Jim Edsall v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, Aug 18 2014, 9:28 am
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JIM A. EDSALL GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MICHAEL GENE WORDEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JIM EDSALL, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 57A05-1402-PC-00051
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE NOBLE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable G. David Laur, Judge
Cause No. 57C01-1307-PC-002
August 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
Jim Edsall, pro se, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in (1) holding
that he did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel and post-conviction counsel
and (2) summarily denying his other post-conviction claims and his motion to correct
error.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
On June 9, 2006, the State charged Edsall with seven counts of Class A felony
delivery of methamphetamine and two counts of Class A felony conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine. Attorney Hugh Taylor (“Taylor”) filed his appearance
on Edsall’s behalf on August 21, 2006. Taylor withdrew his appearance approximately
one year later, on August 29, 2007. On September 14, 2007, attorney James Stevens
(“Stevens”) entered his appearance on Edsall’s behalf.
The following facts of this case were set forth in our decision in Edsall’s direct
appeal:
On January 4, 2008, the parties appeared for a guilty plea hearing and filed
a plea agreement (“Plea Agreement”), in which Edsall agreed to plead
guilty to five counts of Class A felony delivery of methamphetamine and
one count of Class A felony conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine,
and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. With regard to
sentencing, the Plea Agreement provided:
“Upon the Defendant’s plea of guilty to Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9 he shall
receive a concurrent maximum sentence of thirty (30) years in IDOC and
the parties will argue all terms at sentencing.”
2
The Plea Agreement stated that the sentence imposed would be served
consecutive to Edsall’s sentence from a prior Michigan conviction. The
trial court advised Edsall of his rights, including the range of penalties.
Specifically, the trial court told Edsall that the term of imprisonment for a
Class A felony ranges from twenty to fifty years with the advisory term
being thirty years. The trial court also told Edsall that for each count to
which he was pleading guilty there was a potential fine from zero to ten
thousand dollars. There was no mention of restitution at the guilty plea
hearing. Following examination of Edsall under oath to establish a factual
basis, the trial court accepted the Plea Agreement, ordered the preparation
of a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), and set the matter for a
sentencing hearing.
In January 2008, the probation department filed Edsall’s PSI with the trial
court. The victim’s impact statement portion of the PSI stated, “To date, a
restitution request has not been received from I.M.A.G.E. Drug Task Force;
they plan to submit a restitution amount to the prosecutor’s office.” Tr. at
64. Thereafter, at the February 8, 2008 sentencing hearing, the State
presented Exhibit A, entitled Edsall Investigation Costs, a copy of which
had been provided earlier that morning to Edsall’s counsel. The trial court
asked Edsall’s attorney if there was “any argument or objection” to the total
restitution amount, which was $19,581.40, and Edsall’s counsel responded,
“at this point I certainly won’t stipulate to the amount,” but did not pose
any objection to the exhibit or the matter of restitution being sought. Tr. at
81.
Thereafter, the State presented the testimony of Steuben County Sheriff’s
Deputy Tim Troyer (“Deputy Troyer”), who testified about the undercover
operation in which he and at least four other law enforcement officers
infiltrated, over a fifty-seven-day period, Edsall’s manufacturing operation.
Deputy Troyer testified that Edsall’s operation was sophisticated and the
largest he has ever seen in his twenty-one years of law enforcement
experience. As part of the undercover operation, Deputy Troyer, known to
Edsall as “Hawk,” agreed to provide pseudoephedrine pills, or “red things,”
to Edsall, who would then give a portion of the finished product back to
Hawk. Tr. at 89, 91, 94. According to testimony, Deputy Troyer provided
a total of 16,308 red pills, in 96–count boxes, to Edsall during the
investigation. Walgreens Pharmacy donated 5,520 outdated pills, and
undercover officers purchased 10,788 pills at pharmacies. Exhibit A
included the cost incurred to purchase the pills, and the expenses and wages
of those involved. Exhibit A was admitted without objection.
3
Edsall v. State, 983 N.E.2d 200, 203-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied
(internal citations omitted).
The trial court sentenced Edsall to thirty years incarceration for each conviction, to
be served concurrently. The trial court also ordered Edsall to pay $19,581.40 in
restitution to the local drug task force for expenses incurred as a result of its investigation.
Edsall filed a direct appeal of his sentence and the trial court’s restitution order. On
February 18, 2013, this court affirmed Edsall’s sentence but reversed the order of
restitution, concluding that the State was not a “victim” or Edsall’s crimes within the
meaning of the restitution statute. See Edsall v. State, 983 N.E.2d 200 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013), reh’g denied.
Edsall filed his petition for post-conviction relief on July 5, 2013. In his petition,
Edsall claimed that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) his guilty
plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; (3) an inadequate factual
basis existed for Edsall’s guilty plea; (4) law enforcement officer statements that
provided the factual basis for the arrest warrant should not be considered credible; (5) a
law enforcement officer witness was not credible and that he committed perjury; (6) the
State’s claim that there were children present in the area during some of the
methamphetamine deals was false; (7) the prosecutor committed misconduct by refusing
to provide full discovery; (8) Edsall was sentenced differently than his co-defendants; and
(9) law enforcement officers and Walgreens Pharmacy committed various unlawful acts
during the course of the investigation.
4
On July 8, 2013, Edsall filed a request for the appointment of a special prosecutor,
arguing that the elected prosecutor had a conflict of interest and had committed criminal
acts. The post-conviction court denied his request.
On November 15, 2013, the State filed two motions for summary disposition of
Edsall’s claims. The first motion noted that Edsall’s sentence had already been affirmed
by this court. The second motion asserted that Edsall’s other claims, with the sole
exception of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, were waived when he failed
to raise them on direct appeal.
The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on November 21, 2013.
During the hearing, the post-conviction court granted the State’s motions for summary
disposition. The post-conviction court heard evidence only on Edsall’s claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Edsall was represented at the hearing by attorney
Diane Miller (“Miller”). After the court pointed out to Edsall the presence of a possible
conflict of interest, Edsall consented to Miller’s representation of him.1
Miller presented testimony from Taylor, Edsall’s trial counsel, who stated that he
had requested discovery from the State and that he believed that he had obtained full
disclosure. He also stated that he provided Edsall’s subsequent trial counsel, Stevens,
who was deceased at the time of the hearing, with all of the discovery materials. Taylor
testified that he had discussed the plea offer with Edsall and that he withdrew after Edsall
threatened to sue him for malpractice.
1
Miller had served as a judge pro tempore on August 21, 2006. However, she did not preside over any
hearing related to Edsall’s case.
5
On December 18, 2013, the post-conviction court denied Edsall’s petition for post-
conviction relief, concluding that he did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Edsall filed a motion to correct error on January 8, 2014, raising the same claims he
raised in his petition for post-conviction relief and alleging that he had received
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. The post-conviction court denied the
motion.
Edsall now appeals.
Standard of Review
When reviewing appeals from a negative judgment delivered by the post-
conviction court, this court will reverse the denial of post-conviction relief only if the
evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that
reached by the post-conviction court. Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ind.
2002). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are accepted unless clearly erroneous,
Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), but no deference is accorded conclusions of law. Davidson, 763
N.E.2d at 443-44. Accordingly, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility
of witnesses, and we will consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
flowing therefrom that support the post-conviction court’s decision. Id.
I. Motion for Special Prosecutor
Edsall first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a special
prosecutor. Specifically, he claims that the prosecutor, Steve Clouse (“Clouse”), had a
conflict of interest because, prior to being elected prosecutor, Clouse was “fired as the
family attorney without his commission in settling Edsall’s grandfather’s estate” and that
6
Clouse now has a vendetta against Edsall’s family. Appellant’s Br. at 14. Edsall
maintains that he was prejudiced by this conflict, as demonstrated by the fact that
“Edsall’s case is the only case on Record where prosecutor Clouse has tried to collect
Restitution for the wages of the Police,” that Clouse engaged in prosecutorial misconduct,
that Clouse threatened Edsall, and that “Clouse never provided Edsall with a complete
copy of the State’s pre-trial discovery.” Id. at 20.
To serve the ends of justice and preserve public confidence in the criminal justice
system, it sometimes becomes necessary for a trial court to appoint a special prosecutor.
Indiana Code section 33-39-10-2(b) provides that:
A circuit court or superior court judge:
(2) may appoint a special prosecutor if:
(A) a person files a verified petition requesting the
appointment of a special prosecutor; and
(B) the court, after:
(i) notice is given to the prosecuting attorney; and
(ii) an evidentiary hearing is conducted at which the
prosecuting attorney is given an opportunity to be
heard;
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment
is necessary to avoid an actual conflict of interest or there is
probable cause to believe that the prosecuting attorney has
committed a crime;
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine (1) whether
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and, if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of
the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she
would not otherwise have been subjected. Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind.
2002). The gravity of the peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the
7
misconduct on the jury’s decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.
Id.We find no basis to conclude that the circumstances of this case required the
appointment of a special prosecutor. The only evidence Edsall presented concerning
Clouse’s alleged grudge against Edsall and the threats Edsall claims Clouse made,
however, was Edsall’s own self-serving statements. The post-conviction court
determined that Edsall’s allegations of Clouse’s conflict of interest were not credible and
we will not judge for ourselves his credibility. See Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208(Ind. 1998) (noting that the post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of witnesses).
With regard to Edsall’s allegations that Clouse committed prosecutorial
misconduct by engaging in criminal acts and by failing to provide complete discovery,
we again note that Edsall failed to present any credible evidence that Clouse engaged in
criminal activity or misconduct. Edsall’s claim that Clouse failed to provide Edsall with
full discovery for his criminal case is similarly unsupported by the evidence.
Furthermore, attorney Taylor testified at the post-conviction hearing that he received full
discovery from the State and that he provided this material to Stevens after his
withdrawal. Because Edsall failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Clouse committed a crime or that the appointment of a special prosecutor was necessary
to avoid actual conflict, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in denying
Edsall’s request.
8
II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Edsall argues that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that Edsall did not
receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, in his appellant’s brief, Edsall
fails to present any cogent argument with respect to his claim in this regard. Therefore,
Edsall waives this issue on appeal. See Dickes v. Felger, 981 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012); Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 398 n. 3 (Ind. 1999) (holding that the
defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument).
Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in
finding that Edsall did not receive ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. As
far as we can discern, Edsall’s claim is that his trial counsel, both Taylor and Stevens,
were ineffective for failing to secure full discovery from the State and for coercing Edsall
into entering into a plea agreement by threatening him with a 450-year sentence.
In its order denying Edsall’s petition for relief, the post-conviction court stated:
[T]he undisputed evidence is that Mr. Taylor and Mr. Stevens each received
a complete packet of discovery. Mr. Taylor received his discovery packet
directly from the State of Indiana, and then forwarded a copy to Mr.
Stevens upon withdrawing from the case. Further it did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness when Mr. Taylor and Mr. Stevens
each advised Petitioner that he faced up to four hundred fifty (450) years in
prison without the benefit of a plea agreement, for the reason that Petition
was charged with nine class A felonies, each of which had a maximum
sentence of fifty (50 years) in prison. Petitioner’s exposure under the terms
of the plea agreement was only thirty (30) years. Whether or not Mr.
Stevens failed to provide an itemized bill to Petitioner did not affect the
outcome of the case, nor did the failure of Mr. Stevens to timely file an
appeal following the sentence. This Court also recognizes that, though it
was impossible to procure Mr. Stevens’s attendance at the hearing, there is
no reason to believe that Mr. Stevens would have corroborated the
allegations made by Petitioner.
9
Moreover, even if this Court were to find that Mr. Taylor or Mr. Stevens
provided ineffective assistance to Petitioner, there is no evidence to show
that the underlying criminal prosecution would have ended different[ly].
Appellant’s App. pp. 319-320.
The law regarding claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was
summarized in Timberlake v. State as follows:
A defendant claiming a violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel must establish the two components set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First,
the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and that the errors were so serious that they
resulted in a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. To establish prejudice, a defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.
Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics,
and we will accord those decisions deference. A strong presumption arises
that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. The Strickland Court
recognized that even the finest, most experienced criminal defense
attorneys may not agree on the ideal strategy or the most effective way to
represent a client. Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and
instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation
ineffective. The two prongs of the Strickland test are separate and
independent inquiries. Thus, [i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be
followed.
753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind.2001) (citations and quotations omitted).
There is no evidence supporting Edsall’s claim that his trial counsel failed to
secure full discovery from the State, other than his own self-serving statement.
10
Furthermore, as the post-conviction court noted, it did not fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness for Edsall’s trial counsel to accurately advise him that he
could receive up to 450 years in prison for the nine Class A felonies with which he was
charged if he failed to enter into a plea agreement. For all of these reasons, and waiver
notwithstanding, Edsall has not proven that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient
or that he was prejudiced.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel
In his motion to correct error, Edsall raised various claims related to the alleged
ineffectiveness of his post-conviction counsel, Diane Miller. He now argues that the
post-conviction court erred in determining that Miller’s representation of Edsall was not
ineffective. To support his contention that he received ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel, he argues that Miller “made no attorney/client visits to discuss the
case with Edsall prior to the November 21, 2013 evidentiary hearing” and that, due to a
stroke she had previously suffered, her speech was impaired and she failed to make
appropriate objections or present adequate evidence in Edsall’s favor. Appellant’s Br. at
31. He also points out that Miller had previously represented three of Edsall’s co-
defendants.
The right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is not guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana
Constitution. Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (Ind. 1989). A post-conviction
proceeding is not generally regarded as a criminal proceeding. Id. Thus, it is not
required that the constitutional standards applied to ineffective assistance of counsel
11
challenges be applied when judging the actions of post-conviction counsel at the
appellate level. Id. Rather, we apply the standard that “if counsel in fact appeared and
represented the petitioner in a procedurally fair setting which resulted in a judgment of
the court, it is not necessary to judge his performance by the rigorous standard set forth”
for purely criminal proceedings. Id.; see also Hill v. State, 960 N.E.2d 141, 147 (Ind.
2012) (reaffirming the Baum standard as the appropriate standard for evaluating post-
conviction counsel’s performance).
Contrary to Edsall’s argument, Miller’s representation of Edsall was not
ineffective. Miller presented Taylor as a witness and questioned him regarding Edsall’s
claim that the State failed to provide Edsall with its full discovery. She also questioned
him about Edsall’s plea agreement. She called Edsall as a witness and examined him
about his discovery-related allegations against the State and the voluntariness of his
guilty plea. She also called Edsall’s father as a witness and examined him on Stevens’s
representation of Edsall.2 Finally, Miller filed what amounted to proposed findings and
conclusions with the post-conviction court. Under these facts and circumstances, we
conclude that Miller represented Edsall in a procedurally fair setting. Cf. Taylor v. State,
882 N.E.2d 777, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (determining that petitioner was effectively
abandoned by post-conviction counsel because counsel appeared at the post-conviction
hearing but presented no evidence in support of petitioner’s claims). Therefore, the post-
2
In his motion to correct errors, Edsall claims that he was denied the right to confront witnesses against
him because Miller failed to question some of the witnesses he suggested and because the testimony she
elicited from the witnesses she called was damaging to Edsall. This is not a violation of Edsall’s Sixth
Amendment rights, as he contends. See Moore v. State, 839 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that the Confrontation Clause only guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish).
12
conviction court did not err in concluding that Edsall did not receive ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.
III. Summary Denial of Post-Conviction Claims and Motion to Correct Error
Edsall argues that the post-conviction court erred when it summarily denied the
claims set forth in his petition for post-conviction relief related to the validity of his
guilty plea, his sentencing, his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, his challenge to
the State’s claim that children were in the area of the drug sales, and the credibility of
evidence presented by the State during his sentencing hearing.
Specifically, Edsall contends that he was improperly denied the right to challenge
his jail time credit; that he was improperly ordered to serve a lengthier sentence than
those imposed on his eleven co-defendants; that there was an insufficient factual basis to
support his plea agreement; and that the State’s witnesses were dishonest and its evidence
was falsified and fabricated.3 He further argues that the post-conviction court erred when
it denied his motion to correct error, in which he raised many of the same claims raised in
his petition for post-conviction relief in addition to his allegation that his post-conviction
counsel was ineffective. See supra.
We review the grant of a motion for summary disposition in post-conviction
proceedings on appeal in the same way that we review a motion for summary judgment.
Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. 2008). A grant of summary disposition is
3
Edsall also claims that the post-conviction court erred in admitting a tape recording containing evidence
relevant to a charge that had been dismissed pursuant to his plea agreement. We disagree. Edsall claimed
in his petition for post-conviction relief that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain full
discovery from the state and, specifically, that part of the recordings were altered and missing. Therefore,
the recordings were relevant to the post-conviction court’s determination.
13
proper if “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule l(4)(g). Summary disposition is
a matter for appellate de novo determination when the determinative issue is a matter of
law, not fact. Norris, 896 N.E.2d at 1151.
The purpose of the post-conviction relief process is to allow a petitioner to raise
issues not known at the time of the original trial and appeal or for some reason not
available to the petitioner at that time. Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind.
1989). “[I]ssues which are not raised either at the trial level, on appeal, or in a post-
conviction petition are waived.” Howard v. State, 467 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 1984). Edsall’s
sentencing claims, his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and his arguments with
respect to the State’s evidence were available for direct appeal but were not raised and
are therefore waived. See Kirk v. State, 632 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
Furthermore, Edsall is precluded from challenging the evidence supporting his
guilt. Our supreme court has been unambiguous regarding the consequences of pleading
guilty in Indiana: “a defendant’s plea of guilty is not merely a procedural event that
forecloses the necessity of trial and triggers the imposition of sentence. It also, and more
importantly, conclusively establishes the fact of guilt, a prerequisite in Indiana for the
imposition of criminal punishment.” Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (Ind. 2009)
(internal alterations and quotations omitted). “[I]t is inconsistent to allow defendants
both to plead guilty and to challenge evidence supporting the underlying convictions.”
Id. “When a judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea becomes final and the defendant
14
seeks to reopen the proceedings, the inquiry is normally confined to whether the
underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary.” Id.This rationale also applies in the post-conviction setting:
A plea of guilty . . . forecloses a post-conviction challenge to the facts
adjudicated by the trial court’s acceptance of the guilty plea and the
resulting conviction. The facts established by a plea of guilty may not be
later challenged in post-conviction proceedings.
Though this defendant now claims that new evidence would require that his
conviction be vacated, we cannot harmonize this new position taken by the
defendant with the fact that he originally admitted to committing the crime
by his guilty plea. It is inconsistent to allow defendants who pleaded guilty
to use post-conviction proceedings to later revisit the integrity of their plea
in light of alleged new evidence seeking to show that they were in fact not
guilty. Both his confession and his new claims cannot be true. A defendant
knows at the time of his plea whether he is guilty or not to the charged
crime. With a trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s guilty plea, the
defendant waives the right to present evidence regarding guilt or innocence.
Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ind. 2008) (footnote omitted).
Here, when Edsall pleaded guilty, he waived the right to present evidence
regarding his guilt or innocence, as he sought to do before the post-conviction court. See
Poore v. State, 681 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. 1997) (a criminal defendant who pleads guilty
waives, among other things, “the opportunity to put the prosecution to its proof, the
chance to offer [her] own exculpatory evidence, and [her] right to have this evidence
weighed by a neutral finder of fact[ ]”). Simply said, our post-conviction rules do not
permit a defendant who has pleaded guilty to collaterally challenge the evidence
underlying his conviction. Therefore, Edsall’s claims challenging the State’s evidence
are waived for post-conviction review and summary disposition of the claims by the post-
conviction court was proper.
15
IV. Dismissal of Edsall’s Guilty Plea Claim
However, as the State concedes, the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of
Edsall’s challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea was not proper. The long-
standing test for the validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary
and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). In furtherance of this objective, the
Indiana Code provides that the court accepting the guilty plea determine that the
defendant: (1) understands the nature of the charges; (2) has been informed that a guilty
plea effectively waives several constitutional rights, including trial by jury, confrontation
and cross-examining of witnesses, compulsory process, and proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt without self-incrimination; and (3) has been informed of the maximum
and minimum sentences for the crime charged. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2.
A criminal defendant is prohibited from challenging the validity of his guilty plea
by direct appeal. Instead, any allegations of error must be brought by petition for post-
conviction relief. M.Y. v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Because a
challenge to the voluntariness of Edsall’s guilty plea was not available to him on direct
appeal, the trial court erred in determining that he waived this issue for purposes of post-
conviction relief by not raising it on direct appeal. Consequently, we remand to the post-
conviction court for the determination of whether Edsall’s guilty plea was voluntary and
knowing. See Diaz v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. 2010) (concluding that where
evidence before post-conviction court did not reveal whether defendant was provided
with accurate language interpreting a plea agreement, remand of order denying post-
16
conviction relief was required in order for post-conviction court to perform its own
translation of the plea agreement and the sentencing hearing, and to rehear other pertinent
evidence, to determine whether defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent);
Hunter v. State, 477 N.E.2d 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that defendant’s post-
conviction allegations that he pleaded guilty in response to promise of drug and alcohol
treatment while in prison presented factual issue as to whether defendant’s guilty plea
was improperly induced and thereby involuntary, precluding summary disposition).
Conclusion
The post-conviction court’s summary denial of Edsall’s petition for post-
conviction relief and motion to correct error was proper on the issues of the appointment
of special prosecutor, the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the ineffectiveness of
trial counsel, the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel, Edsall’s sentence, and the
credibility of the State’s evidence. However, summary denial was improper on the issue
of the validity of Edsall’s guilty plea. The post-conviction court’s failure to address this
issue requires remand for determination of whether Edsall entered into his guilty plea
knowingly and voluntarily.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
17