Orange County v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development and Daniel Harris ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before                                      Aug 26 2014, 9:51 am
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                            ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
    JAMES C. TUCKER                                     GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    MARILYN TUCKER FULLEN                               Attorney General of Indiana
    Tucker and Tucker, P.C.
    Paoli, Indiana                                      KYLE HUNTER
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    ORANGE COUNTY,                                      )
    )
    Appellant-Petitioner,                        )
    )
    vs.                                  )      No. 93A02-1403-EX-144
    )
    REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA                         )
    DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE                             )
    DEVELOPMENT and DANIEL HARRIS,                      )
    )
    Appellees-Respondents.                       )
    APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE
    INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
    Case No. 14-R-00193
    August 26, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY, Judge
    Orange County appeals a determination by the Review Board of the Department of
    Workforce Development (the Department) that the County’s appeal to the Review Board was
    not timely filed. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Daniel Harris worked for Orange County. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for
    the Department determined Harris was eligible for unemployment benefits because he was
    discharged from his employment without just cause. The decision was mailed on October 31,
    2013, and Orange County did not appeal the decision until January 24, 2014.
    The Review Board heard evidence the ALJ’s decision was mailed to the correct
    address and that Orange County had in the past received mailings from the Department at
    that address. A witness for the County testified Harris’ decision was received January 13,
    2014. Mail from the Department is sent to the county auditor, and that office has been at its
    current address for several years. All mail from the Department is given to the auditor. The
    auditor testified the deputy auditor handed her the document on January 13. But the auditor
    also testified that “when I received this notice,” (Tr. at 7), “[I] asked our attorney if there had
    been a decision and I wanted a copy of it.” (Id.) She also called and left a message with the
    Department asking for a copy of the decision, but her call was not returned. The deputy
    auditor testified the envelope in which the decision was mailed did not appear to be damaged
    in any way. She did not recall whether she looked at the postmark.
    The Review Board determined the County had “failed to provide credible or
    persuasive evidence to establish that the Administrative Law Judge’s decision was delayed
    2
    by more than two months,” (App. at 25), so the County had not shown good cause for its
    untimely appeal. It dismissed the appeal.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    Orange County challenges a decision of the Review Board. The Review Board
    reviews ALJ decisions for errors of fact, law, or procedure based on the record before the
    ALJ. 
    Ind. Code § 22-4-17-5
    (e). The Review Board may “affirm, modify, set aside, remand,
    or reverse the findings, conclusions, or orders of an administrative law judge.” 
    Id.
     Under
    Indiana’s Unemployment Compensation Act (the Act), “[a]ny decision of the review board
    shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” 
    Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12
    (a).
    Review Board decisions may, however, be challenged as contrary to law, in which case we
    are limited to a two-part inquiry into: (1) the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the
    decision; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts. 
    Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12
    (f). Under this standard, we review (1) determinations of specific or “basic”
    underlying facts, (2) conclusions or inferences from those facts, sometimes called “ultimate
    facts,” and (3) conclusions thereon. Saini v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
    5 N.E.3d 768
    , 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
    The Review Board’s findings of basic fact are subject to a “substantial evidence”
    standard of review. 
    Id.
     We do not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses,
    and we consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board’s findings. 
    Id.
     The
    Review Board’s conclusions as to ultimate facts involve an inference or deduction based on
    the findings of basic fact. 
    Id.
     As such, they are typically reviewed to ensure that the Review
    3
    Board’s inference is reasonable in light of its findings. 
    Id.
     We are not bound by the Review
    Board’s conclusions of law, though an interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency
    charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight unless the
    interpretation is inconsistent with the statute itself. 
    Id.
    The parties to an ALJ’s eligibility determination “shall be duly notified of the decision
    . . . and the reasons therefor, which shall be deemed to be the final decision of the review
    board, unless within fifteen (15) days after the date of notification or mailing of such
    decision, an appeal is taken by the commissioner or by any party adversely affected by such
    decision to the review board.” 
    Ind. Code § 22-4-17-3
    . Where, as here, an administrative
    agency sends notice through the regular course of mail, a rebuttable presumption arises that
    such notice is received. Value World Inc. of Ind. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce
    Dev., 
    927 N.E.2d 945
    , 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Evidence of deposit in a post office,
    properly addressed and stamped, is prima facie proof a document was received by the person
    to whom it was addressed. 
    Id.
     We rely on the discretion of the factfinder to weigh evidence,
    and will not reverse absent evidence leading solely to the opposite conclusion. 
    Id. at 949
    .
    The presumption of receipt is not conclusive, but neither is the statement by an
    interested party of non-receipt. 
    Id.
     It is then for the trier of fact to determine from all the
    evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom what occurred. 
    Id.
     The Review
    Board, sitting as trier of fact, concluded after hearing evidence that the presumption was not
    overcome. We cannot say that evidence leads solely to a conclusion opposite that the Review
    Board reached.
    4
    Here, the Review Board treated the matter as a question of fact and of witness
    credibility. It considered the manner in which Orange County processed mail, noted the
    County had consistently received mail without incident, and then found the County’s
    evidence was not “credible or persuasive.” (App. at 25.) Considering those facts in light of
    the presumption Orange County received the notice, and the absence of evidence to
    demonstrate a reason the notice might not have successfully made it to Orange County in a
    timely manner,1 we conclude the Review Board’s decision was not error. We must decline
    Orange County’s invitation to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we accordingly
    affirm.
    Affirmed.
    VAIDIK, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
    1
    Orange County points to Scott v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
    725 N.E.2d 993
    , 996 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2000), and Forni v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
    900 N.E.2d 71
    , 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),
    trans. denied, for the premise that if notice is not actually received in time, further proceedings must be
    permitted. Those decisions do not require a contrary result in the case before us, as in both the trier of fact
    determined the presumption of receipt had been rebutted. See Scott, 
    725 N.E.2d at 996
     (“[b]ecause both
    parties agree that Scott did not receive actual notice of the July 6, 1999 hearing until July 11, 1999, . . . the
    presumption of receipt is rebutted”); Forni, 
    900 N.E.2d at 73
     (“the Board does not dispute that Forni did not
    receive actual notice prior to the hearing; therefore, the presumption has been rebutted”). Here, the
    presumption was not rebutted.
    5