United States v. Brickhouse , 517 F. App'x 22 ( 2013 )


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  •      11-1698-cr
    United States v. Brickhouse
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
    DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
    SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 4th day of April, two thousand thirteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
    7                              Chief Judge,
    8                AMALYA L. KEARSE,
    9                SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    10                              Circuit Judges.
    11
    12       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    13       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    14                Appellee,
    15
    16                    -v.-                                               11-1698-cr
    17
    18       RICKY J. BRICKHOUSE,
    19                Defendant-Appellant,
    20       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    21
    22       FOR APPELLANT:                        FRANCISCO E. CELEDONIO, Law
    23                                             Office of Francisco E.
    24                                             Celedonio, Esq., New York, New
    25                                             York.
    26
    27       FOR APPELLEE:                         NICHOLAS L. MCQUAID (Katherine
    28                                             Polk Failla, on the brief),
    1
    1                              Assistant United States
    2                              Attorneys, for Preet Bharara,
    3                              United States Attorney for the
    4                              Southern District of New York,
    5                              New York, New York.
    6
    7        Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    8   Court for the Southern District of New York (Karas, J.).
    9
    10        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    11   AND DECREED that this appeal from the judgment of the
    12   district court be DISMISSED.
    13
    14        Ricky J. Brickhouse appeals from the judgment of the
    15   United States District Court for the Southern District of
    16   New York (Karas, J.), sentencing him to 120 months’
    17   imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and
    18   to 84 months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently, for
    19   distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack
    20   cocaine. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    21   underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
    22   presented for review.
    23
    24        As an initial matter, the prior decision by a motions
    25   panel of this Court to deny the government’s motion to
    26   dismiss this appeal on the basis of Brickhouse’s appeal
    27   waiver (see Mot. Order, United States v. Brickhouse, No. 11-
    28   1698 (Dkt. No. 83) (Aug. 15, 2012)) is not binding on the
    29   merits panel. See Rezzonico v. H&R Block, Inc., 
    182 F.3d 30
       144, 149 (2d Cir. 1999).
    31
    32        Brickhouse agreed to waive his right to appeal if he
    33   was sentenced to a prison term of 150 months or less, as he
    34   was. The colloquy at Brickhouse’s plea hearing makes clear
    35   that the appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary (see Plea
    36   Hr’g Tr. 36-38 (Sept. 10, 2010)), and such a waiver is not
    37   contrary to public policy. Brickhouse’s appeal waiver was
    38   valid when his plea was entered, and the waiver did not lose
    39   its effectiveness when the district court in a subsequent
    40   proceeding made statements arguably inconsistent with that
    41   waiver. No justifiable reliance could have been placed on
    42   such post-plea statements. See United States v. Fisher, 232
    
    43 F.3d 301
    , 304-05 (2d Cir. 2000).
    44
    2
    1        Even though the Supreme Court has since determined, in
    2   Dorsey v. United States, 
    132 S. Ct. 2321
     (2012), that the
    3   Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 may apply retroactively to
    4   criminal conduct completed before the Act’s effective date,
    5   the change in law does not render Brickhouse’s appellate
    6   waiver unenforceable. See United States v. Harrison, 699
    
    7 F.3d 158
    , 159 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Lee, 
    523 F.3d 8
       104, 107 (2d Cir. 2008).
    9
    10        For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
    11   Brickhouse’s other arguments, we DISMISS the appeal.
    12
    13                              FOR THE COURT:
    14                              CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    15
    16
    17
    18
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1698-cr

Citation Numbers: 517 F. App'x 22

Judges: Amalya, Carney, Dennis, Jacobs, Kearse, Susan

Filed Date: 4/4/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023