Singh v. Holder , 379 F. App'x 15 ( 2010 )

09-1067-ag
Singh v. Holder
BIA
Vomacka, IJ
A078 947 494
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 26 th day of May, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
9 GERARD E. LYNCH,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _______________________________________
13
14 RANVEER PAL SINGH,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 09-1067-ag
18 NAC
19 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 ______________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Sebastian Maguire, Jackson Heights,
25 New York.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
28 General, Richard M. Evans, Assistant
29 Director, Joan E. Smiley, Trial
30 Attorney, Office of Immigration
1 Litigation, Civil Division, United
2 States Department of Justice,
3 Washington, D.C.
4
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
8 is DENIED.
9 Petitioner Ranveer Pal Singh, a native and citizen of
10 India, seeks review of a February 17, 2009, order of the BIA
11 affirming the September 24, 2007, decision of Immigration
12 Judge (“IJ”) Alan A. Vomacka, denying his application for
13 asylum and withholding of removal. In re Ranveer Pal Singh,
14 No. A078 947 494 (B.I.A. Feb. 17, 2009), aff’g No. A078 947
15 494 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 24, 2007). We assume the
16 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
17 procedural history in this case.
18 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
19 decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen
20 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The
21 applicable standards of review are well established. See
22 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110
23 (2d Cir. 2008); Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
24 2008).
2
1 The BIA reasonably found that even assuming his
2 credibility, Singh failed to demonstrate that he suffered
3 past persecution. In order to constitute persecution, the
4 alleged past harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above
5 “mere harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
6 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006). In his brief, Singh
7 argues that the agency erred in determining that he was
8 “merely harassed” by members of the Muslim League Party in
9 light of the “frequency and severity” of his encounters with
10 them. Although we have explained that “violent conduct
11 generally goes beyond the mere annoyance and distress that
12 characterize harassment,” id. at 342, we have never held
13 that all forms of physical mistreatment rise to the level of
14 persecution. Rather, the difference between persecution and
15 harassment “must be assessed with regard to the context in
16 which the mistreatment occurs.” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467
17 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (cautioning the BIA to be
18 “keenly sensitive” to the fact that a “‘minor beating’ or,
19 for that matter, any physical degradation designed to cause
20 pain, humiliation, or other suffering, may rise to the level
21 of persecution if it occurred in the context of an arrest or
22 detention on the basis of a protected ground”). We are
3
1 satisfied that the BIA considered the context of the
2 incidents Singh described and find no error in its
3 conclusion that they did not rise to the level of
4 persecution. Cf. Baba v. Holder, 569 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.
5 2009).
6 Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
7 conclusion that Singh failed to demonstrate that he had a
8 well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
9 § 1208.13(b)(2)(i). An applicant is not eligible for asylum
10 when he “could avoid future persecution by relocating to
11 another part of [his] country of nationality or, if
12 stateless, another part of [his] country of last habitual
13 residence, if under all the circumstances it would be
14 reasonable to expect [him] to do so.” See 8 C.F.R.
15 §§ 1208.13(b)(2)(ii), 1208.16(b)(2). In making his
16 relocation finding, the IJ noted that although Singh
17 testified that he would be targeted by a Muslim group in the
18 city where his family lives, India is a “vast
19 country . . . that is most strongly non-Muslim.” See 8
20 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). The IJ further found that Singh
21 could relocate to the northern part of the state (which is
22 heavily populated by Sikhs) or to another state within India
4
1 where Muslims are not the majority group. Singh argues that
2 the agency erred in finding that he could relocate because
3 the Muslim League Party has “branches and . . . members all
4 over” India and that the Indian government cannot control
5 them. However, we are not compelled to conclude, contrary
6 to the agency, that relocation was not a reasonable option
7 for Singh. Finally, the record does not support Singh’s
8 argument that the agency “overlooked” the documentary
9 evidence he submitted. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of
10 Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17. (2d Cir. 2006)
11 (“presum[ing] that [the agency] has taken into account all
12 of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly
13 suggests otherwise”).
14 Because Singh was unable to demonstrate his eligibility
15 for asylum, the agency reasonably denied his application for
16 withholding of removal, as it was based on the same factual
17 predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.
18 2006). Additionally, contrary to Singh’s argument, the
19 agency did not err in failing to consider his application
20 for CAT relief because in this Court’s July 2006 order
21 remanding his case to the BIA, we found that he waived any
22 challenge to the agency’s denial of his application for CAT
5
1 relief. That finding remains the law of the case. See
2 Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2009).
3 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
4 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
5 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
6 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
7 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
8 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
9 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
10 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
11 FOR THE COURT:
12 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
13
6