United States v. Rickie Atkinson ( 2019 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4589
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICKIE MARKIECE ATKINSON, a/k/a Drama,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:16-cr-00250-D-1)
Submitted: December 28, 2018 Decided: January 14, 2019
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jaclyn L. DiLauro, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Acting First Assistant United States Attorney, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rickie Markiece Atkinson appeals from his 240-month sentence imposed pursuant
to his guilty plea to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. On
appeal, Atkinson challenges his designation as an armed career criminal and argues that
the district court erred in departing upwards from the calculated Sentencing Guidelines
range. We affirm.
We review de novo the question of whether a defendant’s prior convictions for
breaking and entering qualify as predicate felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA). United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 683 (4th Cir. 2017). An armed career
criminal is, in pertinent part, “a person who violates [18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012)] . . . and
has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
“The ACCA defines ‘violent felony’ to include, as relevant here, any offense that ‘is
burglary.’” United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 268 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). “Thus, any burglary offense is an ACCA predicate offense.”
Id. In Mungro, the “question presented” was “does North Carolina’s ‘breaking or
entering’ offense [under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a)] qualify as burglary and, thus, as a
predicate offense under the ACCA?” Id. After a thorough analysis of the statute and
relevant case law, we “conclude[d] that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a), as interpreted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court, sweeps no more broadly than the generic elements of
burglary” and “therefore qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense.” Id. at 272.
Atkinson argues that Mungro is not controlling here because, in that case, this
Court focused its analysis on the “unlawful entry element” of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a)
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and not on the statute’s definition of the term “building.” Atkinson contends that N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a) is broader than generic burglary because North Carolina courts have
convicted defendants under that statute for breaking and entering into mobile homes and
trailers. Generic burglary, Atkinson argues, is narrower and does not encompass, for
example, burglary of a boat, motor vehicle, air vehicle, booth, tent, or railroad car.
Atkinson claims that we are not bound by Mungro because Mungro did not explicitly
address this issue.
We reject this argument and hold that North Carolina Breaking and Entering’s
“building” element sweeps no broader than generic burglary’s “building” element.
Accordingly, we find that Atkinson was properly treated as an armed career criminal.
Atkinson next argues that the district court’s decision to upwardly depart and the
extent of the departure were unwarranted. He contends that the district court’s reasoning
was not sufficiently compelling to support such a large departure, * especially where
certain of the district court’s reasons—offense conduct, obstruction of justice, and
criminal history—were adequately accounted for in the calculation of the original
Guidelines range. Atkinson also notes that nearly all of his unscored convictions were
more than fifteen years old.
When reviewing a departure, we consider whether the sentencing court acted
reasonably both with respect to its decision to depart and with respect to the extent of the
*
The district court departed from a 180- to 188-month Guidelines range to a range
of 210 to 262 months.
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divergence from the sentencing range. United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 529 (4th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An appellate court owes due deference to
a district court’s assessment of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [2012] factors, and mere
disagreement with the sentence below is insufficient to justify reversal of the district
court.” Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court departed
pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3(a)(1), p.s. (2016),
which “authorizes an upward departure when reliable information indicates that the
defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of
the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other
crimes.” United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Further, once the district court reached a criminal history category of VI,
the district court moved to a higher offense level appropriate to the case. USSG
§ 4A1.3(a)(4)(B), p.s.
Atkinson contends that the district court relied too heavily on his earlier
convictions in upwardly departing. However, the district court discussed each of
Atkinson’s convictions, noting his age at the time and the resulting, generally lenient
sentence. It then thoroughly explained its reasoning for the departure, relying not just on
Atkinson’s earlier criminal history, but on a combination of the length of Atkinson’s
criminal history, the lenient sentences he received, his numerous institutional infractions,
his obstruction of justice, his current and past violent behavior, and his failure to modify
his behavior for any period of time.
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The court correctly considered Atkinson’s unscored violations, as well as other
reasons for the upward departure, including “the nature of the prior offenses” and any
prior lenient treatment. USSG § 4A1.3, p.s. cmt. 2(B) (authorizing consideration of “the
nature of the prior offenses rather than simply their number”); see USSG § 4A1.3, p.s.
background (“[A] defendant with an extensive record of serious, assaultive conduct who
had received what might now be considered extremely lenient treatment in the past might
have the same criminal history category as a defendant who had a record of less serious
conduct.”). Moreover, while certain circumstances discussed by the court were at least
partially taken into account by the Guidelines range, the district court offered numerous
reasons supported by the record for its decision to depart, as well as for the extent of the
departure, and the court’s reasoning continually underscored the extraordinarily serious
nature of Atkinson’s history.
For instance, the court concluded that the dates and circumstances of Atkinson’s
criminal history, as well as his institutional infractions, showed a “100 percent” chance of
recidivism, which the court called “extraordinary.” The court recognized that Atkinson’s
violent behavior continued even in prison while awaiting disposition of the instant case.
Further, the court considered the circumstances surrounding Atkinson’s criminal conduct,
including his dismissed charge and his attempt to obstruct justice and avoid
responsibility.
Next, the district court considered the appropriate § 3553(a) factors in imposing
the 240-month sentence. Atkinson’s criminal record reflected a steady pattern of
offenses, some involving violence, since he was 16. The district court also considered
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numerous other relevant factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2) (2012). While Atkinson
claims that the district court failed to account for mitigating circumstances like his mental
health and difficult upbringing, the record reflects that the district court discussed the
mitigating factors, but found Atkinson’s criminal behavior in noncustodial and custodial
settings more telling. While the sentence selected by the district court is significantly
higher than the predeparture Guidelines range established at sentencing, the court
grounded the sentence in the § 3553(a) factors. We therefore find that Atkinson’s
sentence is reasonable and that the district court did not err procedurally or substantively
in its decision to depart.
Thus, we affirm Atkinson’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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