C.C. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Mar 10 2015, 8:10 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Donald J. Frew                                            Gregory F. Zoeller
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Kenneth E. Biggins
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    C.C.,                                                    March 10, 2015
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Court of Appeals Cause No.
    02A03-1408-JV-279
    v.                                               Appeal from the Allen Superior
    Court.
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Daniel G. Heath,
    Judge.
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    The Honorable Daniel G. Pappas,
    Magistrate.
    Cause No. 02D07-1303-JD-433
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 02A03-1408-JV-279 | March 10, 2015     Page 1 of 6
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Respondent, C.C., appeals his delinquency adjudication for battery,
    which would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, Ind. Code §
    35-42-2-1 (2013).
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUE
    [3]   C.C. raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the State
    presented sufficient evidence to establish his adjudication of delinquency
    beyond a reasonable doubt.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   On March 7, 2013, D.B. was riding home from middle school on the school
    bus. While on the bus, D.B. and C.C. got into an argument about the jacket
    D.B. was wearing. At the drop-off location, D.B., C.C., and other children
    exited the school bus and D.B. started walking home with a friend. Suddenly,
    D.B. heard a noise and felt something hit him in the back. He quickly turned
    around and noticed C.C. “trying to [] tuck the gun back away and run through
    some houses.” (Transcript p. 15). The gun was “probably a little pistol,” five
    or six inches long, “all black and probably had a little bit of silver on the
    bottom.” (Tr. pp. 15, 16). D.B. incurred an injury on his back, which hurt and
    bled.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 02A03-1408-JV-279 | March 10, 2015   Page 2 of 6
    [5]   On May 1, 2013, the State filed a petition to adjudge delinquency against C.C.
    for battery, which would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
    On May 19, 2014, the juvenile court conducted a fact finding hearing, at the
    close of which the juvenile court adjudicated C.C. to be a delinquent child. On
    July 10, 2014, the court held a dispositional hearing, placing C.C. “under the
    operational supervision of the [] Probation Department[.]” (Appellant’s App.
    p. 21).
    [6]   C.C. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    [7]   C.C. contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a
    reasonable doubt to sustain his adjudication for battery which, if committed by
    an adult, would be a Class A misdemeanor. Generally, in addressing a claim of
    insufficient evidence, an appellate court must consider only the probative
    evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without weighing
    evidence or assessing witness credibility, and determine therefrom whether a
    reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Glenn v. State, 
    884 N.E.2d 347
    , 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008),
    trans. denied.
    [8]   While C.C. does not contest the statutory elements of the true finding of
    battery, C.C. asserts that his conviction should be set aside because D.B.’s
    testimony was incredibly dubious and inherently improbable. Within the
    narrow confines of the incredible dubiosity rule, a court may impinge upon a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 02A03-1408-JV-279 | March 10, 2015   Page 3 of 6
    jury’s prerogative to judge the credibility of a witness. White v. State, 
    706 N.E.2d 1078
    , 1079 (Ind. 1999). If a sole witness presents inherently improbable
    testimony and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence, a defendant’s
    conviction may be reversed. 
    Id. This is
    appropriate only where the court has
    confronted inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly
    uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity. 
    Id. Application of
    this rule is
    rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly
    dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.
    Stephenson v. State, 
    742 N.E.2d 463
    , 498 (Ind. 2001).
    [9]   During the hearing, D.B. described the gun used by C.C. as a little handgun,
    “all black” with “a little bit of silver on the bottom.” (Tr. p. 16). This
    statement appeared to contradict statements given to three police officers on the
    day of the incident. Officer Cameron Norris with the City of Fort Wayne
    Police Department testified that D.B. told him that he never saw the gun but
    still “thought this weapon sounded like it had a silencer on it.” (Tr. p. 40).
    Officer Mark Bell informed the juvenile court that D.B. never told him a gun
    was involved. And lastly, Officer Stephen Ealing reported that D.B. “believed
    that he was shot with a long gun.” (Tr. p. 53). The officer added that the
    situation and D.B.’s statements were “confusing me.” (Tr. p. 57). Although
    D.B.’s pre-trial statements appear to contradict his trial testimony, these
    discrepancies do not make his testimony incredibly dubious. We have
    previously held that the rule only applies when a witness contradicts himself in
    a single statement or while testifying; the rule finds no application with respect
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 02A03-1408-JV-279 | March 10, 2015   Page 4 of 6
    to conflicts between multiple statements. See, e.g., Buckner v. State, 
    857 N.E.2d 1011
    , 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“The incredible dubiosity rule applies to
    conflicts in trial testimony rather than conflicts that exist between trial
    testimony and statements made to the police before trial.”). Reviewing D.B.’s
    trial testimony, we cannot find any inherent contradictions that would propel
    his testimony to the realm of incredibly dubious.
    [10]   Moreover, it is well established that the testimony of a single eye-witness is
    sufficient to sustain a conviction. Brasher v. State, 
    746 N.E.2d 71
    , 72 (Ind.
    2001). D.B. testified that he was shot by C.C. while walking home. He turned
    around and saw C.C. put the gun away and flee.
    [11]   To be sure, while D.B.’s statements evolved over time, the juvenile court was
    made aware of these inaccuracies through either direct or cross examination
    and had the opportunity to determine the veracity of each witness. Based on
    the facts before us, there is no basis to apply the incredible dubiosity rule. See
    Cowan v. State, 
    783 N.E.2d 1270
    , 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (A defendant
    cannot appeal to this rule by merely showing some inconsistency or irregularity
    in a witness’s testimony.), trans. denied.
    CONCLUSION
    [12]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
    beyond a reasonable doubt to support a true finding of delinquency.
    [13]   Affirmed.
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    [14]   Vaidik, C.J. and Baker, J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 02A03-1408-JV-279 | March 10, 2015   Page 6 of 6