Jin Lin v. Holder , 525 F. App'x 23 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •          12-96
    Lin v. Holder
    BIA
    Hom, IJ
    A087 443 580
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 16th day of May, two thousand thirteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    8                DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    9                RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _____________________________________
    12
    13       JIN LIN,
    14                       Petitioner,
    15
    16                       v.                                     12-96
    17                                                              NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20                Respondent.
    21       _____________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONER:                Gerald Karikari, New York, New York.
    24
    25       FOR RESPONDENT:                Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
    26                                      Attorney General; Blair T. O’Connor,
    27                                      Assistant Director; John B. Holt,
    28                                      Trial Attorney, Office of
    29                                      Immigration Litigation, United
    30                                      States Department of Justice,
    31                                      Washington, D.C.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
    5       Jin Lin, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of
    6   a December 14, 2011 order of the BIA affirming the June 23,
    7   2010 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his
    8   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    9   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).   In re Jin
    10   Lin, No. A087 443 580 (B.I.A. Dec. 14, 2011), aff’g No. A087
    11   443 580 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 23, 2010).   We assume the
    12   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    13   procedural history in this case.
    14       Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    15   the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA’s decision.    See
    16   Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522
    17   (2d Cir. 2005).   The applicable standards of review are well
    18   established.   See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin
    19   Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).    Because
    20   the BIA assumed that Lin’s application was timely, we do not
    21   reach the IJ’s finding as to the applicability of the filing
    22   deadline in 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2)(B).
    23
    2
    1       For applications such as Lin’s, governed by the
    2   amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by
    3   the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the
    4   totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on
    5   the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the
    6   plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his
    7   statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart
    8   of the applicant’s claim.”   See 8 U.S.C.
    9   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    ,
    10   167 (2d Cir. 2008).
    11       Although we “defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
    12   determination unless, from the totality of the
    13   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
    14   could make such an adverse credibility ruling,” Xiu Xia Lin,
    15   
    534 F.3d at 167
    , the IJ’s adverse credibility determination
    16   here is not supported by substantial evidence, as it is
    17   based on mischaracterizations of the record, see Tian-Yong
    18   Chen v. INS, 
    359 F.3d 121
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2004).
    19       The IJ based his credibility finding solely on two
    20   purported inconsistencies in Lin’s testimony:
    21   (1) inconsistent testimony regarding the “diagnosis” of a
    22   childhood injury that Lin sustained, which partially
    3
    1   motivated him to take up the practice of Falun Gong; and
    2   (2) Lin’s testimony that he had seen a doctor after being
    3   beaten in police custody, followed by his testimony that he
    4   had not seen a doctor and had merely purchased medicine to
    5   treat his own wounds.    First, the precise diagnosis or
    6   nature of Lin’s childhood injury was never raised during his
    7   testimony, as neither party nor the IJ asked Lin about this
    8   topic, and thus, the IJ’s finding that Lin testified
    9   inconsistently about his injury is without support in the
    10   record.   Such a finding is the result of flawed fact-finding
    11   and does not “bear a legitimate nexus to the [IJ’s
    12   credibility] finding.”    Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 166
    ; see
    13   Singh v. Mukasey, 
    553 F.3d 207
    , 213 (2d Cir. 2009).
    14       Furthermore, as to the purported inconsistency in Lin’s
    15   testimony regarding whether he saw a doctor upon his release
    16   from police custody, the complete record supports Lin’s
    17   contention that he was briefly confused about the
    18   government’s question, and immediately clarified his
    19   testimony when the confusion was resolved.    While Lin did at
    20   one point state that he saw a doctor upon release from
    21   detention, the context of Lin’s entire direct and cross
    22   examination, which is marked by other moments of
    4
    1   miscommunication between Lin and the government, suggests
    2   that Lin could have been referring to his visits to a doctor
    3   years before for his childhood injury.   Upon clarifying
    4   questions from the government, Lin explained this reference
    5   and testified, consistently with previous and later
    6   testimony, that after his release from detention he
    7   purchased ointment with which he treated his own wounds.
    8   See Tian-Yong Chen, 
    359 F.3d at 129
    ; Dong Gao v. BIA, 482
    
    9 F.3d 122
    , 128-34 (2d Cir. 2007) (purported inconsistencies
    10   which actually resulted from confusion during questioning,
    11   and which were followed by consistent testimony, were
    12   improper basis for adverse credibility determination).
    13       Given the ambiguity in the record on this point, Lin’s
    14   purported inconsistency regarding seeing a doctor upon
    15   release from custody, standing alone, does not constitute
    16   substantial evidence to support the IJ’s adverse credibility
    17   determination.   But the IJ’s credibility determination
    18   relied on this purported inconsistency, in conjunction
    19   solely with the inconsistency finding regarding Lin’s
    20   childhood injury—San inconsistency finding clearly not
    21   supported by the record.   In such circumstances, we must
    22   conclude that there is a realistic possibility that, absent
    23   the IJ’s errors, the IJ or BIA might have reached a
    5
    1   different conclusion.     See Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of
    2   Justice, 
    428 F.3d 391
    , 401 (2d Cir. 2005).      We therefore
    3   remand for further proceedings regarding Lin’s eligibility
    4   for asylum or withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C.
    5   § 1231(b)(3).
    6       If upon remand Lin is found to be credible as to his
    7   practice of Falun Gong in China or the United States, the
    8   agency should address his claim that there is a “pattern or
    9   practice” of persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in
    10   China, to the extent that reaching this claim is necessary
    11   to resolve his eligibility for asylum or withholding of
    12   removal.   See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(2)(iii).     Finally,
    13   because Lin fails to argue sufficiently that he is entitled
    14   to protection under the CAT, his petition is denied as to
    15   CAT relief.     See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    ,
    16   545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
    17       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    18   GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the case REMANDED
    19   for further proceedings consistent with this order.      As we
    20   have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of
    21   removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.      Any pending
    22   request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in
    6
    1   accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
    2   34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    3                              FOR THE COURT:
    4                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    7