Chambers v. Gonzales ( 2007 )

06-0804
Chambers v. Gonzales
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3 August Term, 2006
4 (Argued: April 25, 2007 Decided: July 13, 2007)
5 Docket No. 06-0804-ag
6 -------------------------------------
7 Michelle A. Chambers,
8 Petitioner,
9 - v -
10 Office of Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Alberto
11 R. Gonzales, United States Attorney General,
12 Respondents.
13 -------------------------------------
14 Before: McLAUGHLIN, SACK, Circuit Judges, and POGUE, Judge.*
15 Judge Pogue dissents in a separate opinion.
16 Petition for review of a decision by the Board of
17 Immigration Appeals ordering removal on the grounds that the
18 petitioner knowingly assisted the attempted entry of an illegal
19 alien.
20 Petition denied.
21 Victor Schurr, Pelham, NY, for
22 Petitioner.
23 Ari Nazarov, Trial Attorney, Office of
24 Immigration Litigation, United States
25 Department of Justice (Peter D. Keisler,
26 Assistant Attorney General, and Alison
*
The Honorable Donald C. Pogue, of the United States Court
of International Trade, sitting by designation.
1 M. Igoe, Senior Litigation Counsel, on
2 the brief), Washington, DC, for
3 Respondents.
4 SACK, Circuit Judge:
5 Michelle Chambers, a Jamaican native, petitions for
6 review of a decision by the Bureau of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
7 ordering her removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). In
8 re Michelle A. Chambers, No. A 56 034 092 (B.I.A. Jan. 24, 2006),
9 aff'g No. A 56 034 092 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo Aug. 26, 2004). She
10 contends that the BIA erred in finding that she knowingly
11 assisted her former boyfriend's attempted illegal entry into the
12 United States and that irrespective of whether she knew he could
13 not legally enter the United States, her actions were
14 insufficient to constitute an affirmative act of assistance
15 within the meaning of the statute. We disagree and therefore
16 deny the petition.
17 BACKGROUND
18 Chambers was, at all relevant times, a lawful permanent
19 resident of the United States residing in Hempstead, Long Island,
20 New York. In February 2003, she traveled by automobile with her
21 brother, a United States citizen, to Ontario, Canada, to visit
22 relatives. In 1990, her former boyfriend, Christopher Woolcock,
23 a resident of Jamaica, had been deported by the United States
24 after being convicted of a drug-related felony. He was also in
25 Ontario at the time of Chambers's visit, allegedly to attend his
26 uncle's wedding. Prior to Chambers's and Woolcock's trips to
27 Ontario, they agreed during the course of a telephone
2
1 conversation to meet there and return together to the United
2 States.
3 On February 23, 2003, with Chambers's brother driving,
4 she, her brother, and Woolcock traveled from Ontario headed for
5 the United States in an automobile with Georgia license plates.
6 Chambers was in the front passenger seat and Woolcock was in the
7 back seat. At the border crossing, Chambers's brother handed
8 United States customs officials his passport, his sister's travel
9 documents, and a green card issued in Woolcock's name. Because
10 the customs database revealed that Woolcock had previously been
11 deported, the three were referred to immigration offices for
12 further examination.
13 During subsequent questioning by an immigration
14 inspector, Chambers repeatedly said that Woolcock lived in Long
15 Island and that he had traveled to Canada with her and her
16 brother. She also denied having Woolcock's passport. Moments
17 later, however, she retrieved it from underneath a seat cushion
18 in the area where she had been waiting to be interviewed.
19 Following her interview, Chambers gave a sworn statement to the
20 inspector in which she admitted (1) lying about Woolcock's
21 residence; (2) having previously agreed with Woolcock to
22 accompany him at the Canadian border as he tried to enter the
23 United States; (3) that prior to that conversation, "[h]e was
24 going to come some other way through Kennedy airport"; (4) that
25 she thought Woolcock had last been in the United States seven
26 years before; (5) that she was aware he had been deported
3
1 previously; and (6) that Woolcock was planning to stay with her
2 at her home upon entering the United States.
3 Chambers was charged with knowingly aiding or assisting
4 the illegal entry of another alien under 8 U.S.C.
5 § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), and given a notice to appear at removal
6 proceedings. That removal hearing was held before Immigration
7 Judge ("IJ") Philip J. Montante, Jr. Chambers testified that she
8 thought Woolcock was permitted to enter the United States because
9 he had shown her a green card (with his "much younger" picture on
10 it) and had told her that an immigration officer at the time of
11 his deportation in 1990 had informed him that he could return to
12 the United States after ten years.1 She again admitted having
13 lied to immigration officers both when she told them that
14 Woolcock was a Long Island resident and when she said that she
15 did not know the whereabouts of Woolcock's passport. And she
16 admitted that she had also lied when she told the immigration
17 inspector during her interview that Woolcock was going to live
18 with her when they returned to Long Island. In fact, Chambers
19 testified, he was to live with his mother.
20 Chambers explained her misstatements by saying she was
21 frightened because she had been told she would be deported.
22 Asked on cross-examination why she had never decided to visit her
1
Woolcock, as an alien deported for commission of an
aggravated felon, is permanently ineligible to gain entry. See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
4
1 family in Canada until the weekend that Woolcock was also in
2 Canada, Chambers answered, "Well, we just decided."2
3 At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ issued an oral
4 decision concluding that Chambers had knowingly aided the illegal
5 entry of another alien. The IJ noted Chambers's several
6 misstatements at the Canadian border and found that "she lied to
7 the Court today." In re Michelle A Chambers, A 56 034 092, at 9.
8 Relying on these misstatements and Chambers's sworn statement
9 that she and Woolcock had planned the trip across the border, the
10 IJ concluded that Chambers knew that Woolcock could not legally
11 enter the United States and that her actions "were an attempt to
12 induce and to encourage" Woolcock's illegal entry. Id. at 9-13.
13 The IJ also noted that he perceived Chambers's testimony that
14 Woolcock told her that he could reenter the United States ten
15 years after his deportation to be inconsistent with Chambers's
16 statement to the immigration inspector that Woolcock was last in
17 the United States seven years prior to the 2003 incident at the
18 border. Id. at 11 ("Well, if he had been in the United States
19 seven years ago, doesn't that fly in the face of her statement
20 that [Woolcock] told her allegedly that he could return after 10
21 years and here it was seven years ago that he was in the United
22 States.").
23 On January 24, 2006, the BIA affirmed in a short
24 opinion that closely followed the IJ's reasoning. First, the BIA
2
There is no indication that Chambers received compensation
for assisting Woolcock's attempted entry into the United States.
5
1 determined that "if [Chambers] believed that Mr. Woolcock could
2 only reenter the United States after having been absent for 10
3 years after his deportation, [Chambers] would have had knowledge
4 that Mr. Woolcock would not have been able to reenter the United
5 States after the passage of only 7 years." In re Michelle A.
6 Chambers, A 56 034 092, at 2. Second, it concluded that in light
7 of Chambers's numerous admitted and deliberate misrepresentations
8 to customs officials at the border, the IJ did not err in finding
9 Chambers's testimony at the hearing incredible or in "finding
10 that her deception at the border reflected guilty knowledge."
11 Id.12 Chambers petitions for review.
13 DISCUSSION
14 I. Standard of Review
15 "Since the BIA affirmed the IJ's order in a 'brief
16 opinion [that] closely tracks the IJ's reasoning,' and since our
17 conclusion is the same regardless of which decision we review,
18 'we will consider both the IJ's and the BIA's opinions.'" Lewis
19 v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Wangchuck
20 v. Dep't of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006))
21 (brackets in original).
22 We review the IJ's and BIA's factual findings for
23 substantial evidence, and we consider questions of law and
24 applications of law to fact de novo. Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331
25 F.3d 297, 306-07 (2d Cir. 2003). The BIA's findings of fact "are
6
1 conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
2 to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The
3 petitioner's knowledge at the time in question is a question of
4 fact. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994);
5 Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996); see
6 also Locurto v. Guliani, 447 F.3d 159, 177 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006)
7 ("[T]he defendants' intent is a factual question . . . .").
8 II. Chambers Acted Knowingly
9 Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the Immigration and
10 Naturalization Act provides that an alien is not admissible into
11 the United States if he or she "at any time knowingly has
12 encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien
13 to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of the
14 law." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).3 Chambers argues that the
15 circumstances surrounding her stop at the border compel the
16 conclusion that she did not act "knowingly." Specifically, she
17 contends that her behavior was consistent with the acts of
3
Aliens such as Chambers who have achieved lawful permanent
resident status in the United States are regarded as seeking
admission to the United States if they have "engaged in illegal
activity after having departed the United States." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii) ("An alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking
an admission into the United States for purposes of the
immigration laws unless the alien . . . (iii) has engaged in
illegal activity after having departed the United States.").
7
1 someone who thought she was participating in a legal act: her
2 brother readily handed over Woolcock's green card to the customs
3 officer; no subterfuge in the form of fraudulent documents or
4 hidden compartments was used; and Chambers complied with all of
5 the various officers' requests. She argues further that her
6 misstatements were not only immaterial to the charge of aiding
7 illegal alien entry, but also were later recanted.
8 But Chambers does not contest that she lied at the
9 border regarding Woolcock's residency and the whereabouts of his
10 passport. The nature of these misstatements plainly supports the
11 inference drawn by the IJ and the BIA that Chambers knew Woolcock
12 could not legally enter the United States. For example, her
13 statements that Woolcock lived in Long Island and drove with her
14 and her brother to Canada could reasonably be construed as an
15 attempt by Chambers to convince officials that Woolcock then
16 resided in the United States lawfully. Such an inference would
17 in turn support the corollary inference that Chambers wanted
18 border officials to think Woolcock was a legal resident of the
19 United States because she knew he would otherwise not be
20 permitted to enter in light of his immigration status. These
21 inferences, taken together with Chambers's admissions that she
22 and Woolcock planned the means and method of his return to the
23 United States and that she knew that he had been deported
8
1 previously, constitute substantial evidence to support the IJ's
2 and BIA's findings that Chambers acted knowingly to assist
3 Woolcock's attempted illegal entry. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480
4 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2007) ("So long as there is a basis in the
5 evidence for a challenged inference, we do not question whether a
6 different inference was available or more likely."); see also id.
7 ("[W]e will reject a deduction made by an IJ only when there is a
8 complete absence of probative facts to support it . . . .").
9 To be sure, the IJ and BIA appear to have ascribed
10 misplaced significance to the fact that Chambers professed to
11 believe both that Woolcock had been in the United States within
12 the past seven years and that an immigration officer had told
13 Woolcock he could reenter after ten years. These two assertions
14 are not inherently contradictory. Assuming that Chambers had
15 believed Woolcock's assertion that he could reenter the United
16 States ten years after his deportation in 1990, nothing about the
17 statement would compel Chambers to think that the ten-year clock
18 restarted each time Woolcock entered the United States, as the IJ
19 and BIA seemed to believe. Nevertheless, neither the IJ nor the
20 BIA relied solely -- or, in the case of the IJ, substantially --
21 on this reasoning in finding that Chambers knowingly assisted
22 Woolcock's attempted illegal entry. Instead, each expressly and
23 additionally relied on Chambers's repeated misstatements and the
9
1 reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. We therefore conclude
2 that the record contains substantial evidence in support of the
3 agency's finding that Chambers acted with the requisite knowledge
4 and that, were we to remand, the agency would reach the same
5 result even absent the likely error that we have identified. See
6 Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401 (2d Cir.
7 2005) ("Certainly if the IJ explicitly adopts an alternative and
8 sufficient basis for her determination, no remand is required.");
9 see also Siewe, 480 F.3d at 166-67; Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d
10 129, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2006).
11 III. Chambers's Actions Are Sufficient to Constitute
12 Assistance Under Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i)
13
14 As an alternative basis for granting her petition,
15 Chambers argues that her actions do not as a matter of law rise
16 to the requisite affirmative assistance that § 212(a)(6)(E)(i)
17 requires. In support, she cites cases in which divided panels of
18 the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that the anti-smuggling
19 statute requires an affirmative act of assistance or
20 encouragement beyond either "openly presenting an alien to border
21 officials with accurate identification and citizenship papers,"
22 Tapucu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 736, 737 (6th Cir. 2005), or "mere
23 presence in [a] vehicle with knowledge of [a] plan" to smuggle an
10
1 alien into the United States, Altamirano v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d
2 586, 596 (9th Cir. 2005).
3 Our Circuit has yet to set forth anything approaching a
4 bright-line test as to the nature of the actions that will or
5 will not suffice to support a finding that an alien has
6 "encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided" another in
7 illegally entering the United States. 8 U.S.C.
8 § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). We need not do so here. Chambers did not
9 present agents at the border with accurate information, as did
10 the petitioner in Tapucu, and she was not "mere[ly] presen[t] in
11 the vehicle" in which her brother drove Woolcock across the
12 border like the petitioner in Altamirano. She does not qualify
13 as an innocent bystander on any reading of the facts. The fact
14 that no fraudulent documents were used and no payments by
15 Woolcock were made does not overcome the ample evidence to
16 support the IJ's and BIA's findings that Chambers personally
17 arranged to provide transportation for Woolcock into the United
18 States and purposefully deceived customs officials at the time of
19 his attempted entry. Chambers traveled to Canada with the pre-
20 planned intent to bring Woolcock across the border in her car
21 upon her return, and she actively sought to mislead customs
22 officials about Woolcock's residency status in a way that, if
23 believed, would have made it easier for him to enter the United
11
1 States. There is thus sufficient evidence from which the IJ and
2 the BIA could conclude that she assisted, abetted, or aided
3 Woolcock in his attempt illegally to enter the United States.
4 Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) requires no more.
5 CONCLUSION
6 For the foregoing reasons, Chambers's petition for
7 review is denied.
8
12
1 Pogue, Judge dissenting:
2 The majority opinion correctly states that the BIA’s
3 conclusion that Ms. Chambers violated the alien-smuggling statute
4 is based on the agency’s finding that Ms. Chambers had knowledge
5 of Woolcock’s illegal scheme. The majority opinion also
6 acknowledges – and I agree - that the BIA improperly concluded
7 that Ms. Chambers must have known that Woolcock’s reentry was
8 illegal based on her stated belief that he had been in the
9 country within the last seven years. As the majority notes, if
10 Ms. Chambers believed that Woolcock could reenter the country any
11 time after ten years had passed since his 1990 deportation,
12 whether Woolcock had previously violated the imagined ten-year
13 period says nothing about what Ms. Chambers necessarily believed
14 or knew regarding the propriety of his entry in 2003.
15 I depart from the majority’s opinion, however,
16 because the BIA’s decision also makes it clear that the agency’s
17 erroneous finding - that Ms. Chambers had knowledge of Woolcock’s
18 possible prior reentry - was the major ground for its decision.
19 While the BIA also “found no clear error” in the IJ’s finding
20 that Ms. Chambers’ “deception at the border reflected guilty
21 knowledge,” the BIA did not state that Ms. Chambers’
22 misrepresentations provided an alternative basis for its
23 decision. Based on this record, therefore, I believe we should
24 review the decision on its stated grounds. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
25 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“a reviewing court, in dealing with a
26 determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is
13
1 authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action
2 solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”); see also Lin v.
3 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2006).
4 Moreover, Ms. Chambers corrected or recanted each
5 of her misrepresentations during the customs investigation, and
6 ultimately provided correct information at the border during the
7 investigation. Accordingly, it seems to me that this case is
8 more like the case cited by the majority, Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453
9 F. 3d 129 (2d Cir. 2006), where the court remanded because it
10 could not be “certain that the errors below did not play a role
11 in the decision to deny relief.” Id. at 141. As in Li Zu, the
12 agency’s error here played at least “a role in the decision to
13 deny relief.” Id. Furthermore, as the court in Tapucu
14 explained, there is nothing “illegal about driving a known
15 illegal alien with admittedly authentic papers to the American
16 border for examination by the border guards.” Tapucu v.
17 Gonzales, 399 F.3d 736, 739-40 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Doe v.
18 Gonzales, 484 F.3d 445, 449-50 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that
19 presence at the scene of persecution may not constitute
20 “assistance” in the absence of support or encouragement, and
21 further noting that aiding in a cover-up without advance
22 participation in planning such a cover-up also does not
23 constitute assistance in the actual scheme). As a result, I
24 cannot say with confidence that the BIA would have reached the
25 same result in the absence of error, and it seems to me that the
26 BIA should be given the opportunity to weigh the exculpatory
14
1 evidence and make an initial error-free determination as to
2 whether relief is appropriate.
3 Finally, in order to support a conclusion that Ms.
4 Chambers actually assisted in an illegal entry in violation of
5 Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i), the majority relies on a hypothetical
6 finding – that “Chambers traveled to Canada with the pre-planned
7 intent to bring Woolcock across the border in her car upon her
8 return, and she actively sought to mislead customs officials
9 about Woolcock’s residency status in a way that, if believed,
10 would have made it easier for him to enter the United States.”
11 To find a violation of the statute, however, requires more than a
12 hypothetical finding that the petitioner’s actions “would have
13 made it easier;” it requires that the actions actually assisted,
14 abetted or aided. Perhaps more importantly, the agency made no
15 such finding. Rather, the BIA made the more nuanced and limited
16 conclusion, upon which it did not rely to find a violation of the
17 statute, that Ms. Chambers “arranged to meet with Mr. Woolcock,
18 an alien previously deported from the United States as an
19 aggravated felon, at her family's home in Canada so that he could
20 travel to the United States with her and her brother by car.” In
21 re Michelle A. Chambers, A 56 034 092, at 1-2. Similarly, with
22 regard to the majority’s claim of deception, the agency found
23 only that “... despite the respondent's alleged belief that the
24 [sic] Mr. Woolcock could legally enter the United States, the
25 record reflects that the respondent made several
26 misrepresentations to the immigration officials in secondary
15
1 inspection . . . . Specifically . . . [Chambers] told [the Agent]
2 that all three of the passengers in the car had traveled to
3 Canada together and that they all lived together in Long Island,
4 New York.” Id. at 2. As noted above, Ms. Chambers later
5 corrected or recanted these statements and ultimately provided
6 correct information at the border during the investigation. It
7 does not seem to me that it is our role to expand the agency’s
8 findings in order to support its conclusion.
16