Accessabilities, Inc. v. Review Board of the Indiana Dept. of Workforce Development ( 2013 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not
    be regarded as precedent or cited                             FILED
    before any court except for the purpose                     Jan 29 2013, 9:07 am
    of establishing the defense of res
    judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law                          CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    of the case.                                                     court of appeals and
    tax court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    JOHN P. REED                                      GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Abrahamson Reed & Bilse                           Attorney General of Indiana
    Hammond, Indiana
    STEPHANIE ROTHENBERG
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    ACCESSABILITIES, INC.,                            )
    )
    Appellant,                                )
    )
    vs.                                )       No. 93A02-1207-EX-551
    )
    REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA                       )
    DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE                           )
    DEVELOPMENT,                                      )
    )
    Appellee.                                 )
    APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
    WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
    Case No. 12-R-1869
    January 29, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BARNES, Judge
    Case Summary
    AccessAbilities, Inc., (“Employer”) appeals decision of the Review Board of the
    Indiana Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”) regarding
    unemployment benefits for Michele Norris. We affirm.
    Issue
    Employer raises one issue, which we restate as whether the Review Board
    properly determined that Norris was not discharged for just cause.
    Facts
    Employer provides people with developmental disabilities and the aged with
    residential habilitation, community habilitation, and day services. Norris was employed
    as a developmental instructor with Employer beginning on February 4, 2008. Employer
    has a written policy and procedures manual, which includes a provision that:
    Any employee who receives three disciplinary reports, for
    any reason, in a three month period, will be subject to
    termination following the receipt of another Disciplinary
    Report (the 4th). Each of the Disciplinary Reports, up to the
    final report resulting in termination, will follow the
    procedures for discipline as delineated in this manual.
    App. p. 38.
    Norris received a Disciplinary Report on April 7, 2011, for using white-out on
    documentation after having been warned not to use white-out.         Norris submitted a
    corrective action plan, acknowledged that she had used white-out, and agreed that she
    would not use white-out on Employer’s forms again.
    2
    On June 8, 2011, Norris was observed raising her voice toward a consumer and
    using a “verbally abusive tone” with the consumer. Tr. p. 29. Employer learned that
    Norris was maintaining possession of the consumer’s debit card and cash. Employer
    filed a report with the State of Indiana and began a state-mandated investigation because
    the allegations involved abuse or exploitation. The allegations of abuse and exploitation
    could not be substantiated in the investigation, but Employer determined that Norris’s
    tone with the consumer was not appropriate. Norris was given another Disciplinary
    Report as a result of the inappropriate verbal interactions with the consumer.
    During the investigation of the June 8th incident, Norris was suspended from her
    employment and was not allowed to provide services to Employer’s consumers. Separate
    from her employment, Norris was a representative payee for one of Employer’s
    consumers.    Norris sent repeated disrespectful and inappropriate text messages to a
    supervisor, Heather Opperman, regarding the consumer’s care. Employer gave Norris a
    third Disciplinary Report as a result of the text messages. That Disciplinary Report
    informed Norris that “one more Disciplinary Report, in the month of June 2011, will
    result in termination from her position . . . .” App. p. 85.
    Norris was to remain suspended until she attended a New Employee Training class
    at 10:00 a.m. on June 29, 2011. However, Norris arrived late to the training. Employer
    contends that Norris arrived at 10:15 a.m., while Norris argues that she arrived at 10:04
    a.m. Norris was given a fourth Disciplinary Report because she was late for the training,
    and her employment was terminated by Employer.
    3
    Norris filed for unemployment benefits, and on February 27, 2012, a claims
    deputy of the Department of Workforce Development found that Norris was not
    discharged for just cause and was eligible for benefits. Employer appealed the deputy’s
    determination, and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). After
    the hearing, the ALJ issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon affirming the claims
    deputy’s determination. The Employer appealed the ALJ’s determination to the Review
    Board, which adopted and incorporated the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions
    thereon and affirmed the ALJ’s decision, which provided, in part:
    The employer did not present any documentary evidence to
    show that the fourth disciplinary report which resulted in the
    claimant’s discharge had followed the procedures for
    discipline as delineated in the manual. The employer did not
    present any evidence to show that a warning was to be issued
    to an individual who was four minutes late in reporting for a
    training. The other disciplinary reports did not deal with
    attendance issues.
    *****
    It is concluded that the rule that the employer was enforcing
    in this case was having greater than three disciplinary reports
    in a three month period. The last disciplinary report which
    brought about her discharge involved an alleged tardiness
    violation. It is concluded that the employer did not produce
    documentary evidence to show that the attendance policy was
    properly enforced. This procedure concerning greater than
    three disciplinary reports requires the employer to follow the
    procedures for discipline as delineated in the manual. The
    claimant was determined to be tardy because of arriving four
    minutes late for training. It is concluded that the employer
    did not present any documentary evidence to show that one
    incident of tardiness should result in a discharge.
    Further, the employer has admitted that the allegations made
    in the employee disciplinary report concerning the incident of
    4
    June 8 through June 10, 2011, (Employer’s Exhibit 10), were
    not substantiated. Therefore, the claimant did not accumulate
    more than three valid disciplinary reports during a three
    month period.
    It is concluded that the claimant did not violate the
    employer’s rule. It is concluded that the employer failed to
    meet its burden of proof to show that the claimant knowingly
    violated a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule concerning
    greater than three disciplinary reports in a three month period.
    Therefore, it is concluded that the claimant was discharged
    but not for just cause within the meaning and intent of I.C.
    22-4-15-1.
    Id. at 5-6. Employer now appeals.
    Analysis
    Employer argues that the Review Board erred when it found that Norris was
    eligible to receive unemployment benefits. On appeal, we review the Review Board’s (1)
    determinations of specific or basic underlying facts; (2) conclusions or inferences from
    those facts, or determinations of ultimate facts; and (3) conclusions of law. McClain v.
    Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
    693 N.E.2d 1314
    , 1317 (Ind. 1998).
    The Review Board’s findings of basic fact are subject to a “substantial evidence”
    standard of review. 
    Id.
     In this analysis, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the
    credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review
    Board’s findings. 
    Id.
     Reversal is warranted only if there is no substantial evidence to
    support the Review Board’s findings. 
    Id.
     (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Indiana
    Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
    656 N.E.2d 842
    , 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). Next, the Review
    Board’s determinations of ultimate facts, which involve an inference or deduction based
    upon the findings of basic fact, are generally reviewed to ensure that the Review Board’s
    5
    inference is reasonable.    Id. at 1317-18.       Finally, we review conclusions of law to
    determine whether the Review Board correctly interpreted and applied the law. McHugh
    v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
    842 N.E.2d 436
    , 440 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2006).
    In Indiana, an employee is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he or she is
    discharged for just cause. Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
    958 N.E.2d 1136
    , 1140-41 (Ind. 2011); 
    Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1
    . Indiana Code Section 22-4-
    15-1(d) delineates nine non-exclusive scenarios that can amount to “[d]ischarge for just
    cause,” which include “any breach of duty in connection with work which is reasonably
    owed an employer by an employee.”          The breach of duty “ground for just [cause]
    discharge is an amorphous one, without clearly ascertainable limits or definition, and
    with few rules governing its utilization.” Recker, 958 N.E.2d at 1140 (quoting Hehr v.
    Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t. Sec. Div., 
    534 N.E.2d 1122
    , 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)).
    In considering whether an employer may utilize this provision
    as a basis for justifying its action, the Board should consider
    whether the conduct which is said to have been a breach of a
    duty reasonably owed to the employer is of such a nature that
    a reasonable employee of the employer would understand that
    the conduct in question was a violation of a duty owed the
    employer and that he would be subject to discharge for
    engaging in the activity or behavior.
    Recker, 958 N.E.2d at 1140-41 (quoting Hehr, 
    534 N.E.2d at 1126
    ). The employer bears
    the burden of establishing a prima facie showing of just cause for termination, and if that
    burden is met, the burden shifts to the employee to introduce competent evidence to rebut
    the employer’s case. Herr, 
    534 N.E.2d at 1124
    .
    6
    Employer argues that the Review Board’s findings are clearly erroneous regarding
    the tardiness incident and associated fourth Disciplinary Report. Employer’s manual
    provided that “[e]ach of the Disciplinary Reports, up to the final report resulting in
    termination, will follow the procedures for discipline as delineated in this manual.” App.
    p. 38. The Review Board concluded that Employer failed to produce documentary
    evidence regarding its attendance policy and the procedures for discipline regarding
    attendance. The portions of the manual that were admitted did not address attendance
    policies and whether a Disciplinary Report was an appropriate response to being fifteen
    minutes late to a training.
    Employer argues that the ALJ improperly limited the admission of the entire
    manual. However, the ALJ emphasized that Employer should move to admit only the
    policies that brought about Norris’s discharge. Employer apparently did not move to
    admit the attendance policy at issue here. The ALJ could not err by failing to admit a
    policy that Employer did not request to have admitted.
    Employer failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the fourth Disciplinary
    Report was proper. As a result, Norris did not receive four valid Disciplinary Reports in
    a three month period to justify her discharge. Because the Review Board’s findings and
    conclusions regarding the validity of the fourth Disciplinary Report are not clearly
    erroneous, we need not address Employer’s arguments regarding the Disciplinary Report
    for the June 8th through June 10th incident.
    7
    Conclusion
    The Review Board’s findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous, and the
    Review Board properly concluded that Norris was entitled to unemployment benefits.
    We affirm.
    Affirmed.
    BAKER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
    8