Landi Chalco v. Sessions ( 2018 )


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  •      17-66
    Landi Chalco v. Sessions
    BIA
    Straus, IJ
    A205 709 657
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 3rd day of April, two thousand eighteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DENNIS JACOBS,
    8            PETER W. HALL,
    9            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   SERGIO RAMIRO LANDI CHALCO,
    14
    15                               Petitioner,
    16
    17                     v.                                          17-66
    18                                                                 NAC
    19
    20   JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
    21   UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    22
    23                 Respondent.
    24   _____________________________________
    25
    26   FOR PETITIONER:                           Justin Conlon, Hartford, CT.
    27
    28   FOR RESPONDENT:                           Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
    29                                             Attorney General; Paul Fiorino,
    1                               Senior Litigation Counsel; Rebekah
    2                               Nahas, Trial Attorney, Office of
    3                               Immigration Litigation, United
    4                               States Department of Justice,
    5                               Washington, DC.
    6
    7        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    8    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    9    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    10   is DENIED.
    11       Petitioner Sergio Ramiro Landi Chalco, a native and
    12   citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a December 9, 2016,
    13   decision of the BIA affirming a November 30, 2015, decision
    14   of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of
    15   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    16   (“CAT”).   In re Sergio Ramiro Landi Chalco, No. A205 709 657
    17   (B.I.A. Dec. 9, 2016), aff’g No. A205 709 657 (Immig. Ct.
    18   Hartford Nov. 30, 2015).   We assume the parties’ familiarity
    19   with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    20       We have reviewed the decision of the IJ as modified by
    21   the BIA.     See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426
    
    22 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).       Since Chalco entered (without
    23   inspection) in 2003, he failed to timely file his asylum
    24   application with one year of his entry.         In any event, he
    25   would not qualify.     The only issue properly before us is
    2
    1    whether     Landi    Chalco       satisfied       his    burden    of     proof   for
    2    withholding of removal (asylum) by establishing that the
    3    extortion he fears in Ecuador is on account of his membership
    4    in a cognizable social group, namely individuals with ties to
    5    the   United       States.        We    find     no   error   in    the    agency’s
    6    conclusion that he did not.
    7          In    order    to    demonstrate          eligibility    for      asylum    and
    8    withholding of removal, “the applicant must establish that
    9    race,      religion,      nationality,          membership    in    a   particular
    10   social group, or political opinion was or will be at least
    11   one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”                         8 U.S.C.
    12   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also 
    id. § 1231(b)(3)(A);
    Matter of
    13   C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010).                     To constitute
    14   a particular social group, a group must be: “(1) composed of
    15   members      who     share    a        common     immutable       characteristic,
    16   (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
    17   within the society in question.”                   Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I.
    18   & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014).
    19         The agency determined that Chalco’s proposed social group
    20   is not cognizable because it was not defined with sufficient
    21   particularity.         The   boundaries          of     the   proposed      group--
    22   individuals with ties to the United States--are overbroad and
    3
    1    narrowed only by a subjectively defined factor that does not
    2    “provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within
    3    the group.”    
    Id. at 239.
      Indeed, a determination of who has
    4    “ties”    to    the     United    States      involves     subjective
    5    interpretations rather than objective standards, and thus the
    6    boundaries of the proposed group cannot be objectively drawn.
    7    See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 70
    , 73 (2d Cir. 2007)
    8    (“If ‘wealth’ defined the boundaries of a particular social
    9    group, a determination about whether any petitioner fit into
    10   the group (or might be perceived as a member of the group)
    11   would necessitate a sociological analysis as to how persons
    12   with various assets would have been viewed by others in their
    13   country.”); see also Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579,
    14   585 (BIA 2008) (finding too amorphous the proposed group of
    15   “male children who lack stable families and meaningful adult
    16   protection[] [and] who are from middle and low income classes
    17   . . . because people’s ideas of what those terms mean can
    18   vary” (internal quotation marks omitted)).         The social group
    19   posted by Chalco is (simply) any Ecuadorian who is here.
    20       Moreover, Chalco failed to demonstrate that his proposed
    21   group was socially distinct in Ecuadorian society.           “To have
    22   social   distinction,   there    must   be   evidence    showing   that
    4
    1    society    in   general    perceives,     considers,    or    recognizes
    2    persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group.”
    3    Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393-94 (B.I.A. 2014)
    4    (internal quotation marks omitted).              Chalco submitted no
    5    evidence that Ecuadorian society views individuals with ties
    6    to the United States as a distinct group.
    7           Chalco now argues that the agency erred by failing to
    8    introduce evidence of conditions in Ecuador, such as the U.S.
    9    State Department’s Human Rights Report.          We do not reach this
    10   issue because, as the Government argues, Chalco failed to
    11   exhaust it before the BIA.            See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of
    12   Justice, 
    480 F.3d 104
    , 120-22 (2d Cir. 2007).                   We note,
    13   however, that Chalco has not cited any material passage from
    14   the Human Rights Reports.
    15          Because Chalco’s proposed social group is not defined
    16   with    particularity     and   the   record   does   not    include   any
    17   evidence that the group is socially distinct in Ecuadorian
    18   society, Chalco failed to establish that he faces harm on
    19   account of his membership in a cognizable social group.                See
    20   
    Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73
    ; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
    21   Dec. at 237.    Accordingly, he did not state a claim for asylum
    5
    1    or withholding of removal.   See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),
    2    1231(b)(3)(A).
    3        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    4    DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    5    that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    6    and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    7    is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for oral argument
    8    in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    9    Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    10   34.1(b).
    11                       FOR THE COURT:
    12                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-66

Filed Date: 4/3/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021