Meng v. Holder , 598 F. App'x 37 ( 2015 )


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  •          13-457
    Meng v. Holder
    BIA
    Videla, IJ
    A087 790 819
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 26th day of February, two thousand fifteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                DENNIS JACOBS,
    8                DENNY CHIN,
    9                RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _____________________________________
    12
    13       QINGQIANG MENG,
    14                Petitioner,
    15
    16                        v.                                    13-457
    17                                                              NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20                Respondent.
    21       _____________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONERS:              David A. Bredin, Law Office of David
    24                                     A. Bredin, New York, NY.
    25
    26       FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
    27                                     General; Carl McIntyre, Assistant
    28                                     Director; Brooke M. Maurer, Trial
    29                                     Attorney, Office of Immigration
    30                                     Litigation, United States Department
    31                                     of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is DENIED.
    5       Qingqiang Meng, a native and citizen of the People’s
    6   Republic of China, seeks review of a January 15, 2013,
    7   decision of the BIA affirming the July 13, 2011, decision of
    8   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Gabriel C. Videla, which denied
    9   Qingqiang Meng’s application for asylum, withholding of
    10   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    11   (“CAT”).     In re Qingqiang Meng, No. A087 790 819 (B.I.A.
    12   Jan. 15, 2013), aff’g No. A087 790 819 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
    13   July 13, 2011).    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    14   underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    15       Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
    16   IJ’s decision, including the portions not explicitly
    17   discussed by the BIA.     See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432
    
    18 F.3d 391
    , 394 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).     The applicable
    19   standards of review are well established.     See 8 U.S.C.
    20   § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513
    21   (2d Cir. 2009).
    22
    23
    2
    1   I. Adverse Credibility Determination
    2       For asylum applications such as Meng’s, governed by the
    3   REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the
    4   totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on
    5   an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,”
    6   the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his
    7   statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart
    8   of the applicant’s claim,” so long as they reasonably
    9   support an inference that the applicant is not credible.   8
    10   U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
    
    11 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).   We “defer . . .
    12   to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
    13   totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
    14   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
    15   credibility ruling.”   Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .
    16       The agency erred when it found that Meng omitted an
    17   important part of his claim from his asylum application.
    18   However, because the agency’s conclusion that aspects of
    19   Meng’s claim were implausible is tethered to record
    20   evidence, and the agency found other inconsistencies in
    21   Meng’s testimony which are supported by the record,
    22   substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility
    3
    1   determination.     Accordingly, remand would be futile.    See
    2   Diallo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    548 F.3d 232
    , 235 & n.3 (2d
    3   Cir. 2008).
    4       The IJ found, reasonably, that aspects of Meng’s
    5   testimony were implausible.     Specifically, the IJ found
    6   implausible Meng’s testimony that although he had been
    7   living in hiding since 2006, in 2008 he went to the Public
    8   Security Office and gave officials there his name and
    9   address to renew his passport.      Furthermore, given Meng’s
    10   stated fear of sterilization, the IJ found implausible that
    11   he was able to travel as part of a tourist group to Malaysia
    12   and Hong Kong, and that he did not attempt to remain in
    13   Malaysia and not return to China.      The IJ also found Meng’s
    14   explanations for why he was unable to stay in Malaysia
    15   unconvincing – Meng first testified that he would have
    16   trouble finding a job in Malaysia, and then that he did not
    17   know that Malaysia was a country he could immigrate to, and
    18   finally that the tour guide would not allow him to stay in
    19   Malaysia.     The IJ’s implausibility findings are supported by
    20   substantial evidence, because the reasons for his
    21   incredulity are self-evident.       See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey,
    22   
    509 F.3d 63
    , 67 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
    4
    1       The IJ found that Meng’s testimony often seemed to be
    2   non-responsive, evasive, and as if he was “not really
    3   testifying from actual experience.”    We generally afford
    4   particular deference to an IJ’s assessment of an applicant’s
    5   demeanor because the IJ’s ability to observe the witness
    6   places him in the best position to evaluate credibility.
    7   See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 104
    , 113 (2d
    8   Cir. 2005).   Moreover, we can be “more confident in our
    9   review of observations about an applicant’s demeanor where
    10   . . . they are supported by specific examples of
    11   inconsistent testimony.”     Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of
    12   Justice, 
    453 F.3d 99
    , 109 (2d Cir. 2006).     Here, the IJ
    13   found that Meng testified inconsistently in explaining why
    14   he did not provide corroborating evidence, and this finding
    15   is supported by the record.     Furthermore, Meng acknowledged
    16   that as a result of the lack of corroboration, the IJ had no
    17   evidence other than Meng’s own testimony that anyone sought
    18   to sterilize him.     Cf. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    ,
    19   273 (2d Cir. 2007).
    20       In light of Meng’s unresponsive, inconsistent, and
    21   implausible testimony, we conclude that the totality of the
    22   circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility
    23   determination..     See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
    5
    1   
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .     Even discounting the IJ’s erroneous
    2   omission finding, the record does not compel a contrary
    3   finding.     See Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .   Because the
    4   only evidence of a threat to Meng’s life or freedom depended
    5   upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination
    6   necessarily precludes success on this claim for asylum,
    7   withholding of removal, and CAT relief.     See Paul v.
    8   Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang
    9   v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 523 (2d Cir. 2005).
    10   II. Future Persecution
    11       Meng contends that he fears future persecution based on
    12   his Christian faith.     Because Meng did not challenge the
    13   IJ’s conclusion regarding a pattern or practice of
    14   persecution before the BIA, we decline to consider the
    15   issue.     Cf. Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    480 F.3d 16
      104, 119-20, 124 (2d Cir. 2007).
    17       As the agency concluded, Meng did not present any
    18   evidence that Chinese authorities were aware that he was
    19   Christian, or that he attended church in the United States.
    20   The IJ also noted that Meng testified that his wife had been
    21   a practicing Christian for years in China, and had not
    22   encountered any problems with the authorities on the basis
    23   of her religion.    Accordingly, the agency did not err in
    6
    1   concluding that Meng did not show a well-founded fear of
    2   future persecution.   See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 3
      135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Melgar de Torres v.
    4   Reno, 
    191 F.3d 307
    , 313 (2d Cir. 1999).    Because Meng was
    5   unable to establish the objective likelihood of harm based
    6   on his Christian faith needed to make out an asylum claim,
    7   he was necessarily unable to meet the higher standard
    8   required to succeed on a claim for withholding of removal or
    9   CAT relief.   See Lecaj v. Holder, 
    616 F.3d 111
    , 119-20 (2d
    10   Cir. 2010).
    11       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    12   DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    13   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    14   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    15   this petition is DENIED as moot.    Any pending request for
    16   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    17   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    18   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    19                                 FOR THE COURT:
    20                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    21
    22
    23
    7