Chiaramonte v. the Animal Med. Ctr. , 677 F. App'x 689 ( 2017 )

16-0478-cv
Chiaramonte v. The Animal Med. Ctr., et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@).
A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 26th day of January, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT:
PETER W. HALL,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
DEIRDRE CHIARAMONTE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 16-0478-cv
THE ANIMAL MEDICAL CENTER,
KATHRYN COYNE,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: ANNE CLARK, (Anne C. Vladeck and Ming-Qi
Chu, on the brief), Vladeck, Raskin & Clark,
P.C., New York, NY.
For Defendants-Appellees: LOUIS P. DILORENZO, (Michael P. Collins, on
the brief), Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC,
New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Failla, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Deirdre Chiaramonte appeals the decision of the district court granting
summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees the Animal Medical Center and its Chief
Executive Officer Kathryn Coyne [hereinafter AMC], dismissing Chiaramonte’s claims under the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) [hereinafter the EPA], and New York Labor Law, N.Y. Lab.
Law § 194 [hereinafter the NYLL],1 as well as her pendent state-law claims. Chiaramonte asserts on
appeal that the district court erred in concluding that she had not made out a prima facie case for
discrimination under the EPA because she had failed to demonstrate that she performed work
substantially equal to that of her better-paid colleagues. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg.
Co. Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment “only where,
construing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and drawing all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor, ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (omission in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the
1 “An equal pay claim under New York Labor Law § 194 is analyzed under the same standards applicable to the federal
Equal Pay Act.” Talwar v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 610 F. App’x 28, 29 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
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mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 248 (1986) (internal quotation
marks, citations, and alterations omitted); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”).
“[T]o prove a violation of the EPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the employer pays
different wages to employees of the opposite sex; (2) the employees perform equal work on jobs
requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and (3) the jobs are performed under similar working
conditions.” E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 254–55 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). Critical to an EPA claim is the equal work
inquiry, which requires evidence “that the jobs compared are ‘substantially equal.’” Id. at 255.
“Substantially equal” does not mean “identical.” Id.
“To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must establish that the jobs compared entail common duties
or content, and do not simply overlap in titles or classifications.” Id. (emphasis added). “[A] successful EPA
claim depends on the comparison of actual job content; broad generalizations drawn from job titles,
classifications, or divisions, and conclusory assertions of sex discrimination, cannot suffice.” Id. at
256; see also Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1310 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the central concern
of an EPA claim is “job content and not job title or description”), abrogated on other grounds by
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Because Chiaramonte has not demonstrated that
her claims amount to more than mere generalizations drawn from job titles and divisions, the district
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of AMC.
Chiaramonte contends that she has sufficiently established that her better-paid male
colleagues perform substantially equal work because they are all department heads with similar
credentials and significant responsibilities. She also claims that the district court erred in concluding
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that veterinarians in different specializations were improper comparators. Despite the fact that her
position as the Director of the President’s Council and Rehabilitation Center shared some common
characteristics, such as administrative responsibilities, with the positions of her male co-workers,
Chiaramonte overlooks the material differences in the congruity of job content.
Chiraramonte’s responsibilities as the Director of the President’s Council entailed primarily
public-relations-type duties as well as primary care. She performed basic treatments—parallel to
those performed by a general practitioner—and would refer patients to specialists if necessary.
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of Chiaramonte’s work at the Rehab Center could be
performed by technicians and aides. By contrast, Chiaramonte’s better-paid male colleagues
practiced in specialized areas of veterinarian medicine and performed complex procedures. Unlike
the alleged comparators, Chiaramonte was not responsible for supervising interns or other
veterinarians, and she contributed little if any scholarly research. Moreover, Chiaramonte carried a
low patient load, seeing only one to three patients a day. Although she did perform some
rehabilitation treatments at the Rehabilitation Center, she could go months without treating patients.
Some of her better-paid male colleagues, on the other hand, treated up to 15 patients a day.
As aptly noted by the district court, Chiaramonte’s efforts to draw comparisons between her
positions and those of her five co-workers “miss the mark because they essentially require the
[c]ourt to embrace the principle that the work of all veterinarians is equivalent, thereby ignoring
distinctions among the different specialties in veterinarian medicine.” S. App’x at 28. That basis for
demonstrating equal work has been expressly foreclosed by this Court. See Port Auth., 768 F.3d at
255. The focus of the equal work inquiry is “on the congruity and equality of actual job content
between the plaintiff and comparator.” Id. The fact that Chiaramonte and the alleged comparators
are department heads whose positions share some common responsibilities is insufficient to
demonstrate substantially equal work in light of the drastic differences in job content—that is, the
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differences in specialties, patient loads, supervision, teaching, and research contributions. See, e.g.,
Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1452 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing judgment in favor of plaintiff
asserting an EPA claim because—although she and her better-paid male co-worker were both
college professors—the plaintiff “never introduced evidence establishing that she and [her co-
worker] performed equivalent work”), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); see also Byrne v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc., 339 F. App’x 13, 16 (2d Cir. 2009)
(summary order) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant, notwithstanding that plaintiff
and higher-paid male co-workers had same job title, because “[f]or purposes of an equal pay claim . .
. a finding of substantial equality must be based on actual job content”). Other than the broad
generalizations drawn from the fact that the alleged comparators are department heads and
veterinarians, their work content is simply not equivalent to that of Chiaramonte.2
Chiaramonte contends that the district court erred in failing to consider “across-the-board
discriminatory pay” among veterinarians at AMC. Appellant’s Br. at 56; Reply at 23. Whether other
female veterinarians are paid less than male veterinarians, without more, cannot suffice to establish
that, because of sex alone, Chiaramonte was indeed paid less than males who performed
substantially equal work. Relying on Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2001),
Chiaramonte asserts that this Court may consider evidence of “company-wide” pay discrimination if
she has identified a male comparator. Appellant’s Br. at 57. Lavin-McEleney does not stand for such
a general principle. There, we held “that statistical evidence of a gender-based salary disparity
among comparable professors properly contributed to plaintiff’s case in conjunction with her identification
of a specific male comparator.” Lavin-McEleney, 239 F.3d at 481 (emphasis added). In particular, we
2 Because the district court properly granted summary judgment, dismissing Chiaramonte’s federal claims, it likewise
appropriately declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Chiaramonte’s remaining state-law claims. In re Merrill
Lynch Ltd. P’ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen the federal claims are dismissed the ‘state claims should
be dismissed as well.’” (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))).
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concluded that, after identifying a specific male comparator, it was proper for the plaintiff to
introduce a statistical composite of male faculty members, based on an expert witness’s regression
analysis. Id. at 481–82. In calculating the composite, the expert used “the entire Marist faculty to
establish a sufficiently large sample size, extrapolating from professors who did not compare to
plaintiff across all five variables to predict what a male professor who would have so compared
typically would have been paid.” Id.
Here, in stark contrast, not only has Chiaramonte failed to identify a male veterinarian that
performs substantially equal work, but the “statistics” she seeks to offer are “basically a roll call of
[veterinarians] and salaries, with no effort made to explain what each [veterinarian] did.” S. App’x at
3 n.1. The Lavin-McEleney Court did not suggest that an EPA plaintiff could make out a prima facie
case of discrimination by virtue of generic evidence of pay disparities between males and females in
a given company. The district court, therefore, properly declined to consider Chiaramonte’s
proposed “statistical” evidence of pay discrimination at AMC.
Finally, Chiaramonte argues that the district court improperly relied on Dr. Goldstein’s
affidavit in determining what constituted “substantially equal” work because Dr. Goldstein is an
“interested witness” that the “jury is not required to believe.” Reply at 27–28; see Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000). This may be true to the extent that it is the function
of the jury to weigh evidence, make credibility determinations, and draw factual inferences. See In re
Dana Corp., 574 F.3d 129, 152 (2d Cir. 2009). That an “interested witness” has testified regarding a
certain issue, however, does not in and of itself raise a genuine issue of material fact. Cf. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248 (“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)).
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Because Dr. Goldstein’s testimony on which the district court relied is uncontradicted and
unimpeached, the court properly relied on it in granting AMC’s motion.
We have considered all of Chiaramonte’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to
be without merit. Accordingly, and for all the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision
granting AMC’s summary judgment motion is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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