Rebecca Roberts v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule
65(D), this Memorandum Decision
shall not be regarded as precedent
or cited before any court except for
the purpose of establishing the Jun 26 2014, 7:09 am
defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CHRISTOPHER L. CLERC GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
REBECCA ROBERTS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 03A01-1311-CR-498
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Stephen R. Heimann, Judge
Cause No. 03C01-0704-FB-748
June 26, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Rebecca Roberts appeals the trial court’s decision ordering her to serve the entire
previously-suspended sentence following her probation violation. We affirm.
Issue
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
Roberts to serve the entire previously-suspended sentence.
Facts
On March 31, 2008, Rebecca Roberts pled guilty to Class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine. On May 5, 2008, the trial court sentenced Roberts to eighteen years
imprisonment with six-years suspended to supervised probation, eighteen months of which
were to be in community corrections. Roberts was released from prison on March 25, 2012
and was placed in community corrections. As a condition of her probation, Roberts was to
abstain from using illegal drugs and submit to random drug screens. During an orientation
monitoring on April 18, 2012, Roberts was administered a drug screen that had a positive
presence for methamphetamine. On April 26, 2012, Roberts returned to fill out her work
schedule and was given an instant test and drug screen that was positive for
methamphetamine and marijuana. Roberts then cut off her electronic monitoring bracelet
and absconded from community corrections day reporting.
On May 1, 2012, the Bartholomew County Probation Department filed an amended
verified petition to revoke Roberts’s probation alleging that she violated the terms and
conditions of her probation by using methamphetamine and marijuana, by absconding from
day reporting, and by being arrested for possession of marijuana and a syringe. On May
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4, 2012, a warrant for her arrest was issued. Roberts remained at large for approximately
sixteen months until she was arrested on August 30, 2013, on charges of possession of
marijuana and a syringe. At the revocation hearing Roberts admitted to using
methamphetamine and marijuana that resulted in her positive screens on April 26, 2012, to
cutting off her electronic ankle bracelet, and to fleeing. Roberts also admitted that these
acts constituted violations of the terms of her probation. The trial court found that Roberts
violated her probation based upon these admissions and ordered that Roberts serve the
entire previously-suspended six-year portion of her sentence. Roberts now appeals.
Analysis
Roberts challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court after she admitted that
she violated probation. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a
right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.
2007). “If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s
conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation, we will affirm its
decision to revoke probation.” Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995). Upon
a finding of a probation violation, a trial court may: (1) continue the defendant on
probation; (2) extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the
original period; and/or (3) order all or part of a previously-suspended sentence to be
executed. Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Ind. Code
§ 35-38-2-3(g)). Proof of a single violation of the conditions of a defendant’s probation is
sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke probation. Hubbard v. State, 683
N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). When a trial court exercises the third option, a
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defendant is entitled to challenge the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. Id.
“An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. A defendant cannot collaterally
attack the propriety of an original sentence in the context of a probation revocation
proceeding. Abernathy v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However,
a defendant is entitled to challenge the sentence a trial court decides to impose after
revoking probation. Id.
Here, Roberts argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give
mitigating weight to the admission of her probation violations and by relying on Roberts’s
poor attitude as justification for revocation of the entire suspended sentence. Roberts was
arrested for possession of marijuana and a syringe, was at large for nearly sixteen months,
cut off her electronic ankle bracelet, absconded from day reporting requirements and tested
positive for methamphetamine on two occasions after being convicted of a
methamphetamine offense. Tr. pp. 17-23. The trial court found home detention through
the use of an electronic ankle bracelet inappropriate for Roberts because of her lengthy
history of numerous probation revocations and her admission that she cut off her
previously-issued bracelet. Id. at 32-33. This sentence is reasonable and not an abuse of
discretion.
Roberts relies on a case from our supreme court where the defendant challenged an
original sentence of fifty years imprisonment for possession of methamphetamine alleging
that his sentence was excessive due to the trial court failing to give adequate weight to
mitigating circumstances. See Cotto v. State, 829 N.E2d 520, 523-24 (Ind. 2005).
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However, this case does not govern our analysis. Roberts has already been sentenced and
is being ordered during a revocation proceeding to serve her original sentence in prison.
Roberts also relies upon on Puckett. In Puckett, the defendant pled guilty to one
count of Class C felony child molesting. Puckett, 956 N.E.2d at 1184. After he later
admitted to violating his probation, the trial court imposed the entirety of his previously-
suspended sentence. Id. at 1186. In doing so, the trial court expressed displeasure with
Pucketts plea agreement, which it described as generous, and found that Puckett had
committed a more serious offense than the one to which he pled guilty. Id. at 1186-87.
The trial court also referenced probation violation allegations that had been dismissed. Id.
On appeal, Puckett challenged the imposition of the entire previously-suspended sentence,
arguing that the trial court had erred in many ways, including by considering charges
dismissed as part of a plea agreement. Id. We reversed the trial court, noting that a
defendant who enters into a plea agreement is entitled to the benefits of that bargain and
cannot be punished for perceived leniency at the original sentencing. Id. This court also
held that the trial court erred by relying upon dismissed probation violation allegations and
a desire to send a personal philosophical message when deciding what sentence to impose.
Id.
Puckett is distinguishable from this case. Puckett involves sentencing that stems
directly from the plea agreement at issue. That is not this case. In this case, the trial court
considered Roberts’s criminal history and previous rehabilitative attempts outside of a
penal facility that were unsuccessful. The trial court additionally found electronic ankle
bracelet monitoring insufficient due to Roberts’ admission to cutting off her previously-
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issued bracelet. We find no evidence that the trial court considered any dismissed charges,
dismissed probation violations, or any perceived leniencies in the original sentence. Taken
together with the trial court’s statement of reasons for imposing the entire suspended six-
year sentence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Conclusion
The trial court’s imposition of the entire suspended sentence upon Roberts’s
admission that she violated probation was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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