Alan Ramsey v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    Apr 30 2014, 6:51 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the
    case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    MARK S. LENYO                                    GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    South Bend, Indiana                              Attorney General of Indiana
    CHANDRA K. HEIN
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    ALAN RAMSEY,                                     )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                      )
    )
    vs.                                )      No. 71A03-1308-CR-341
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                       )
    APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Jerome Frese, Judge
    Cause No. 71D03-1212-FA-32
    April 30, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SHEPARD, Senior Judge
    Alan Ramsey coerced his young niece to put her hand on his penis and to put her
    mouth on his penis. A jury convicted him of class C felony child molesting and class A
    felony child molesting. He appeals only the C felony conviction. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Ramsey frequently babysat his six-year-old niece, A.W. One day, Ramsey turned
    off the television show A.W. was watching and had her come with him to his room. He
    said they were going to play a game. Ramsey closed the door and took off his pants. He
    told her to hold his penis, and she did. Next, he told her to put her mouth on his penis.
    When she declined, he repeated his demand, and she complied.
    The State charged Ramsey with A felony and C felony child molesting. Ind. Code
    § 35-42-4-3 (2007). A jury determined that he was guilty as charged, and the trial court
    sentenced him accordingly. This appeal followed.
    ISSUES
    Ramsey raises two issues:
    I.      Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain his C felony conviction.
    II.     Whether Ramsey’s conviction for C felony child molesting violates the
    Indiana Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause.1
    1
    Ramsey cites the Fifth Amendment in passing, but his analysis focuses upon Indiana’s Double Jeopardy
    Clause. We thus do not address the Fifth Amendment.
    2
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine only the probative
    evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict. Lock v. State, 
    971 N.E.2d 71
    , 74 (Ind. 2012). We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh the evidence
    to determine if it was sufficient to support a conviction. 
    Id. We affirm
    the conviction
    unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt. 
    Id. To obtain
    a conviction of child molesting as a class C felony, the State must prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) with a child under fourteen years of age
    (2) performed or submitted to any fondling or touching (3) of either the child or the older
    person (4) with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the
    older person. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).
    Ramsey says A.W. did not touch him other than to place her mouth on his penis,
    which was the subject of the A felony charge.
    The evidence shows otherwise. Ramsey’s recorded interview with the police was
    played for the jury. During the interview, Ramsey told an officer that he directed A.W. to
    hold his penis and subsequently demanded that she put her mouth on it, and that she had
    done both. State’s Ex. 3 at 10:51:03-10:55:58. Ramsey’s citation to A.W.’s testimony
    that she did not touch his penis with her hand merely establishes an evidentiary dispute,
    which was for the finder of fact to resolve.
    3
    II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
    Article 1, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides in part, “No person shall
    be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Two or more offenses are the “same
    offense” for purposes of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause if, with respect to either the
    statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the
    essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of
    another challenged offense. Sloan v. State, 
    947 N.E.2d 917
    , 924 (Ind. 2011).
    Ramsey argues that his C felony conviction violates the actual evidence portion of
    the test.   Dual convictions cannot stand if a defendant demonstrates a reasonable
    possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the jury to establish elements of one offense
    may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged
    offense. 
    Id. As Justice
    David wrote for the Court in Sloan, “Application of the actual-
    evidence test requires a reviewing court to look at the evidence presented at trial and
    decide whether each challenged offense was established by separate, distinct facts.” 
    Id. As we
    noted above, the State presented evidence describing two closely-related
    but separate actions: A.W.’s holding of Ramsey’s penis upon his request and her
    subsequently placing her mouth on it at Ramsey’s insistence. As the Sloan Court noted,
    where there is “independent and distinct” evidence of two criminal acts of molestation,
    the fact that they occurred together does not demonstrate a double jeopardy violation. 
    Id. 4 That
    it did not lead to a violation in this case is buttressed by the prosecutor’s
    approach at trial. During opening and closing arguments the prosecutor described for the
    jury the evidence that supported each charge. See Tr. p. 190 (“I think that the defendant’s
    own statement, his own words are sufficient to allow you to be convinced beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the fondling occurred.”). As the Supreme Court did in Sloan, we
    conclude that Ramsey has failed to establish a reasonable possibility that the jury based
    both of his convictions on the same facts. On the other hand, we also think the trial judge
    was wise to impose concurrent sentences.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
    MATHIAS, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 71A03-1308-CR-341

Filed Date: 4/30/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021