Marcus Jenkins v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                             COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-12-00395-CR
    MARCUS JENKINS                                                        APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                         STATE
    ----------
    FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    ----------
    Appellant Marcus D. Jenkins appeals the revocation of his felony deferred
    adjudication community supervision, his conviction for the offense of continuous
    violence against the family, and his sentence of five years’ confinement. We
    affirm.
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    On June 14, 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to the underlying offense of
    assault bodily injury (continuous violence against the family). See Tex. Pen.
    Code Ann. § 25.11 (West 2011). Under the terms of his plea deal, Appellant
    received two years’ deferred adjudication community supervision. On October
    28, 2011, the State filed its petition to proceed to adjudication.         In its first
    amended petition, filed on August 10, 2012, the State alleged that Appellant
    failed to report for the months of July to December 2011 and January to July
    2012; failed to pay the supervision fee for July to December 2011 and January to
    July 2012; failed to pay the Crime Stoppers fee within thirty days from the date of
    his community supervision; failed to report directly to the District Clerk’s office to
    make payment arrangements; and, on August 5, 2012, gave a false or fictitious
    name to a peace officer who had lawfully arrested or detained him. Appellant
    pleaded true to violating the terms and conditions of his deferred adjudication
    community supervision.
    At the hearing, Appellant testified that he did not make payment
    arrangements because he forgot, and he never returned to set up a payment
    plan because he was scared. Appellant testified that he has six children and
    three more on the way and is unemployed. He denied having a drug problem,
    but occasionally smoked marijuana “to calm [himself] down” because he has an
    “anger problem.” Appellant stated that he lived with his mother but had not lived
    there long because he would get in trouble for “not wanting to follow the rules
    and do what [he] wanted to do.”
    2
    Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
    withdraw as counsel, accompanied by a brief in support of that motion. In the
    brief, counsel states that in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous and
    without merit. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    (1967), by presenting a professional
    evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for
    relief. Appellant had the opportunity to file a pro se brief but did not do so. The
    State has not filed a brief.
    Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
    the grounds that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
    have a supervisory obligation to undertake an examination of the proceedings.
    See Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
    State, 
    904 S.W.2d 920
    , 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only
    after our independent review is complete may we grant counsel’s motion to
    withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 82–83, 
    109 S. Ct. 346
    , 351 (1988).
    We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with
    appellate counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find
    nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v.
    State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State,
    
    206 S.W.3d 684
    , 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).             Accordingly, we grant
    counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R.
    App. P. 43.2(a).
    3
    LEE GABRIEL
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: August 1, 2013
    4