Silva-Silva v. Barr ( 2019 )


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  •      17-2784
    Silva-Silva v. Barr
    BIA
    Straus, IJ
    A200 031 712
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 6th day of November, two thousand nineteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            REENA RAGGI,
    8            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    9            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   ERICO SILVA-SILVA, AKA ANDERSON
    14   ERICO DA SILVA,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                         v.                                    17-2784
    18                                                               NAC
    19   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                       Jeffrey A. Devore, Esq., Palm
    25                                         Beach Gardens, FL.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                       Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
    28                                         Attorney General; Erica B. Miles,
    29                                         Senior Litigation Counsel; Enitan
    30                                         O. Otunla, Trial Attorney, Office
    31                                         of Immigration Litigation, United
    32                                         States Department of Justice,
    33                                         Washington, DC.
    1            UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4    is DENIED.
    5        Petitioner Erico Silva-Silva, a native and citizen of
    6    Brazil, seeks review of an August 10, 2017, decision of the
    7    BIA affirming a March 20, 2017, decision of an Immigration
    8    Judge    (“IJ”)   denying   Silva-Silva’s   motion   to   reopen   his
    9    removal proceedings and rescind his removal order.             In re
    10   Erico Silva-Silva, No. A 200 031 712 (B.I.A. Aug. 10, 2017),
    11   aff’g No. A 200 031 712 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Mar. 20, 2017).
    12   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    13   and procedural history in this case.
    14       We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions
    15   “for the sake of completeness.”             Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
    16   Homeland Security, 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir. 2006).               We
    17   review the denial of a motion to reopen and rescind an in
    18   absentia removal order for abuse of discretion.           See Alrefae
    19   v. Chertoff, 
    471 F.3d 353
    , 357 (2d Cir. 2006).
    20       There are two grounds to rescind an in absentia removal
    21   order: (1) lack of notice of the hearing; and (2) exceptional
    2
    1    circumstances      for      failure     to          appear     if     rescission    is
    2    requested    within      180    days.           8    U.S.C.    §    1229a(b)(5)(C);
    3    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).                   Only the first provision is
    4    at issue because Silva-Silva filed his motion to reopen and
    5    rescind more than 10 years after the IJ entered the removal
    6    order.
    7           If, as here, notice was “served via regular mail,” there
    8    is “a ‘less stringent, rebuttable presumption’ of receipt”
    9    than if served by certified mail.                      Silva-Carvalho Lopes v.
    10   Mukasey, 
    517 F.3d 156
    , 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Alrefae,
    
    11 471 F.3d at 359
    ).           The agency “must consider all of the
    12   petitioner’s evidence (circumstantial or otherwise) in a
    13   practical    fashion,       guided     by       common       sense,    to    determine
    14   whether the slight presumption of receipt of regular mail has
    15   more    probably     than      not    been          overcome.”         
    Id. at 160.
    16   Importantly, however, for aliens who receive notice of their
    17   obligation to inform the immigration court of any change in
    18   address and of the consequences of failing to do so, in
    19   compliance with 8 U.S.C § 1229(a), the “requirement that an
    20   alien    ‘receive’    notice         [is]       constructively         satisfied    if
    21   notice is properly provided and the alien changes address
    3
    1    without informing” the agency.          Maghradze v. Gonzales, 462
    
    2 F.3d 150
    , 154 (2d Cir. 2006).
    3        The    agency     may   consider,   among   other     evidence,   the
    4    following:
    5       (1) the respondent’s affidavit; (2) affidavits from
    6       family members or other individuals who are
    7       knowledgeable about the facts relevant to whether
    8       notice was received; (3) the respondent’s actions
    9       upon learning of the in absentia order, and whether
    10       due diligence was exercised in seeking to redress
    11       the situation; (4) any prior affirmative application
    12       for relief, indicating that the respondent had an
    13       incentive to appear; (5) any prior application for
    14       relief filed with the Immigration Court or any prima
    15       facie evidence in the record or the respondent’s
    16       motion   of  statutory   eligibility   for   relief,
    17       indicating that the respondent had an incentive to
    18       appear; (6) the respondent’s previous attendance at
    19       Immigration Court hearings, if applicable; and
    20       (7) any other circumstances or evidence indicating
    21       possible nonreceipt of notice.
    22
    23   Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665, 674 (B.I.A. 2008).
    24   The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Silva-
    25   Silva’s motion to rescind.
    26       First,      the     agency   reasonably     applied     the   slight
    27   presumption that Silva-Silva received notice of his May 2006
    28   hearing based on the following.          In July 2005, Silva-Silva
    29   was personally served with, and signed and fingerprinted, a
    30   Notice    to   Appear    (“NTA”),   which   placed   him    in    removal
    4
    1    proceedings, informed him of the time, date, and place of a
    2    hearing in Connecticut, and warned him that he could be
    3    ordered removed in absentia if he failed to provide a change
    4    of address.   He does not allege that he appeared at the time
    5    and place listed in the NTA.            Moreover, hearing notices
    6    mailed to that address in 2005 and 2006 were returned to the
    7    immigration court.       Although these return notices indicate
    8    that Silva-Silva did not actually receive the notices, he “is
    9    deemed to be in constructive receipt of properly-provided
    10   notice — and hence ineligible for rescission of his in
    11   absentia   order    of   removal   —   if   he   thwarted   delivery.”
    12   
    Maghradze, 462 F.3d at 153-54
    .         The agency did not abuse its
    13   discretion in concluding that Silva-Silva thwarted delivery:
    14   even crediting his allegation that the Connecticut address
    15   was wrong, he received the NTA and Form I-213 that contained
    16   the incorrect address, as well as a warning about changing
    17   the address and the consequences of failure to appear in the
    18   Connecticut immigration court, which was the court listed on
    19   his NTA.   Because the agency sent the hearing notices to his
    20   address of record, he is presumed to be in receipt of the
    21   notices.      See   Silva-Carvalho      
    Lopes, 517 F.3d at 160
    ;
    5
    1    
    Maghradze, 462 F.3d at 153-54
    .
    2        Nor did Silva-Silva rebut the presumption of receipt.
    3    His affidavit did not explain why he failed to challenge the
    4    erroneous address or the fact that the NTA listed the hearing
    5    location as Connecticut.      Therefore, his affidavit provided
    6    no basis for finding the presumption of receipt overcome.
    7    See 
    Maghradze, 462 F.3d at 154
    .
    8        The agency also reasonably found it troubling that Silva-
    9    Silva failed to inquire into the status of his removal
    10   proceedings or apply for relief in those proceedings for
    11   approximately 12 years.       See Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N.
    12   Dec. at 674 (holding that agency may consider movant’s due
    13   diligence in seeking to rectify in absentia order and his
    14   prima   facie   eligibility   for       relief   at   time   of   original
    15   hearing).   His affidavit did not describe any action he took
    16   in the almost 12 years that passed between service of the NTA
    17   and his motion to reopen and rescind.            Therefore, given that
    18   Silva-Silva failed to inquire about or apply for relief until
    19   his visa petition was approved in 2015, he did not demonstrate
    20   that he had an incentive to appear at his hearing and would
    21   have done so had he received notice in 2006.             See 
    id. 6 1
             Finally,    Silva-Silva’s     argument     that    his   failure    to
    2    appear stemmed from the lack of a written translation of the
    3    NTA    is   unavailing.     There    is    no   requirement      that    the
    4    Government provide a written translation of the NTA.                See 8
    5    U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1); Lopes v. Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 81
    , 84-85
    6    (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e reject [petitioner’s] claim that the
    7    notices to appear were defective because they did not advise
    8    him in his native Portuguese . . . . The relevant statute
    9    does not require that notice be provided in any particular
    10   language.”).      The record adequately demonstrates that Silva-
    11   Silva received the requisite oral notice in Portuguese of the
    12   time and place of his hearing and the consequences of failing
    13   to appear, and the NTA instructed him to appear before an IJ
    14   at    “Ribicoff   Federal   Building      450   Main    Street   Room    509
    15   Hartford CONNECTICUT US.”         Certified Administrative Record
    16   at 118.
    17         In sum, because Silva-Silva was personally served with
    18   an NTA that listed both his address and hearing location as
    19   Connecticut and warned of the consequences of failing to give
    20   notice of a change of his address, Silva-Silva has not
    21   overcome the presumption of receipt, and the agency did not
    7
    1   abuse its discretion in declining to rescind his in absentia
    2   removal order.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii); see also
    3   Silva-Carvalho 
    Lopes, 517 F.3d at 160
    ; Matter of M-R-A-, 24
    4   I. & N. Dec. at 674.
    5       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    6   DENIED.   All pending motions are DENIED and stays VACATED.
    7                               FOR THE COURT:
    8                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    9                               Clerk of Court
    8