Caiozzo v. Koreman ( 2009 )

05-4002-cv
Caiozzo v. Koreman
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3 August Term, 2008
4 (Argued: October 24, 2008 Decided: September 22, 2009)
5 Docket No. 05-4002-cv
6 -------------------------------------
7 ANTHONY CAIOZZO, as Administrator of the Estate of Phillip
8 Caiozzo,
9 Plaintiff-Appellant,
10 - v -
11 BRIAN KOREMAN, MICHAEL BENEDETTO, ANTHONY CRISORIO, MICHAEL
12 MOFFRE and GORDON C. RIVERS,
13 Defendants-Cross-Claimants,
14 JACK BEVLICOLA and VINAY B. DAS, M.D.,
15 Defendants-Cross-Defendants,
16 LINDA CUMMINS, R.N.,
17 Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee.
18 -------------------------------------
19 Before: SACK, KATZMANN and KELLY,* Circuit Judges.
20 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
21 Court for the Northern District of New York (Gary L. Sharpe,
22 Judge). We reaffirm our position, stated in Arroyo v. Schaefer,
23 548 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1977), that the standard for analyzing a
24 claim of deliberate indifference to the health or safety of a
*
The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 convicted prison inmate held in state custody as a violation of
2 the right of the inmate to be free from cruel and unusual
3 punishment under the Eighth Amendment is also applicable to
4 claims brought by pretrial state detainees under the Due Process
5 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In light of the Supreme
6 Court's subsequent holding that a subjective standard is to be
7 applied in the Eighth Amendment context, under which a defendant
8 is liable only if he disregards a risk of harm of which he is
9 aware, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), we conclude
10 that the subjective standard also applies in the Due Process
11 context. Contrary to our case law prior to the Supreme Court
12 decision, the question of fact before the district court was
13 therefore whether the defendant "kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an
14 excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. at 837. There
15 is no evidence in the record on appeal from which a reasonable
16 juror could conclude in the affirmative.
17 Affirmed.
18 CHAD A. JEROME, The LaFave Law Firm,
19 PLLC (Lawrence J. Zyra, of counsel),
20 Delmar, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
21 TIMOTHY S. BRENNAN, Phelan, Phelan &
22 Danek, Albany, NY, for Defendant-Cross-
23 Defendant-Appellee.
24 SACK, Circuit Judge:
25 In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), the
26 Supreme Court held that a subjective test adapted from the
27 criminal law applies to suits against federal prison officials
28 for violating a convicted inmate's right to be free from cruel or
2
1 unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In the wake of
2 Farmer, such a defendant is liable to an injured prisoner only if
3 he "disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware," id. at 837,
4 and that causes the injury. Prior to Farmer, we had held that
5 deliberate indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees in
6 state facilities under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
7 Amendment were to be analyzed under the same test as Eighth
8 Amendment claims by inmates who stood convicted. See, e.g.,
9 Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1977). In the pre-
10 Farmer cases, however, the test we employed was objective, that
11 is, it could be met without proof as to the state of mind of the
12 defendant. We asked whether there were "circumstances indicating
13 an evil intent, or recklessness, or at least deliberate
14 indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under
15 his control or dependent upon him." Id. at 49 (internal
16 quotation marks omitted).
17 In light of Farmer, we must decide which of two lines
18 of our case law to follow -- our prior Fourteenth Amendment Due
19 Process Clause jurisprudence, which permitted liability for abuse
20 of pretrial state detainees if the more easily met objective test
21 alone was met, or our prior decisions concluding that Fourteenth
22 Amendment due process cases brought by state pretrial detainees
23 should employ the same standards as Eighth Amendment cruel and
24 unusual punishment cases brought by convicts, now clearly a
3
1 subjective standard. We adhere to the latter line of authority.1
2 Following the lead of our sister circuits that have addressed
3 this question, we conclude that in Fourteenth Amendment
4 deliberate indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees in
5 state custody, the subjective standard is to be applied.
6 Applying it, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
7 judgment to the defendant.
8 BACKGROUND
9 Because summary judgment was granted against the
10 appellant, the administrator of the estate of Phillip Caiozzo
11 ("Caiozzo"), we consider the evidence in the light most favorable
12 to him. See, e.g., Konikoff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 234
13 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2000). At approximately 9:49 a.m. on July
14 11, 2001, Caiozzo was arrested by an Albany police officer and
15 charged with first degree harassment.2 Following his arraignment
16 in Albany City Court, he was committed to the custody of the
17 Albany County Sheriff, who transferred him to the Albany County
1
Because this decision effectively overrules prior
decisions of this Court, it has been circulated to all the active
judges of the Court before filing. See, e.g., Slayton v. Am.
Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 228 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006).
2
A person is guilty of harassment in the first
degree when he or she intentionally and
repeatedly harasses another person by
following such person in or about a public
place or places or by engaging in a course of
conduct or by repeatedly committing acts
which places such person in reasonable fear
of physical injury.
N.Y. Penal Law § 240.25.
4
1 Correctional Facility ("ACCF") at around 6:45 p.m. Caiozzo had
2 previously been incarcerated at the ACCF on at least twenty-seven
3 separate occasions, and had been treated for chronic alcoholism
4 by the facility's medical staff. On this occasion, the ACCF
5 booking officer recommended that Caiozzo be placed under
6 intensive observation because he appeared intoxicated. Caiozzo
7 was then sent to the medical department, where the nurse on duty,
8 Defendant-Appellee Linda Cummins, R.N., performed an intake
9 medical assessment at around 7:30 p.m. Vinay B. Das, M.D., was
10 the doctor on call at that time.
11 The ACCF intake assessment consists of obtaining
12 information from the detainee by asking a standardized list of
13 questions. The nurse is required to make several specific
14 observations, including whether the detainee is conscious, shows
15 signs of injury or illness, or has visible signs of fever. The
16 nurse is also required to assess any signs that the detainee is
17 at risk of suicide, assault, or abnormal behavior.
18 In her intake assessment of Caiozzo, Cummins took his
19 vital signs, which were within normal limits. Caiozzo was able
20 to answer her questions and to sign the intake form. Cummins
21 noted that Caiozzo exhibited abnormal behavior and smelled of
22 alcohol, and that he stated that he was "possessed." Caiozzo
23 also told Cummins that he wanted to go to sleep because he was
24 tired. He reported that he had been hospitalized during the
25 preceding year. Caiozzo had a history of psychiatric treatment
5
1 and mental problems that the appellant asserts were related to
2 alcohol abuse.
3 Caiozzo told Cummins that he consumed alcohol daily.
4 Cummins then asked when he had had his last drink. Cummins'
5 notes indicate her understanding, based on Caiozzo's response,
6 that his last drink had been in the early evening of that very
7 day, July 11. It now appears that this was not the case, and
8 that Caiozzo meant to refer to the previous evening. Cummins'
9 understanding corresponded with the booking officer's
10 observation, of which Cummins was aware, that Caiozzo appeared
11 intoxicated when he was booked at 6:45 p.m.; it also corresponded
12 with her own observation that his breath smelled of alcohol. The
13 appellant argues that Cummins should have realized that it was
14 not possible for Caiozzo to have consumed alcohol earlier that
15 same evening, since he had been arrested that morning and had
16 been in custody ever since. While the appellant acknowledges
17 that Cummins was unaware of this chronology, he asserts that with
18 proper diligence, Cummins would have uncovered this information.
19 The timing of a detainee's last drink is important in assessing
20 the need for and timing of alcohol withdrawal treatment.
21 At the end of her assessment, Cummins concluded --
22 erroneously, as it turns out -- that Caiozzo was under the
23 influence of alcohol. She placed him under continual
24 observation, which was consistent with the booking officer's
25 recommendation.
6
1 That evening, two corrections officers were assigned to
2 monitor five inmates, including Caiozzo. The officers kept the
3 inmates under continual observation and recorded their
4 observations in a log book at approximately 15 minute intervals.
5 At about 10:15 p.m., Cummins received a call from the officer
6 monitoring Caiozzo, who stated that Caiozzo was yelling and
7 acting irrationally. Cummins came to his cell, where Caiozzo
8 told her that he was going to go through alcohol withdrawal.
9 Cummins noted in her medical chart: "[S]tates will be having
10 withdrawal from alcohol." Cummins did not enter the cell,
11 examine the decedent, or ask him any questions, any or all of
12 which might have led her to observe alcohol withdrawal signs and
13 symptoms such as incoherence, tremors, or sweating.
14 Cummins called Dr. Das and reported Caiozzo's signs and
15 symptoms as she had observed them. Based on her earlier
16 misinterpretation of Caiozzo's statement, she told Das that
17 Caiozzo's most recent drink had been earlier that evening. She
18 also told Das that Caiozzo was intoxicated, noting that he was
19 speaking irrationally to himself, and was behaving erratically
20 and apparently had mental health problems. Das indicated that
21 Caiozzo should be kept under constant observation, that Das would
22 follow up first thing in the morning, and that Das would start an
23 alcohol withdrawal protocol at that time, if necessary.
24 Cummins did not receive any further calls from the
25 observing officer between 10:15 p.m. and 2:45 a.m. During that
26 time period, the officer assigned to monitor Caiozzo, defendant
7
1 Koreman, did not notice Caiozzo shaking, trembling or sweating.
2 Neither did he observe any unusual behavior by Caiozzo, who
3 appeared to be awake on and off. Caiozzo vomited once in his
4 toilet, but aside from that, he did not seem to Koreman to be in
5 medical distress.
6 At approximately 2:50 a.m., Caiozzo appeared to Koreman
7 to have "some sort of spasm," after which Caiozzo rolled out of
8 bed. Koreman asked Caiozzo if he was all right. He did not
9 respond. Koreman yelled to the other officer to summon medical
10 help and opened the cell to check on Caiozzo, who appeared to be
11 breathing.
12 The ACCF medical unit was informed that Caiozzo had
13 fallen out of bed and was not moving. Another officer, defendant
14 Michael Benedetto, entered the cell and found that Caiozzo was
15 breathing and had a pulse. The officers continued to monitor him
16 until a nurse, Ann Curtis, arrived shortly thereafter. Curtis
17 examined Caiozzo and found that he was not breathing. Cardio-
18 pulmonary resuscitation procedures were begun. Cummins was
19 called to assist. She furnished oxygen and other emergency
20 equipment. CPR was applied pending the arrival of the Emergency
21 Medical Service at 3:15 a.m. EMS then took over the treatment.
22 At the time, Caiozzo had a pulse of 60 beats per minute and blood
23 pressure of 70 over 30. He was taken to Albany Medical Center.
24 Later that day, having been removed from life support,
25 Caiozzo died. His death was ascribed to seizure due to acute and
26 chronic alcoholism.
8
1 On March 12, 2003, Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Caiozzo,
2 as administrator of Caiozzo's estate, instituted this action in
3 the United States District Court for the Northern District of New
4 York pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various
5 constitutional violations by various defendants. At the close of
6 discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. At that
7 time, the plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his claims against all
8 of the defendants except for Cummins and Das, and withdrew
9 certain of his constitutional claims as against them. The
10 remaining claims against Cummins and Das were for deliberate
11 indifference to Caiozzo's medical needs in violation of his
12 rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
13 At the conclusion of oral argument, the district court
14 (Gary L. Sharpe, Judge) granted Das' motion for summary judgment,
15 but reserved judgment on Cummins' motion and requested further
16 briefing on the question of whether an "objective" or
17 "subjective" standard should be applied. Following the
18 additional briefing and further oral argument, the court applied
19 the subjective test, under which a defendant is liable only if he
20 "disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware," Farmer, 511
21 U.S. at 836-37, and granted summary judgment dismissing the
22 plaintiff's claims against Cummins. The court stated: "I
23 believe this decision is generated from the decision as to what
24 standard applies, the objective one or the subjective one."
25 Hearing Tr., May 19, 2005 ("May Tr."), at 11.
9
1 The plaintiff does not contest the grant of summary
2 judgment to Das. The sole issue on appeal is the district
3 court's decision to grant Cummins' motion for summary judgment on
4 the claim of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a
5 pretrial detainee. The plaintiff argues that the objective test
6 should be applied, and that even under the subjective test,
7 summary judgment should not have been granted.
8 We agree with the district court that the subjective
9 test applies and that no reasonable juror could conclude that
10 Cummins' behavior met that test. We therefore affirm the
11 judgment of the district court.
12 DISCUSSION
13 I. Standard of Review
14 We review the district court's grant of summary
15 judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most
16 favorable to the nonmoving party. Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,
17 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). "[W]e are 'required to resolve
18 all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in
19 favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.'"
20 Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003). Whether to
21 apply the subjective or objective standard is a legal question
22 that we also review de novo. See Guiles ex rel. Guiles v.
23 Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 323-24 (2d Cir. 2006).
24 II. Applicable Substantive Standard
25 A convicted prisoner's claim of deliberate indifference
26 to his medical needs by those overseeing his care is analyzed
10
1 under the Eighth Amendment2 because the right the plaintiff seeks
2 to vindicate arises from the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
3 "cruel and unusual punishment." Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845,
4 856 (2d Cir. 1996). In the case of a person being held prior to
5 trial, however, "the 'cruel and unusual punishment' proscription
6 of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply,"
7 because "as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being
8 'punished,'" Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir.
9 2000); see also Weyant, 101 F.3d at 856. Instead, a person
10 detained prior to conviction receives protection against
11 mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due
12 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the pretrial detainee is
13 held in federal custody, or the Due Process Clause of the
14 Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. Compare Cuoco,
15 222 F.3d at 103, 106 (applying Fifth Amendment to a federal
16 detainee), with Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 275-76 (2d Cir.
17 1990) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to a state detainee). While
18 the plaintiff identified causes of action for deliberate
19 indifference under the Eighth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
20 the district court correctly concluded that a claim for
21 indifference to the medical needs of Caiozzo, as a pretrial
22 detainee in state custody, was properly brought under the Due
23 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See May Tr. at 3.
2
In the case of a state prisoner, it is the Eighth
Amendment as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Olivier v. Robert L. Yeager Mental Health Ctr., 398
F.3d 183, 191 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
11
1 In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme
2 Court addressed the question of whether to use a "subjective" or
3 an "objective" standard in determining deliberate indifference in
4 the context of a convicted prisoner's rights under the Eighth
5 Amendment, see id. at 837-38. The Court noted that "[w]ith
6 deliberate indifference lying somewhere between the poles of
7 negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other, the
8 Courts of Appeals have routinely equated deliberate indifference
9 with recklessness." Id. at 836. But this did not resolve the
10 question, because there are two legal tests for recklessness: the
11 civil-law objective test, under which a defendant is liable if he
12 "fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm
13 that is either known or so obvious that it should be known," and
14 the criminal-law subjective test, under which a defendant is
15 liable if he "disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware."
16 Id. at 836-37. The Court concluded that the subjective test
17 should apply under the Eighth Amendment because it prohibits
18 cruel and unusual punishment, and a prison official's action or
19 inaction cannot properly be termed "punishment" of the detainee
20 if the official was not actually aware of an excessive risk to an
21 inmate's health or safety. See id. at 837-38.
22 We have not decided which standard to use when a claim
23 of deliberate indifference in violation of the Due Process Clause
24 of the Fourteenth Amendment is brought by a pretrial detainee in
25 state custody. In Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35 (2d Cir.
26 2003), we noted that "in a challenge by pretrial detainees
12
1 asserting a protracted failure to provide safe prison conditions,
2 the deliberate indifference standard does not require the
3 detainees to show anything more than actual or imminent
4 substantial harm," id. at 51 (emphasis in original). But we
5 observed by way of footnote that "[i]n other types of challenges
6 -– for example, when pretrial detainees challenge discrete
7 judgments of state officials -– meeting the deliberate
8 indifference standard may require a further showing." Id. at 51,
9 n.18 (emphasis added).
10 Before Farmer was decided, in Liscio v. Warren, 901
11 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1990), we applied the objective standard in a
12 case somewhat similar to this one. There, the state pretrial
13 detainee brought a claim of deliberate indifference, asserting
14 that his alcohol withdrawal was not properly treated due in part
15 to an initial misdiagnosis made at a state detention center. See
16 id. at 275-76. We reversed the district court's grant of the
17 defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that "[s]ince the
18 medical records indicated that Liscio was a 'poor historian' of
19 his own condition, [the defendant] was on notice that Liscio
20 might be suffering from ailments other than" the ones the
21 plaintiff himself had identified. Id. at 276. We also noted
22 that several facts had been elicited that could have led a
23 reasonable juror to find that the defendant should have been
24 aware that Liscio was suffering from alcohol withdrawal. See id.
25 at 277. The plaintiff argues that Liscio requires us to apply
13
1 the objective standard to the case at hand. If Liscio were still
2 good law, the plaintiff's argument might well be persuasive.
3 Also prior to Farmer, however, we held that the
4 standard for deliberate indifference is the same under the Due
5 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it is under the
6 Eighth Amendment. Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 49-50 & n.3
7 (2d Cir. 1977). In Arroyo we concluded that "[w]hile the Eighth
8 Amendment may not, strictly speaking, be applicable to pretrial
9 detainees," id. at 50, in the context of a claim for deliberate
10 indifference to the medical needs of a state pretrial detainee,
11 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires no
12 more" than the Eighth Amendment does in the case of a convicted
13 prisoner, id. (citation omitted). And if a defendant prison
14 official in this context is liable for an Eighth Amendment
15 violation only if he "disregards a risk of harm [to a prisoner]
16 of which he is aware" under the Eighth Amendment, Farmer, 511
17 U.S. at 837, it would seem to follow that a defendant prison
18 official also is liable for a Fourteenth Amendment violation only
19 if he disregards a risk of harm to a detainee of which he is
20 aware.
21 In the wake of Farmer, we have assumed that our
22 practice of applying the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
23 test in cases involving claims brought under the Fourteenth
24 Amendment continues. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106
25 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We have often applied the Eighth Amendment
26 deliberate indifference test to pre-trial detainees bringing
14
1 actions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
2 Amendment."). Cuoco applied the Farmer standard to a claim of
3 deliberate indifference brought under the Fifth Amendment by a
4 pretrial detainee in federal custody. We see no reason to apply
5 a standard for due process claims brought by state detainees
6 under the Fourteenth Amendment that is different from the one
7 that we employ for due process claims brought by federal
8 detainees under the Fifth Amendment. See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 106
9 ("We see no reason why the analysis should be different under the
10 Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment [than under the Due
11 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment]."); see also Malinski
12 v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
13 concurring) ("To suppose that 'due process of law' meant one
14 thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too
15 frivolous to require elaborate rejection.").
16 We think, then, that it is a logical extension of the
17 principles recognized in Farmer that an injured state pretrial
18 detainee, to establish a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
19 due process rights, must prove, inter alia, that the government-
20 employed defendant disregarded a risk of harm to the plaintiff of
21 which the defendant was aware. Cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
22 Our sister circuits that have examined this question
23 after Farmer have all reached a similar conclusion.3 As the
3
See Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 539-40
(6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (holding that under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial
detainee asserting a claim of deliberate indifference to serious
15
1 Fifth Circuit reasoned in its post-Farmer decision in Hare v.
medical needs must demonstrate both "the existence of a
'sufficiently serious' medical need" and that "'the official
being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer
substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the
inference, and that he then disregarded that risk,'" reasoning
that this approach "'is meant to prevent the
constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims'"); Butler v.
Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344-46 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding "that
deliberate indifference [which has both an objective and
subjective component] is the appropriate standard of culpability
for all claims that prison officials failed to provide pretrial
detainees with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety"), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 917 (2007);
Surprenant v. Rivas 424 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding, in
the context of a claim of unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, "the parameters of [a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth
Amendment interests] are coextensive with those of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment" and
that "[i]n order to establish a constitutional violation, a
plaintiff's claim must meet both objective and subjective
criteria"); Whiting v. Marathon County Sheriff's Dept., 382 F.3d
700, 703 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the question of whether
the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim was based on the
Eighth Amendment as a prisoner or the Fourteenth Amendment as a
pretrial detainee was "immaterial" since "the legal standard
. . . is the same under either"); Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312
F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted)
("Although '[p]retrial detainees are protected under the Due
Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, . . . this Court
applies an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment
cases brought pursuant to [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.'"); Brown v.
Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e need not resolve
whether [the decedent] was a pretrial detainee or a convicted
prisoner because the standard in either case is the same.");
Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 & n.6 (11th
Cir. 1997) (concluding that "the minimum standard for providing
medical care to a pre-trial detainee under the Fourteenth
Amendment is the same as the minimum standard required by the
Eighth Amendment for a convicted prisoner" and that the standard
is "violated by a government official's deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs"); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74
F.3d 633, 649 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("Though Farmer dealt
specifically with a prison official's duty under the Eighth
Amendment to provide a convicted inmate with humane conditions of
confinement, we conclude that its subjective definition of
deliberate indifference provides the appropriate standard for
measuring the duty owed to pretrial detainees under the Due
Process Clause.").
16
1 City of Corinth, Mississippi, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
2 banc):
3 [D]espite the distinct constitutional sources
4 of the rights of pretrial detainees and
5 convicted inmates, state jail and prison
6 officials owe the same duty to provide the
7 same quantum of basic human needs and humane
8 conditions of confinement to both
9 groups. . . . That pretrial detainees may
10 have more protections or rights in
11 general . . . does not mean that they are
12 entitled to greater protection of rights
13 shared in common with convicted inmates. For
14 purposes of measuring constitutional duties,
15 our case law and the teachings of the Supreme
16 Court indicate that there is no legally
17 significant situation in which a failure to
18 provide an incarcerated individual with
19 medical care or protection from violence
20 is punishment yet is not cruel and unusual.
21 The fact of conviction ought not make one
22 more amenable under the Constitution to
23 unnecessary random violence or suffering, or
24 to a greater denial of basic human needs.
25 Id. at 649 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
26 We thus reaffirm the position that we expressed in
27 Arroyo: Claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
28 condition or other serious threat to the health or safety of a
29 person in custody should be analyzed under the same standard
30 irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or
31 Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Supreme Court in Farmer
32 articulated the proper standard for analyzing such claims under
33 the Eighth Amendment -- a standard that we have already applied
34 in Cuoco to a Fifth Amendment due process case -- we adopt that
35 standard in this case under the Due Process Clause of the
36 Fourteenth Amendment.
17
1 III. The Standard Applied
2 There are two elements to a claim of deliberate
3 indifference to a serious medical condition: "[The plaintiff]
4 must show that she [or he] had a 'serious medical condition' and
5 that it was met with 'deliberate indifference.'" Cuoco, 222 F.3d
6 at 106. Here, there is no dispute that Caiozzo had a serious
7 medical condition. The question is therefore whether a
8 reasonable juror could show that Cummins was deliberately
9 indifferent to that condition, which, under the Farmer test,
10 means that she "kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to
11 [Caiozzo's] health or safety" and that she was "both . . . aware
12 of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
13 substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . also dr[e]w
14 the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
15 Most of the evidence offered by the plaintiff was in
16 support of the argument that Cummins should have been aware that
17 Caiozzo was in immediate danger of alcohol withdrawal. A
18 reasonable juror might have concluded that this was the case.
19 There is virtually no evidence, however, to support a conclusion
20 by a reasonable juror that Cummins was actually aware of that
21 immediate danger. The evidence is clear that she thought,
22 wrongly it turned out, that Caiozzo was intoxicated and therefore
23 not in danger of an imminent severe alcohol withdrawal reaction.
24 No reasonable juror could conclude that the Farmer test has been
25 met.
18
1 CONCLUSION
2 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
3 court is affirmed.
19