Collins v. Saratoga County Support Collection Unit , 528 F. App'x 15 ( 2013 )

12-3117-cv
Collins v. Saratoga Cnty. Support Collection Unit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 20th day of June, two thousand thirteen.
PRESENT: REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges,
JED S. RAKOFF,
District Judge.*
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EVERETT B. COLLINS, CHARLES E. COLLINS, III,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 12-3117-cv
v.
SARATOGA COUNTY SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT,
SARATOGA COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
RICHARD A. KUPFERMAN, THE NEW YORK STATE
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
Defendants-Appellees,
JOHN DOES #1–2, JANE DOES #1–2,
Defendants.
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*
Judge Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
FOR APPELLANTS: Everett B. Collins, Charles E. Collins, III, pro se, Troy,
New York.
FOR APPELLEES: Crystal R. Peck, Bailey, Kelleher & Johnson, P.C.,
Albany, New York, for Appellees Saratoga County
Support Collection Unit, Saratoga County Attorney’s
Office, and Richard Kupferman.
Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Laura
Etlinger, Denise A. Hartman, Assistant Solicitors
General, on behalf of Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney
General of the State of New York, Albany, New York,
for Appellee New York State Division of Child Support
and Enforcement.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York (Gary L. Sharpe, Chief Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment entered on July 3, 2012, is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiffs Everett B. Collins and Charles E. Collins, III, appeal pro se from the
dismissal of their complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,
and the issues on appeal.
We review the challenged dismissal de novo, accepting the complaint’s factual
allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. See Famous
Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2010). To survive a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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Although the complaint’s factual allegations are presumed true, this tenet is “inapplicable to
legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further, while pro se
complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard, see
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2009), we are obliged to review pro se
submissions with “special solicitude” and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims]
that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006)
(emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted).
Having independently reviewed the record and relevant case law, we conclude that
plaintiffs’ § 1983 complaint fails to state a claim for substantially the reasons articulated by
the district court in its well-reasoned memorandum decision. Specifically, the procedural due
process claims arising from the temporary suspension of Charles Collins’s driver’s license
and the delay in disbursing child support funds due to Everett Collins are defeated by the
availability of adequate pre- and post-deprivation administrative process under statute and
regulation, see, e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510; N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 18,
§ 347.25, as well Article 78 judicial proceedings under New York law. Plaintiffs’ equal
protection claims fail for lack of the necessary allegations of unequal treatment as compared
to similarly situated individuals. Moreover, the claim against attorney Kupferman—who
assisted in the restoration of Charles Collins’s driving privileges, only to find himself sued
for civil rights violations—was properly dismissed in the absence of allegations showing
Kupferman’s personal involvement in any alleged constitutional violations.
3
To the extent plaintiffs urge the court to construe their complaint to allege violations
of the Fourth Amendment and substantive due process, we hold any such claims forfeited for
plaintiffs’ failure to raise them, even in a general fashion, in opposition to dismissal in the
district court. See In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2008).
In any event, the newly asserted claims are meritless. First, the suspension of Charles
Collins’s driving privileges was not a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
as it did not involve meaningful interference with his liberty or with his possessory interests
in property. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992). Second, even if the alleged
suspension of Charles Collins’s driver’s license and the delay in disbursing child support
sums to Everett Collins were erroneous, these decisions were not “so outrageously arbitrary
as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority,” as required to state a substantive
due process claim. Harlen Assocs. v. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 167 (2d Cir.
2010) (holding that substantive due process analysis does not entitle federal courts to
examine “routine,” if “vexatious,” violations of state law).
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint
without allowing an opportunity to replead. While district courts should generally afford a
pro se plaintiff at least one chance at amendment, such leave to amend is unnecessary when
it would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, nothing
in plaintiffs’ complaint suggests that their pleading is merely inartful or underdeveloped. See
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id. Rather, the claims plainly fail as a matter of law. Therefore, remanding for amendment
would be futile.
We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and reject them as without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
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