Shahabdeen v. Holder , 362 F. App'x 208 ( 2010 )


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  •          09-1855-ag
    Shahabdeen v. Holder
    BIA
    Abrams, IJ
    A099 927 169
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    4       New York, on the 27 th day of January, two thousand ten.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN,
    8                JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    9                DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    10                         Circuit Judges.
    11       _______________________________________
    12
    13       MOHAMED SHIFAN MOHAMED SHAHABDEEN,
    14                Petitioner,
    15
    16                          v.                                  09-1855-ag
    17                                                              NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20                Respondent.
    21       _______________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONER:                 Benjamin B. Xue, New York, New York.
    24
    1    FOR RESPONDENT:        Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    2                           General, Civil Division; M. Jocelyn
    3                           Lopez Wright, Senior Litigation
    4                           Counsel; Kristin K. Edison,
    5                           Attorney, Office of Immigration
    6                           Litigation, United States Department
    7                           of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    8
    9        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
    12   is GRANTED.
    13       Mohamed Shifan Mohamed Shahabdeen, a native and citizen
    14   of Sri Lanka, seeks review of an April 9, 2009 order of the
    15   BIA, affirming the November 7, 2007 decision of Immigration
    16   Judge (“IJ”) Steven R. Abrams, which denied his application
    17   for asylum, granted withholding of removal to Sri Lanka, and
    18   declined to reach his request for relief under the
    19   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).     In re Mohamed Shifan
    20   Mohamed Shahabdeen, No. A099 927 169 (B.I.A. Apr. 9, 2009),
    21   aff’g No. A099 927 169 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 7, 2007).
    22   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    23   and procedural history in this case.
    24       Under the circumstances of this case, we review both
    25   the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions.     See Yan Chen v. Gonzales,
    26   
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).     The applicable standards
    27   of review are well-established.     See 8 U.S.C.
    2
    1    § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 
    519 F.3d 90
    ,
    2    95 (2d Cir. 2008).
    3        In denying Shahahbdeen’s application for asylum, the
    4    agency concluded that he was firmly resettled in Dubai,
    5    United Arab Emirates (“U.A.E.”) prior to his arrival in the
    6    United States.   
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.15
    .    We have held that in
    7    determining the issue of firm resettlement, the agency
    8    should apply a totality of the circumstances test.        See Sall
    9    v. Gonzales, 
    437 F.3d 229
    , 232-33 (2d Cir. 2006).     Under
    10   this test, the agency may look beyond the presence of a
    11   formal offer of permanent residence from a third country and
    12   examine the “totality of the alien’s circumstances” to
    13   determine whether the applicant has found an “alternative
    14   place[] of refuge abroad.”     Id; see also Jin Yi Liao v.
    15   Holder, 
    558 F.3d 152
    , 157-58 (2d Cir. 2009).     Factors the
    16   agency may consider include: “whether [the applicant]
    17   intended to settle in [the country] when he arrived there,
    18   whether he has family ties there, whether he has business or
    19   property connections that connote permanence, and whether he
    20   enjoyed the legal rights–such as the right to work and enter
    21   and leave the country at will–that permanently settled
    22   persons can expect to have.”     Sall, 
    437 F.3d at 235
    .
    23       Here, the agency found that Shahabdeen had resettled in
    3
    1    the U.A.E. because he lived there for three and a half
    2    years, had work authorization, employment, and lodging at a
    3    hotel, was able to renew his residence permit, and had
    4    family ties to the country.   However, we find that the
    5    agency erred by failing to consider material evidence
    6    weighing against this conclusion.   See Jorge-Tzoc v.
    7    Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 146
    , 150 (2d Cir. 2006).   Specifically,
    8    the agency neglected to consider that Shahabdeen’s residence
    9    permit was valid for only a temporary period, that he had
    10   difficulty renewing it, and that his continued ability to
    11   remain in the U.A.E. was entirely dependent on his continued
    12   employment.   Although Shahabdeen’s brother lived in the
    13   U.A.E., he was also a temporary worker.   Finally, the agency
    14   failed to discuss Shahabdeen’s testimony that the U.A.E.
    15   does not offer citizenship, permanent residence, or asylum
    16   to non-nationals, and thus, as a temporary resident of that
    17   country, he was not guaranteed safety from persecution. *
    18       While Shahabdeen further argues that he qualifies for
    19   an exception to the statutory bar to asylum for firm
    *
    We also note the argument Shahabdeen raised in his
    brief before the BIA that foreign workers in Dubai have
    few of the same rights as U.A.E. citizens, including
    redress for employment grievances and rights to own real
    property.
    4
    1    resettlement, he failed to raise this issue in his appeal to
    2    the BIA.   Because the Government has raised this failure to
    3    exhaust in its brief to this Court, we decline to consider
    4    this issue.   Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    480 F.3d 5
       104, 119-20, 124 (2d Cir. 2007).
    6        Ultimately, the agency erred by failing to consider
    7    material evidence relevant to whether Shahabdeen was firmly
    8    resettled in the U.A.E.   See Jorge-Tzoc, 
    435 F.3d at 150
    .
    9    Because the IJ found that Shahabdeen established that he
    10   would face persecution if returned to Sri Lanka, remand is
    11   warranted for reconsideration of the record evidence and of
    12   Shahabdeen’s eligibility for asylum.
    13       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    14   GRANTED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    15   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    16   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    17   this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
    18   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    19   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    20   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    21                                 FOR THE COURT:
    22                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    23
    24
    5