Singh v. Garland ( 2022 )

20-1754
Singh v. Garland
BIA
Thompson, IJ
A205 935 828
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 22nd day of November, two thousand twenty-
two.
PRESENT:
GERARD E. LYNCH,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
STEVEN J. MENASHI,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
LOVEJEET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 20-1754
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Jackson
Heights, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Linda S.
Wernery, Assistant Director; Susan
Bennett Green, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Lovejeet Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a May 18, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming
a June 5, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Lovejeet Singh, No. A205 935 828 (B.I.A. May
18, 2020), aff’g No. A205 935 828 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June
5, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history.
We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the
BIA, and address only the grounds that the BIA relied on.
See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522
(2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he
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administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.”); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d
Cir. 2009) (reviewing factual findings for substantial
evidence and questions of law and application of law to facts
de novo).
Singh alleged past persecution by members of the Congress
Party on account of his support for the Shiromani Akali Dal
Mann Party (“Mann Party”) and his Sikh faith. Because the
BIA assumed credibility and past persecution, Singh was
entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). However, that
presumption may be rebutted where a preponderance of the
evidence demonstrates that circumstances have fundamentally
changed. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii). The changed
circumstances must “obviate the risk to life or freedom
related to the original claim.” Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d
141, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2010). When assessing whether there has
been such a change in the country of removal, the IJ should
undertake an individualized analysis and consider the most
recent U.S. State Department report and other evidence
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submitted by the applicant. See Passi v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d
98, 101–03 (2d Cir. 2008) (remanding based on “cursory
treatment” of issue where agency ignored evidence favorable
to applicant).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion
that conditions have changed such that Singh no longer has a
well-founded fear of persecution from the Congress Party.
The 2017 State Department Report for India establishes that
the Congress Party is no longer in power nationally and it
does not reflect ongoing violence between supporters of the
Congress Party and Singh’s party. The country conditions
evidence otherwise discusses the treatment of opposition
political parties in Punjab, which is not Singh’s home state,
predates the 2014 election, or fails to describe ongoing
violence. The evidence indicates there are over 16 million
Sikhs living in India and as of 2013, the Sikh population
faced “little discrimination” across India. On this record,
the agency did not err in finding that Singh no longer had a
well-founded fear of future persecution from Congress Party
members. See Kone, 593 F.3d at 149 (presumption of well-
founded fear is rebutted where preponderance of the evidence
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shows “changed conditions obviate the risk to life or freedom
related to the original claim”). The agency did not err in
denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection
because all three claims were based on the same factual
predicate. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 115–16, 119–
20 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that where record does not
demonstrate chance of persecution required for asylum, it
“necessarily fails to demonstrate” the likelihood of harm for
withholding of removal and CAT relief). For the same reason,
Singh’s pattern or practice argument fails. He asserts that
he demonstrated a pattern or practice of persecution of
similarly situated individuals. However, as discussed above,
the more recent country conditions evidence does not reflect
persecution of Mann Party members and Sikhs by the Congress
Party. To the extent he asserts a pattern or practice of
persecution from other groups, as the Government noted, he
did not exhaust that claim before the agency. See Lin Zhong
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 123 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that “usually . . . issues not raised to the BIA
will not be examined by the reviewing court”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
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DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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