Keith D. Bott v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before                                         Jun 18 2014, 10:50 am
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                             ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    WILLIAM BYER, JR.                                   GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Byer & Byer                                         Attorney General of Indiana
    Anderson, Indiana
    ANDREW FALK
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    KEITH D. BOTT,                                      )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                         )
    )
    vs.                                  )      No. 48A02-1312-CR-1058
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                   )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                          )
    APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Angela Warner Sims, Judge
    Cause No. 48C02-0905-FC-221
    June 18, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY, Judge
    Keith D. Bott appeals the revocation of his probation. He alleges the evidence is not
    sufficient to establish he violated his probation by committing the Class A misdemeanor
    intimidation.1 We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On May 1, 2009, Bott was charged with Class C felony forgery2 and Class D felony
    attempt to obtain controlled substance by fraud or deceit.3 Bott entered a plea agreement, and
    his resulting sentence was four years on probation.
    On September 26, 2013, the State filed an Amended Notice of Violation of Probation
    that alleged Bott committed intimidation. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on
    November 5, 2013, at which Bott’s father, Timothy K. Bott, and a family friend, Cynthia
    Miller, testified.
    Timothy testified Bott telephoned him multiple times between August 22, 2013, and
    September 13, 2013. In these calls, Bott claimed he would be “coming with artillery” and he
    was the “angel of death.” (Tr. at 7-8.)
    Miller testified she received fifteen to twenty calls from Bott starting on September 4,
    2013, and she had charges filed against Bott for the threats he was making in these phone
    calls. In one voicemail Bott left for Miller, Bott stated: “I’m going to round you up and
    we’re going to shoot every one of you God-damned nasty-assed females in the head . . . you
    wanna play snitch and God, you’re going to go down for your shit . . . .” (Ex. A.) Miller
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1
    .
    2
    
    Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2
    .
    3
    
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7
    .
    2
    identified the caller as Bott because in the voicemail Bott said his full name. Timothy also
    identified Bott as the caller on Miller’s voicemail.
    The trial court found that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
    Bott had committed intimidation. It revoked Bott’s probation and ordered him to serve his
    remaining sentence in the Department of Correction.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    There was sufficient evidence to prove Bott violated the terms of his probation by
    committing intimidation. Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature and the
    violation need be proved by only a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3
    (e);
    Thornton v. State, 
    792 N.E.2d 94
    , 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). When reviewing the revocation
    decision, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without assessing
    credibility of the witnesses. McHenry v. State, 
    820 N.E.2d 124
    , 126 (Ind. 2005). We affirm
    unless the trial court abused its discretion. Sanders v. State, 
    825 N.E.2d 952
    , 956 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2005).
    If a person on probation commits another crime, the court may revoke probation. 
    Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1
    (b). It is not necessary that the State show the probationer was convicted of
    a new crime. Whatley v. State, 
    847 N.E.2d 1007
    , 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The State must
    demonstrate the commission of that new crime by only a preponderance of the evidence.
    Heaton v. State, 
    984 N.E.2d 614
    , 617 (Ind. 2013).
    To establish Bott committed Class A misdemeanor intimidation, the State was
    required to show Bott (1) communicated a threat, (2) to another person, (3) with intent that
    3
    the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-45
    -
    2-1(a)(2). The trial court found Bott communicated threats to Miller by making phone calls
    and leaving voicemails that contained threats. The issue is whether the State proved by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Bott made the phone calls with intent to put Miller in fear
    for a prior lawful act.      Bott argues there was no prior lawful act for which he was
    threatening Miller. In Casey v. State, we addressed the meaning of “prior lawful act”:
    BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 885 (6th ed.1990), defines “lawful” as:
    “Legal; warranted or authorized by the law; having the qualifications
    prescribed by law; not contrary to nor forbidden by the law; not illegal.”
    “Retaliation” is defined as “to repay in kind; to return for like; to get revenge.”
    WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 999 (10th ed.1993). Construing
    these words together, it is apparent that the legislature intended to require the
    State to prove that the victim had engaged in a prior act, which was not
    contrary to the law, and that the defendant intended to repay the victim for the
    prior lawful act.
    
    676 N.E.2d 1069
    , 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
    In H.J. v. State, 
    746 N.E.2d 400
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), H.J. argued there was no
    evidence her threats against a fellow student were made in retaliation for a prior lawful act.
    H.J. and another student prepared a list of teachers and students entitled “LaPort-o-cide.” 
    Id. at 401
    . They referred to the list as the names of people they would kill. 
    Id.
     S.J. noticed she
    and her brother were on the list, and she reported it to school officials. 
    Id.
     After learning
    S.J. had reported the list, H.J threatened to kill her. 
    Id. at 402
    . The court inferred H.J.’s
    threats were related to the lawful act of S.J. turning in the list of names H.J. created. 
    Id. at 403
    . The court therefore found H.J. had committed intimidation. 
    Id. at 404
    .
    Reporting improper behavior to authorities is commonly called “snitching.” Merriam-
    4
    Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited May 29, 2014).
    Snitching is the act for which Bott threatened Miller in the voicemail. Bott said “You wanna
    play snitch and God, you’re going to go down for your shit . . . .” (Ex. A.) As we have no
    reason to hold that “play[ing] snitch and God” are unlawful acts, the trial court correctly
    inferred Bott was threatening Miller in retaliation for a lawful act. See H.J., 
    746 N.E.2d at 403
     (holding report of improper behavior to authorities was lawful act and that threats made
    in retaliation therefore constituted crime of intimidation).
    CONCLUSION
    As there was sufficient evidence for the court to infer by a preponderance of the
    evidence that Bott committed intimidation, we find no abuse of discretion in the revocation
    of his probation. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 48A02-1312-CR-1058

Filed Date: 6/18/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021