West v. Nexpress Solutions, Inc. , 372 F. App'x 185 ( 2010 )

09-4009-cv
West v. Nexpress Solutions, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or
after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a
party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary
order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by
counsel.
At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, at 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,
on the 20th day of April, two thousand ten.
Present: PIERRE N. LEVAL,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________________________
JENNIFER WEST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v- No. 09-4009-cv
NEXPRESS SOLUTIONS, INC., EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY,
NEXPRESS SOLUTIONS, INC. SEVERANCE BENEFIT PLAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: J. NELSON THOMAS (Cristina A. Douglass, on
the brief), Thomas & Solomon LLP, Rochester,
N.Y.
For Defendants-Appellees: MEGHAN M. DIPASQUALE , Ward Norris Heller
& Reidy LLP, Rochester, N.Y.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
(Telesca, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-appellant Jennifer West appeals from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York (Telesca, J.) entered September 11, 2009, granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary
judgment, and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in her
favor. Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2003). Summary judgment
is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In an ERISA action where, as here,
“written plan documents confer upon a plan administrator the discretionary authority to
determine eligibility, we will not disturb the administrator’s ultimate conclusion unless it is
‘arbitrary and capricious.’” Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Upon consideration, and in light of these principles, we conclude that the district court
properly granted defendants’ summary judgment motion because the plan administrator did not
act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying plaintiff’s request for severance benefits. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the district court for substantially the same reasons as those
articulated by that court.
2
Plaintiff nevertheless argues that the district court’s judgment should be vacated because
that court erred in refusing to allow discovery regarding an “abundance of disputed factual
issues.” Pl. Brief at 24. We review such a refusal for abuse of discretion. See Gualandi v.
Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2004). Having carefully considered the record below and
the parties’ submissions to this Court, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it limited discovery to those matters relating to defendants’ treatment of
similarly situated employees.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the plan administrator’s denial of benefits was improperly
influenced by the administrator’s “conflict of interest as evaluator and payor of benefits.”
Hobson, 574 F.3d at 83. Plaintiff raised this argument for the first time in her reply brief on
appeal, however, and we thus decline to consider it here. See Diaz v. Paterson, 547 F.3d 88,
94-95 (2d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, defendants’ motion to strike that portion of plaintiff’s reply
brief is hereby DENIED as moot.
We have considered the remainder of plaintiff’s arguments and find them to be without
merit. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
3