United States v. Letcher , 640 F. App'x 59 ( 2016 )

14-4634
United States v. Letcher
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 23rd day of February, two thousand sixteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 DENNY CHIN,
8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
13 Appellee,
14
15 -v.- 14-4634
16
17 RYAN LETCHER,
18 Defendant-Appellant.
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
20
21 FOR APPELLEE: RAJIT S. DOSANJH (Tamara B.
22 Thomson, on the brief),
23 Assistant United States
24 Attorneys, for Richard S.
25 Hartunian, United States
26 Attorney for the Northern
27 District of New York, Syracuse,
28 New York.
1
1
2 FOR APPELLANT: BRUCE R. BRYAN, Syracuse, New
3 York.
4
5 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
6 Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.).
7
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
9 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
10 AFFIRMED.
11
12 Ryan Letcher appeals his conviction, after jury trial
13 before the United States District Court for the Northern
14 District of New York (McAvoy, J.), for knowingly and
15 willfully making a false writing knowing it to contain a
16 materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement in
17 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3). We assume the parties’
18 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
19 history, and the issues presented for review.
20
21 At the time of the offense conduct, Letcher was an
22 employee of BAE Systems, a Department of Defense (“DOD”)
23 contractor. Letcher composed and mailed a letter to Defense
24 Security Service, a DOD agency, that falsely asserted that
25 Letcher’s co-worker “Paul Heiland at BAE Systems in Johnson
26 City, NY is Foreign Intelligence.” App’x at 276. Letcher
27 argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
28 to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Letcher knew that
29 the statement (“Paul Heiland . . . is Foreign Intelligence”)
30 was false.
31
32 On a sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the
33 light most favorable to the government, and draw all
34 reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v.
35 Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v.
36 Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000). Viewed in this
37 light, the evidence is sufficient to support Letcher’s
38 conviction.
39
40 FBI Agent David Schutz investigated the allegation made
41 in Letcher’s letter and interviewed Letcher in the course of
42 his investigation. Schutz testified at trial that he asked
43 Letcher numerous times whether Letcher had any evidence that
44 Heiland was a foreign intelligence officer, or participating
2
1 in espionage or treason,1 and whether Letcher had any
2 logical reason for such a belief; Letcher provided no
3 information and offered only a vague claim that “things
4 weren’t adding up.” App’x at 170, 267.
5
6 In the interview, Letcher expressed “anger and . . .
7 disdain” toward Heiland, and appeared “obsessed” with
8 discussing their workplace conflicts. App’x at 151.
9 Letcher was particularly upset about his exclusion from a
10 patent application on which Heiland and other employees were
11 working; he told Schutz that this exclusion was “the
12 catalyst that prompted him to send the letter.” Id. Schutz
13 testified that Letcher claimed Heiland was “trying to
14 sabotage his career,” and that Letcher admitted “the reason
15 he sent that [letter] was his disdain” for Heiland. App’x
16 at 151, 153.
17
18 Both Heiland’s and Letcher’s trial testimony
19 corroborated that Letcher had been upset about the project
20 that involved the patent application.2 Heiland testified
21 that management had rejected Letcher’s approach to the
22 project, and Letcher then requested to leave the team.
23 Letcher testified that he believed it was Heiland’s fault
24 that Letcher had not received credit on the application or
25 the $800 bonus associated with a patent invention. Letcher
26 lodged an official complaint with the employer that Heiland
27 was getting credit for Letcher’s work.
28
1
As used in BAE Systems security training, which
Letcher attended annually, “Foreign Intelligence” referred
to a foreign government or terrorist organization--someone
“not acting on behalf of the United States”--seeking U.S.
technology or defense information. App’x at 51, 124-25.
2
At the close of the prosecution’s case, Letcher moved
for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29(a). The court denied the motion.
Letcher testified in his own defense; he then renewed his
Rule 29 motion, which the court again denied. Accordingly,
we may consider Letcher’s sufficiency challenge based on the
entire trial record, including his defense case. See United
States v. Velasquez, 271 F.3d 364, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2001);
see also United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1114 (2d
Cir. 1995).
3
1 Additionally, there was substantial evidence presented
2 regarding the steps Letcher took to conceal his identity.
3 The evidence was introduced through Agent Schutz’s testimony
4 as to Letcher’s prior statements, Letcher’s own testimony on
5 cross-examination, and testimony by forensic examiners.
6 Letcher waited until he was alone at the office; he inserted
7 a single page into the middle of an existing 30-to-40-page
8 document, then separated out that single page and typed the
9 accusation on it; he printed the new document from behind a
10 firewall so it “would be less scrutinized by any systems
11 administrator,” App’x at 150; and he made sure no temporary
12 file remained on the computer when he was done. Letcher
13 prepared the envelope address label in the same manner, and
14 took home the label template and burned it. The envelope
15 contained no postage or return address. The evidence also
16 suggested that Letcher took care to wear gloves when
17 handling the document and to avoid licking the envelope: the
18 fingerprint examiner was unable to detect Letcher’s prints
19 on the letter or envelope; and Letcher’s DNA was
20 undetectable on the envelope, which required moisture for
21 sealing.
22
23 It would have been reasonable for the jury to find from
24 Letcher’s failure to provide any specific explanation for
25 his purported belief that Heiland was “Foreign Intelligence”
26 that he did not in fact have such a belief. It would have
27 been reasonable for the jury to find, based on (inter alia)
28 Letcher’s statements to Schutz, that Letcher was motivated
29 by spite, and sought to harm Heiland’s reputation and career
30 to avenge Heiland’s (perceived) sabotage of Letcher’s own
31 career. And it would have been reasonable for the jury to
32 infer from this motivation that Letcher did not believe
33 Heiland to be a foreign agent, and knew that his statement
34 to that effect was false.3 See United States v. MacPherson,
3
The jury was free to reject as noncredible Letcher’s
explanations--for example, that Letcher had believed Heiland
excluded him from the patent project in order to discredit
Letcher at work, possibly because Heiland thought Letcher
was “on to him”; and that this in turn led Letcher to
believe Heiland “could possibly be foreign intelligence.”
App’x at 192, 198. See United States v. Frampton, 382 F.3d
213, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (“It is well-established that the
evaluation of witness credibility is a function of the jury
. . . .” (citation omitted)); see also United States v.
Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 577 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he jury was
4
1 424 F.3d 183, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The law . . .
2 recognizes that the mens rea elements of knowledge and
3 intent can often be proved through circumstantial evidence
4 and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.”); id. at 185
5 n.2 (“[E]vidence of motive . . . is a factor that a jury may
6 weigh in considering whether the totality of the
7 circumstances permits it to infer guilty knowledge . . .
8 beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The jury could have also
9 reasonably inferred that the extensive steps Letcher took to
10 avoid being connected to the letter signaled consciousness
11 of guilt (in this context, awareness that the statement was
12 false), particularly when contrasted to Letcher’s history of
13 lodging signed complaints at BAE Systems.
14
15 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
16 Letcher’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
17 the district court.
18
19 FOR THE COURT:
20 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
21
entitled to disbelieve [the defendant’s] testimony, and use
its disbelief to supplement the other evidence against
him.”).
5