Ryan Harris v. Sheriff, Jefferson County Florida , 460 F. App'x 896 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-12605 ; 11-14750 MARCH 14, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 4:08-cv-00569-RH-WCS
RYAN HARRIS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF, JEFFERSON COUNTY FLORIDA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(March 14, 2012)
Before WILSON, PRYOR, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Ryan Harris, but upon the
defendant’s motion, the district court found the great weight of the evidence was
contrary to the verdict. Accordingly, the district court ordered a new trial. We
reverse and remand because sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that
the Sheriff’s negligence caused Harris’s injuries.
I.
In December 2004, Harris was an inmate at the Jefferson County Jail
awaiting trial for criminal charges. On December 21, 2004, he attempted suicide
by overdosing on antidepressant drugs that he obtained from another inmate.
Officials at the jail did not promptly arrange medical treatment, and Harris’s
arrival at the hospital was delayed by one or two hours. He survived but did not
fully recover. Harris’s physical injuries include neurological damage, nerve
damage to his legs, and bilateral foot drop. One doctor testified that Harris cannot
walk.
Harris sued the Sheriff who operated the jail. He alleged the Sheriff (1)
negligently failed to prevent him from attempting suicide, (2) negligently failed to
arrange prompt medical treatment after the suicide attempt, and (3) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, violated his constitutional rights. A jury returned a verdict for
Harris on each claim. It found damages of one dollar on the failure-to-prevent-
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suicide claim and attributed ten percent of the fault to the Sheriff. The jury found
damages of $750,000 on the claims concerning delayed medical treatment, and it
attributed to the Sheriff ninety percent of the fault.
After the trial the Sheriff moved for judgment as a matter of law and, in the
alternative, for a new trial. The district court denied the motion for judgment as a
matter of law but granted the request for a new trial. The court noted what it
considered to be an inconsistency in the jury verdict: the damages for the
attempted suicide were nominal, but the damages caused by the negligent delay
were substantial. The district court reasoned that the verdict could not stand
because Harris “presented no evidence that [his] substantial damages could have
been avoided, even if jail officials had acted as promptly as possible . . . .”
Harris’s primary evidence on causation was the testimony of one of his
treating physicians, Dr. Hultstrand. The doctor testified that if Harris had arrived
at the hospital an hour or two earlier, steps could have been taken that would have
prevented injury. Antiseizure medication could have been administered to prevent
prolonged seizures. Additionally, Harris’s condition would have benefitted from
earlier intubation and administration of a bicarbonate.
The district court discounted the testimony because when Harris arrived at
the hospital the physicians did not know he had overdosed on drugs, and the court
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reasoned that an earlier arrival would not necessarily have meant earlier
implementation of procedures that would have helped Harris. After reviewing the
record, the district court concluded that medical staff did not promptly initiate the
procedures, and therefore, an earlier arrival at the hospital would have been futile.
Harris also provided evidence that his injuries might have been avoided if
the jail had notified the hospital that he had access to medications including
Desyrel, a tricyclic antidepressant. It was not until January 5, 2005—fourteen
days after Harris was admitted to the hospital—that jail officials informed Dr.
Hultstrand that Harris may have swallowed tricyclic antidepressants. Dr.
Hultstrand testified that if this information had been delivered the day Harris
arrived at the hospital, measures could have been taken to improve Harris’s
condition.
II.
“[W]hen the district court discards the verdict on the ground it is against the
great weight of the evidence,” our review is “extremely stringent.” Auto-Owners
Ins. Co. v. Se. Floating Docks, Inc., 571 F.3d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam). The heightened standard of review ensures that the district court does not
substitute its own credibility choices and inferences for the reasonable choices and
inferences made by the jury. Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Prods., Inc., 827
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F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The question is whether, in light
of the evidence presented, reasonable jurors could reach the same conclusion as
the jury did here. Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 679 n.1 (11th Cir.
1984). Because of the great deference we give to jury verdicts, we answer this
question in the affirmative.
The district court does not identify what evidence in the record supports its
independent conclusion that an earlier arrival would have been futile. The
defendant did not present its own expert to rebut Dr. Hultstrand’s conclusion that
preventive procedures would have been taken had Harris arrived at the hospital
earlier. And during the cross examination of Dr. Hultstrand, the defendant did not
elicit any testimony on the issues of whether the preventive procedures would
have actually been implemented.
Even assuming that the great weight of the evidence supports the district
court’s conclusion that the hospital would not have taken the preventive measures
until it discovered that Harris overdosed on drugs, evidence supports the theory
that jail officials did not promptly notify the hospital that Harris had access to
tricyclic antidepressants. Although we might not reach the conclusion, a
reasonable jury could conclude that the cause of Harris’s injuries was a delay in
alerting the hospital that Harris had access to tricyclic antidepressants.
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We REVERSE and REMAND so the district court can reinstate the jury
verdict returned in the first trial.
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