Ray A. Chamorro v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    May 29 2014, 10:41 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    STEVEN KNECHT                                   GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C.                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Lafayette, Indiana
    KARL M. SCHARNBERG
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    RAY A. CHAMORRO,                                )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )      No. 91A05-1309-CR-445
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                               )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE WHITE SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack, Judge
    Cause No. 91D01-1210-MR-136
    May 29, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    RILEY, Judge
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant-Defendant, Ray Chamorro (Chamorro), appeals his conviction for Count
    I, murder, 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3
    .
    We affirm.
    ISSUES
    Chamorro raises two issues on appeal which we restate as follows:
    (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on
    self-defense; and
    (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting two autopsy
    photographs.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On October 1, 2012, Alexandria Chapman (Chapman) communicated to David
    Jones (Jones) that she wanted to “get high.” (Transcript p. 53). On the same day, Jones
    called Robert Breeden (Breeden), a drug supplier, met with him, and purchased a quarter
    gram of methamphetamine. Jones took it back to Chapman’s house. Also present at the
    house was Robby Brown (Brown) and Chamorro. According to Jones, he gave a little bit
    of the methamphetamine to Brown, Chamorro, and Chapman. He then used the rest of the
    methamphetamine. Jones never felt a rush. The next day, Jones received a phone call from
    Chris Martin (Martin), also a friend to Breeden, who told him that Breeden had sold him
    bad drugs. Soon after, Jones placed a call to Breeden and complained of the bad drugs.
    Breeden promised Jones he would take care of him the next time he cooked a batch.
    2
    On October 3, 2012, Chamorro, Jones, Brown, Chapman, and LaShae Ramsey
    (Ramsey) were hanging out at Brown’s house. That evening, Jones called Breeden several
    times, demanding that he delivers on his promise and replace the bad drugs. During one
    of the many phone calls that Jones made to Breeden, Tye Rentfrow (Rentfrow), a friend to
    Breeden and who also helped to manufacture the methamphetamine, grabbed the phone
    from Breeden and told Jones, “[y]ou’ll get it at [7:00] a.m.” (Tr. p. 58). Jones asked who
    he was talking to, and Rentfrow responded, “It’s your daddy, bitch.” 
    Id.
     The comment
    angered Jones, and he started arguing with Rentfrow. Jones kept calling Breeden’s phone,
    but every time either Rentfrow or Breeden would hang up. On one of the calls that went
    through, Chamorro grabbed the phone from Jones and started yelling at Rentfrow, asking
    him, “Do you know who the fuck you’re talking to, bitch? [] Where the fuck you at?” (Tr.
    p. 185).
    After the heated exchange, Chamorro and Jones decided to go find Rentfrow.
    Before that though, Chamorro wanted to go back to his house to obtain his gun. At the
    time, Ramsey was the only person who had a car. At first she refused to take Chamorro,
    but she eventually agreed. All five got in the car and drove to Chamorro’s house. After
    Chamorro retrieved his gun, Ramsey drove the men to Martin’s house. Martin’s house, to
    some extent, operated as a flop house where people, including Breeden spent time. On
    their way their way to Martin’s house, according to Ramsey, Jones asked Chamorro why
    he needed the gun and Chamorro responded by saying “I’m tired of people out here
    thinking I’m a bitch. I’m going to show them I ain’t a bitch.” (Tr. p. 498). Ramsey
    3
    dropped off Chamorro, Jones, and Brown at Martin’s house and then she left with
    Chapman.
    Once Chamorro, Jones, and Brown were inside the house, they found a passed out
    Martin in the hallway. Jones shook him aggressively until he woke up. Next, Chamorro
    pointed a gun to Martin’s head and asked him to call Breeden. Martin called Breeden and
    asked him to bring back his car which Breeden had been borrowing. Breeden promised
    Martin that he would be at Martin’s house in about ten minutes. They waited for about ten
    to fifteen minutes before Martin suggested that Breeden and Rentfrow might be down at
    “Tioga Bridge,” cooking methamphetamine. (Tr. p. 194). Just as the men were leaving
    Martin’s house, Breeden and Rentfrow pulled into the driveway in Martin’s car. Jones and
    Chamorro saw the car as they were walking away from the house, so they changed their
    course and ran toward Martin’s car. Rentfrow hopped out from the passenger seat. Once
    outside the car, Jones asked Rentfrow if he had called him a bitch, but Rentfrow denied
    having said that. At that moment, Jones punched Rentfrow in the face. Rentfrow staggered
    back toward the car but caught his balance and came right back. At that point, Chamorro
    pulled out his gun and shot straight at Rentfrow. Rentfrow ran from the scene screaming,
    clutching his chest but later fell at the corner of the Martin’s house. Chamorro also fired
    two additional shots toward the house as he was running away from the scene. During the
    same time or close to the end of the third shot, Jones, Brown, and Chamorro took off
    running in different directions but soon reunited at a high school nearby. Brown then called
    Ramsey and asked her to pick them up. Before Chamorro got inside the car, he hid the gun
    under a garbage can. While in the car, Chamorro admitted that he had shot Rentfrow in
    4
    the chest. Ramsey drove Chamorro and Jones to Chicago and returned to Indiana with
    Brown and Chapman. Meanwhile, at the crime scene, Breeden called 911, and shortly
    thereafter the police arrived, arrested Breeden and started their investigation.
    On October 26, 2012, the State filed an Information charging Chamorro with Count
    I, murder, I.C. § 35-42-1-3. On November 2, 2012, the State filed an amendment, adding,
    Count II, felony murder, I.C. § 35-42-1-1(3). However, on June 4, 2013, the State moved
    to dismiss the felony murder Count. A four-day jury trial was conducted from July 15
    through July 18, 2013. At trial, Chamorro requested a jury instruction for self-defense,
    which the trial court denied. At the close of the evidence, the jury found Chamorro guilty
    as charged. On August 22, 2013, the trial court sentenced him to sixty years, executed.
    Chamorro now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Self-Defense Instruction
    Chamorro contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct
    the jury on self-defense. The giving of jury instructions is a matter within the sound
    discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court’s refusal to give a tendered
    instruction for an abuse of that discretion. Creager v. State, 
    737 N.E.2d 771
    , 776 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2000), trans. denied. Generally, we will reverse a trial court for failure to give a
    tendered instruction if: (1) the instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) it is
    supported by the evidence; (3) it does not repeat material adequately covered by other
    instructions; and (4) the substantial rights of the tendering party would be prejudiced by
    the court’s failure to give it. 
    Id.
    5
    Moreover, we note that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the jury
    instructed on any theory of defense that has some foundation in the evidence. 
    Id. at 777
    .
    We apply this rule even if the evidence is weak and inconsistent so long as the evidence
    presented at trial has some probative value to support it. 
    Id.
     Further, we recognize it is
    within the province of the jury to determine whether the defendant’s evidence was
    believable, unbelievable, or sufficient to warrant the use of force. 
    Id.
    Additionally, our supreme court set forth three factors that a defendant must prove
    to support his claim for self-defense: (1) that he was in a place where he had a right to be;
    (2) that he acted without fault; and (3) that he has a reasonable fear or apprehension of
    death or great bodily harm. Miller v. State, 
    720 N.E.2d 696
    , 700 (Ind. 1999).
    In denying Chamorro’s self-defense instruction, the trial court noted that Chamorro
    provoked and instigated the confrontation. We also note that Chamorro’s claim of self-
    defense failed in two ways—Chamorro did not act without fault, and he was not in
    reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. The evidence shows that it was Chamorro
    who brandished the gun and fired shots at Rentfrow. Prior to the shooting, Chamorro was
    angry at Rentfrow for disrespecting him on the phone. Chamorro and Jones wanted to find
    Rentfrow and seek revenge. First, they drove to Chamorro’s house, where Chamorro
    picked up his gun. Afterwards, Ramsey drove the men to Martin’s house. When they were
    inside Martin’s house, Chamorro pointed his gun at Martin and demanded that he call
    Breeden. When Breeden and Rentfrow pulled into the driveway, both Chamorro and Jones,
    who were walking away from Martin’s house, changed their course and ran toward the car
    to confront Breeden and Rentfrow. When Rentfrow jumped out of the vehicle, neither
    6
    Chamorro nor Jones retreated. Instead, Jones punched Rentfrow in the face, and Chamorro
    pulled out his gun and shot Rentfrow.
    Moreover, the evidence does not show that Chamorro was in reasonable fear of
    death or great bodily harm. Chamorro’s self-serving testimony that during the altercation,
    Rentfrow dipped his hands in his sweater as if to reach out for “something steel” from his
    pocket, is simply a request for this court to reweigh the evidence and credit his version of
    events, which we will not do.
    In addition, the trial court’s decision refusing to tender the self-defense instruction
    was premised on the fact that Chamorro was the initial aggressor and that he first opened
    fire to an unarmed Rentfrow. Lastly, we find that Chamorro’s use of force was excessive,
    thus his right to claim self-defense was extinguished. See Mateo v. State, 
    981 N.E.2d 59
    ,
    72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
    In sum, because there is no evidence to support the tendering of the instruction, we
    conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a self-defense
    instruction.
    II. Autopsy Photographs
    Lastly, Chamorro argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
    into evidence, over his objection, the autopsy photographs at trial.
    The admission and exclusion of photographic evidence falls within the trial court's
    sound discretion and we review the admission of said evidence for an abuse of discretion.
    Alsheik v. Guerrero, 956 N .E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh’g denied. Relevant
    photographic evidence is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed
    7
    by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
    Id.
     Gory and revolting photographs may be admissible
    as long as they are relevant to some material issue or show scenes that a witness could
    describe orally. 
    Id.
     Photographs, even those gruesome in nature, are admissible if they act
    as interpretative aids for the jury and have strong probative value. 
    Id.
     The potential that
    passions may be aroused by the gruesomeness of the photograph is not sufficient grounds
    for exclusion if the photograph is material and relevant. 
    Id.
    Further, autopsy photos often present a unique problem because the pathologist has
    manipulated the corpse in some way during the autopsy. Therefore, autopsy photographs
    are generally inadmissible if they show the body in an altered condition. 
    Id.
     This is so
    because the photographs may impute to the accused the handiwork of the pathologist and
    thereby render the defendant responsible in the minds of the jurors for the cuts, incisions,
    and indignity of an autopsy. Custis v. State, 
    793 N.E.2d 1220
    , 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
    trans. denied. However, there are situations where some alteration of the body is necessary
    to demonstrate witness testimony. See 
    id.
    The two photographs at issue were State’s Exhibits 15 and 17. The first showed a
    metal dowel inserted into the bullet wound, and the second showed Rentfrow’s heart held
    outside the body with the metal dowel rod inserted.             Chamorro argues that these
    photographs were irrelevant in establishing Rentfrow’s cause of death because it was not
    disputed that he died from a bullet wound. Also, Chamorro argues that the photographs
    were gruesome in nature and had the potential risk of inflaming the passions of the jury.
    The State, however, maintains that these two photographs were helpful in assisting the jury
    8
    understand Chamorro’s stance during the shooting, and also visualize the trajectory of the
    bullet fired by Chamorro. We agree.
    The record reflects that the photographs were relevant in describing Rentfrow’s
    autopsy, including the procedures and the results. More importantly, the pathologist
    testified at trial that the “bullet went straight through the breastbone” and was on a “flat
    plane.” (Tr. p. 335). Thus, both autopsy photographs revealed that the wound inflicted on
    Rentfrow was on a level shot, and that Chamorro was standing in front of Rentfrow when
    he made the shot. Furthermore, the photographs also dispelled Chamorro’s claim that he
    fired the shots blindly, and not directly to Rentfrow, as he was running away from the
    scene.
    Moreover, the relevance of the photographs is not lessened by Chamorro’s claim
    that he did not contest Rentfrow’s cause of death. The State had to prove beyond
    reasonable doubt that Chamorro intentionally killed Rentfrow. It is well-established that
    “‘the State is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, and that a criminal
    defendant may not stipulate his or her way out of the full evidentiary force of the case to
    be presented against him or her [.]’” State v. Lewis, 
    883 N.E.2d 847
    , 853 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2008) (quoting Hines v. State, 
    801 N.E.2d 634
    , 635 (Ind. 2004)).
    Finally, the graphic and gruesome character of the photographs was not unfairly
    prejudicial simply because they depicted the autopsy. The pathologist testified in depth
    about the autopsy, how it was performed, and that he inserted the dowel rods so as to show
    the trajectory of the bullet. Further, the jury was not so overcome with passion that it
    unintelligently convicted Chamorro.
    9
    In conclusion, we find that the autopsy photographs were relevant and their
    probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to Chamorro. Accordingly, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by admitting these photographs into evidence at
    Chamorro’s trial.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense or by admitting the autopsy photographs into
    evidence.
    Affirmed.
    ROBB, J. and BRADFORD, J. concur
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 91A05-1309-CR-445

Filed Date: 5/29/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021