    and September 2010.
    One and one-half years later, by letter dated May 27, 2011, and addressed to Brune,
    the SEC again contacted Patriarch. The letter, this time captioned “In the Matter of
    Patriarch Partners, HO-11665,” described the SEC proceeding as an “informal
    investigation,” as opposed to the earlier “inquiry.” Like the December 2009 letter, the May
    2011 letter enclosed a Form 1662. In the May 2011 letter, the SEC requested extensive
    information and documents relating to Patriarch’s organization and business practices. It
    3
    also requested information about particular “Patriarch Structures,” which the agency defined
    to include any CLO that Patriarch had provided investment advice on from 2002 until the
    date of the letter, and certain other funds marketed by Patriarch, including the “Zohar”
    CLOs. App’x at 507.
    On June 3, 2011, the SEC internally issued an “Order Directing Private Investigation
    and Designating Officers to Take Testimony” (the “Order of Investigation” or “Order”)
    against Patriarch.1 It bore the same caption as the May 2011 letter. The Order of
    Investigation authorized certain SEC enforcement officers for the first time to issue
    subpoenas and take sworn testimony under oath in the Patriarch matter. The Order stated
    that “[t]he Commission has information that tends to show” that Patriarch had acted in
    “possible violation” of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
    1934 in the “structuring and marketing” of certain Patriarch CLOs—largely the same CLOs
    that had been the subject of the May 27, 2011 information request. App’x at 519-520. The
    Order was not published or publicly available. Although Patriarch maintains that it did not
    see a copy of the Order until October 2012, Patriarch concedes that Brune, its outside
    counsel, “became aware” of the Order on June 13, 2011. App’x at 1980.
    Also in or about June 2011, the SEC requested interviews with two former Patriarch
    executives, Todd Kaloudis and Meric Topbas. Kaloudis and Topbas each retained counsel
    for assistance in responding to the SEC requests. In June and July of 2011, they turned to
    Patriarch for indemnification of their legal expenses, and Patriarch agreed to their requests.
    In addition to an interview, the SEC requested that Topbas produce documents
    created during his employment with Patriarch. On June 13, 2011, Topbas’s counsel
    requested a copy of the Order of Investigation from the SEC and reviewed it before
    1 The SEC refers to such orders as “Formal Orders of Investigation” or “formal orders.” SEC Division of
    Enforcement, Enforcement Manual, 2.3.3 (November 28, 2017). Under the Enforcement Manual, Division
    Directors at the SEC may issue formal orders when, in their discretion, they believe that a formal
    investigation is necessary to determine whether a violation of federal securities laws has occurred. 
    Id. at 2.3.4
    Formal orders generally describe the nature of the investigation and identify the specific staff officers
    authorized to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, and otherwise compel the production of evidence. 
    Id. 4 contacting
    Patriarch’s outside counsel the next day. Topbas eventually submitted to the
    interview without demanding a subpoena, but his counsel took the position with the SEC
    that the documents would be “more appropriately provided” in response to a subpoena.
    App’x at 1661. On July 1, invoking its authority under the Order, the SEC issued a formal
    subpoena to Topbas (the “Topbas Subpoena”). The Topbas Subpoena bore the same
    caption as the May 2011 letter and the Order.
    On July 5, 2011, Patriarch’s outside counsel (Brune and other Brune & Richard
    attorneys) met with SEC officials in Washington, D.C., and provided information on
    Patriarch’s structure, operations, and certain of its CLOs. On August 11, an SEC officer who
    had attended the July meeting emailed Brune requesting, among other things, extensive
    information and documents related to the “Zohar” CLOs. In the email, the SEC officer
    referred to the July 5 meeting as a “proffer” and asked the firm to respond to certain
    substantive questions that had been raised at that meeting about the “Ark” and “Zohar”
    CLOs. Notably, the email also advised that the SEC “will follow this voluntary request with a
    subpoena that may seek more information,” and directed Patriarch to preserve certain
    communications. App’x at 1917-19 (emphasis added). Brune’s associate forwarded this email
    to Tilton within an hour of receiving it, and Tilton responded minutes later. That evening,
    Patriarch’s chief compliance officer sent out an office-wide “Retention Policy Reminder,”
    directing employees to retain certain of their communications and documents.
    Meanwhile, Patriarch was in the process of renewing its directors and officers (D&O)
    professional liability insurance portfolio. Its existing policies expired and were renewed
    annually on or about July 31. In previous years, Patriarch had maintained a “tower” of D&O
    insurance comprised of several policies totaling $20 million in policy limits. As of June 2011,
    the existing tower consisted of (1) a primary policy with a $10 million limit issued by
    Continental Casualty Company (the “CNA Policy”), (2) a $5 million first-level excess policy
    issued by the Great American Insurance Company, and (3) a $5 million second-level excess
    policy issued by Illinois National Insurance Company.
    5
    On August 9,2 Patriarch’s insurance broker, Steve Blount, recommended to Patriarch
    that it purchase a third excess layer of $5 million, extending Patriarch’s policy limit to $25
    million. The same day, Axis gave Blount a quote for a third $5 million excess layer. Patriarch
    accepted the Axis quote on August 12, at which point the Axis Policy became “bound.” 3
    Coverage under the Axis Policy was made effective as of July 31. The Axis Policy, like the
    other two excess policies, was a “follow-form” policy that rested on the CNA Policy.
    According to industry practice, this meant that the excess policies adopted the terms of the
    primary CNA Policy, except as modified by certain “endorsements.”
    Following the terms of the CNA Policy, the policies in Patriarch’s insurance tower—
    including Axis—provided coverage for “any Claim first made against an Insured . . . during
    the Policy Period.” App’x at 181. The policies defined a “Claim” to include, among other
    things, “an Investigation of an Insured alleging a Wrongful Act.” 
    Id. at 183.
    An
    “Investigation” was defined to include “a formal . . . regulatory investigation or inquiry,”
    including specifically “an order of investigation or other investigation by the [SEC].” 
    Id. at 186.
    In August, before Patriarch accepted the Axis quote, Blount notified Patriarch’s
    insurance team that Axis had made its quote contingent upon Patriarch’s execution of a
    warranty statement (the “Warranty”). Blount wrote in an email dated August 12 that Axis
    intended the Warranty to “eliminate the potential for Axis to come on the program and be
    immediately hit with a claim that the client knew was close but hadn’t been filed yet.” App’x
    at 847. Patriarch and Axis negotiated the text of the Warranty between approximately
    2Although the 2010-2011 policies were due to expire on July 31, they were briefly extended and the
    negotiations over quotes for the 2011-2012 policy period occurred in early August. All D&O policies for the
    2011-2012 policy period were retroactively made effective as of July 31, 2011.
    3 The Axis policy was “bound” through the execution of policy “binders,” which Blount forwarded from
    Axis to Patriarch on August 22. Binders are temporary, unintegrated insurance contracts that provide
    coverage to the insured pending the issuance of a full policy. See 1A Couch on Insurance § 13:6 (3d ed.). For
    reasons that the parties dispute and that are unclear from the record, the full Axis Policy was not issued until
    March 2012. Whether the Axis binders differed in substance from the full Axis Policy presented an important
    and disputed issue in the District Court decision. Because we decide this case on different grounds, however,
    we do not elaborate on any potential distinctions here.
    6
    August 22 and September 9. Axis received an executed copy of the Warranty on the latter
    date. At Patriarch’s request the Warranty was dated August 12, 2011.
    Signed by Tilton, the Warranty provided as follows:
    This letter is provided pursuant to a request by Axis Insurance
    Company (“Insurer”). The information contained herein applies
    only to the captioned policies to be provided to the Insureds by
    the Insurer. It is understood and agreed that this letter is and shall
    be deemed to be submitted to the Insurer and material to the
    underwriting and acceptance of risk for the Captioned Policy.
    The undersigned, on behalf of Patriarch and all of its directors
    and officers, hereby represents that as of the date of this letter
    neither the undersigned nor any other director or officer of Patriarch is aware
    of any facts or circumstances that would reasonably be expected to result in a
    Claim under the Captioned Policy. It is understood that the Captioned
    Policy and any renewal thereof does not provide coverage for
    Claims relating to facts or circumstances that, as of the date of
    this letter, Patriarch was aware of and would reasonably have
    expected to result in a Claim covered by such Captioned Policy (or
    future renewal thereof).
    By executing this letter, I confirm that I understand that the
    Insurer is relying upon this warranty in order to incept the
    proposed coverage.
    App’x at 131 (emphasis added). The Warranty header defined the “Captioned Policy” as
    “Axis Excess Policy No. MNN762262/01/2011 ($5mm limit excess $20mm).”
    On February 27, 2012, just over six months after the Axis Policy became effective,
    the SEC served the subpoena that it had advised Patriarch in August would be forthcoming
    (the “Patriarch Subpoena”). The Patriarch Subpoena was issued under the same SEC
    numbered caption as the May 27, 2011 letter, the Order of Investigation, and the Topbas
    Subpoena: “In the Matter of Patriarch Partners (HO-11665).” It required Patriarch to
    produce all emails or instant messages from Tilton, Kaloudis, and Topbas from January 1,
    2008, through the subpoena’s date.
    On March 5, 2012, in a letter to all of its D&O insurers, Patriarch tendered notice of
    the Patriarch Subpoena as a “new matter.” CNA responded to Patriarch in a letter dated
    March 7, 2012, that Patriarch Subpoena “appears to qualify as a ‘Claim’ for a ‘Wrongful
    7
    Act.’” App’x at 1027. Axis also acknowledged Patriarch’s notice of the SEC investigation as
    a Claim but, in a letter dated October 7, 2013, expressly reserved its rights to deny coverage
    under the Axis Policy.
    In March 2015, more than three years after it issued the Patriarch subpoena, the SEC
    filed an administrative enforcement action against Patriarch. In the intervening years, the
    costs of defending the SEC proceeding had depleted nearly all of Patriarch’s underlying $20
    million in D&O coverage. In August 2015, Patriarch notified Axis that it had exhausted its
    underlying policy limits, and asked Axis to assume the obligation to cover defense costs.
    Axis denied coverage on the basis (among others) that the SEC investigation was not a
    Claim “first made” against Patriarch during the Axis Policy period, because the investigation
    had begun before the policy inception date of July 31, 2011. This lawsuit followed.
    Following extensive discovery at the District Court, the parties filed cross-motions
    for summary judgment. Axis argued that it was excused from coverage on at least two bases:
    First, that the SEC investigation was a “Claim” first made before the Axis policy incepted
    and was therefore not covered by the Axis Policy; second, that the Warranty relieved Axis of
    its obligations because the SEC investigation constituted “facts or circumstances” of which
    Patriarch was aware that could reasonably have been expected to result in the Claim.
    In a thorough opinion, the District Court ruled that the SEC investigation was a
    “Claim” that was “pending prior to the inception of the Axis policy,” and was therefore
    excluded under the binder’s “pending or prior claim” endorsement. Because this ground was
    dispositive, the District Court did not address Axis’s alternative arguments or Patriarch’s
    cross-motion.
    Patriarch timely appealed.
    II.
    Patriarch concedes that the Warranty effects an exclusion from coverage but disputes
    that it excluded coverage for the SEC investigation Claim. Patriarch makes two arguments
    against applying the Warranty exclusion. First, it argues that the Warranty excluded coverage
    8
    only for Claims relating to facts or circumstances of which Tilton herself was aware as of
    August 12, since Tilton was the sole officer or director of Patriarch. Tilton made sworn
    statements that she was not aware of the Order of Investigation before August 12, 2011;
    Patriarch contends accordingly that, whether the Claim is excluded under the Warranty is a
    disputed question of fact that must be decided by a jury. Second, Patriarch contends that the
    Warranty phrases “Claim under the Captioned Policy” and “Claim covered by such
    Captioned Policy” referred only to Claims giving rise to losses in excess of $20 million
    because the Axis Policy provided coverage only after the underlying policies were exhausted
    by a particular Claim. Thus, under Patriarch’s interpretation, the Warranty excludes coverage
    only for Claims relating to circumstances of which Tilton herself was aware before August
    12 and which Tilton would reasonably have expected to result in a Claim with losses
    exceeding $20 million.
    The parties agree that New York law governs this case. In New York, “[t]he tests to
    be applied in construing an insurance policy are common speech and the reasonable
    expectation and purpose of the ordinary businessman.” Ace Wire & Cable Co., v. Aetna Cas.
    & Sur. Co., 
    60 N.Y.2d 390
    , 398 (1983) (internal citations omitted). Insurance coverage
    exclusions must be stated in “clear and unmistakable” language and are subject to a “strict
    and narrow construction.” Seaboard Surety Co. v. Gillette Co., 
    64 N.Y.2d 304
    , 311 (1984). Any
    ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the insured. See Parks Real Estate Purchasing Grp. v.
    St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472, F.3d 33, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2006).
    Patriarch’s position that the Warranty applies only to facts or circumstances
    subjectively known by Tilton is unsupported by the text of the Warranty, which explicitly
    refers to facts or circumstances that “Patriarch was aware of.” Moreover, “under traditional
    principles of agency [an] attorney’s knowledge must be imputed to [her client].” Veal v.
    Geraci, 
    23 F.3d 722
    , 725 (2d Cir. 1994). Thus, at a minimum, we consider that facts and
    circumstances that were known not only to Tilton, but to Patriarch’s outside counsel and
    Patriarch’s in-house counsel are facts and circumstances that “Patriarch was aware of” for
    purposes of analyzing the Warranty.
    9
    Patriarch’s position that the Warranty applies only to known facts or circumstances
    that Patriarch would reasonably have expected to result in a Claim with losses exceeding the
    $20 million in underlying policies is also not established by the text of the Warranty. The
    Warranty’s use of the capitalized term “Claim” indicates that it is a defined term and thus
    means “Claim” as defined in the CNA Policy. The CNA Policy definition of “Claim” is not
    limited in the manner Patriarch urges. It is true that the Warranty refers both to Claims
    “under” the Axis Policy—a term best understood to mean “defined by”—and to Claims
    “covered by” the Axis Policy. Patriarch insists that the Axis Policy “covers” only Claims
    whose losses exceed $20 million. Reading the Warranty as a whole, however, and taking into
    consideration its context and purpose, we are not persuaded by Patriarch’s interpretation.
    Because the Axis Policy is a “follow-form” policy, the same Claims that are “covered by” the
    CNA Policy are also “covered by” the Axis Policy and other underlying excess policies. That
    Axis provides excess insurance does not change or limit the class of Claims that it provides
    coverage for; it changes only the circumstances under which Axis must pay for losses
    resulting from such Claims.4 The only reasonable interpretation of the Warranty, in our view,
    is that it excludes claims arising from facts or circumstances of which Patriarch was aware as
    of August 12 and that Patriarch would reasonably have expected to result in a Claim as
    defined by the CNA Policy.
    Patriarch urges us to consider deposition testimony that, it contends, demonstrates
    that Axis employees involved in the drafting of the Warranty intended Patriarch’s limiting
    interpretation. But this Court may consider extrinsic evidence only to resolve ambiguities
    4 Our decision in Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, LLC, 
    628 F.3d 46
    (2d Cir. 2010), does
    not require a different conclusion. Lumbermens involved materially different policies with materially different
    terms. The excess policy in Lumbermens, which did not follow the primary policy, required notice “whenever it
    appears likely it will result in a claim involving this Coverage Part.” 
    Id. at 54
    (Kearse, J., dissenting) (emphasis
    added). Because the excess policy had its own notice provision, it was clear that “involving this Coverage
    Part” meant “involving excess coverage.” Relying on caselaw from Michigan—the law under which the
    contract was construed—we concluded that “involving excess coverage” had previously been interpreted to
    mean “actually being implicated through liability,” and thus that notice was required under the excess policy
    only when it was likely that a claim would exceed the underlying policy. 
    Id. at 51-52.
    The textual differences—
    “covered by” or “under” as opposed to “involving”—and the fact that the excess Axis Policy follows the
    underlying policies and therefore defines “Claim” identically, renders Lumbermens largely inapposite.
    10
    that exist on the face of an agreement. W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 
    77 N.Y.2d 157
    ,
    162-163 (1990). Whether such ambiguities exist is a question of law to be resolved by courts.
    
    Id. at 162.
    For the reasons set out above, we conclude that the Warranty, “read as a whole to
    determine its purpose and intent,” 
    id., contains no
    ambiguity. We therefore decline to
    consider the extrinsic evidence that Patriarch offers to support its interpretation of the
    Warranty.
    By August 12, 2011, the effective date of the Warranty, Patriarch “was aware” of the
    SEC Order of Investigation, the escalating severity and focus of the SEC investigation, the
    subpoena of a former employee, and notice of an impending subpoena to be issued to
    Patriarch itself. It also “was aware” of the SEC’s focus on at least the Zohar CLOs. Further,
    Patriarch had accrued over $390,000 in legal expenses for outside counsel in responding to
    the SEC’s requests of it by the time Tilton executed the Warranty. These sums were in
    addition to the retainers and legal expenses that Patriarch had committed to provide for
    Kaloudis and Topbas, which, when billed in late September, amounted to nearly $200,000.
    We conclude that, contrary to the representations made in the Warranty, Patriarch
    was “aware” that the SEC had become more—not less—insistent in its demands of
    Patriarch, despite Patriarch’s accrual of hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal costs to
    prevent such escalation. These are “facts and circumstances” that could reasonably be
    expected to give rise to a Claim under the Axis Policy. Indeed, Patriarch conceded in its
    briefing on appeal that “[t]he SEC’s contacts with Patriarch and two former employees prior
    to the effective date of the AXIS Policy were an indication that a Claim might be asserted
    against Patriarch in the future.” Appellant’s Br. at 50. The Warranty thus excludes Patriarch’s
    losses arising from its defense of the SEC investigation Claim from coverage under the Axis
    Policy.
    11
    * * *
    We have considered Patriarch’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are
    without merit. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court is
    AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    12