Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance , 719 F.3d 94 ( 2013 )


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  • 12-4270-bk
    In re Quebecor World (USA), Inc.
    U NITED S TATES C OURT OF A PPEALS
    FOR THE S ECOND C IRCUIT
    August Term 2012
    (Argued:       May 13, 2013             Decided: June 10, 2013)
    Docket No. 12-4270-bk
    IN   RE :   Q UEBECOR W ORLD (USA) I NC .,
    Debtor.
    O FFICIAL C OMMITTEE OF U NSECURED C REDITORS
    OF Q UEBECOR W ORLD (USA) I NC .
    Appellant,
    v.
    A MERICAN U NITED L IFE I NSURANCE C OMPANY , AUSA L IFE I NSURANCE
    C OMPANY , B ARCLAYS B ANK PLC, D EUTSCHE B ANK S ECURITIES I NC ., L IFE
    I NVESTORS I NSURANCE C OMPANY OF A MERICA , M IDLAND N ATIONAL L IFE
    I NSURANCE C OMPANY A NNUITY , M ODERN W OODMEN OF A MERICA , N ORTH
    A MERICAN C OMPANY FOR L IFE AND H EALTH I NSURANCE /A NNUITY , N ORTH
    A MERICAN C OMPANY FOR L IFE AND H EALTH I NSURANCE OF N EW Y ORK ,
    P ROVIDENT L IFE AND A CCIDENT I NSURANCE C OMPANY , T HE N ORTHWESTERN
    M UTUAL L IFE I NSURANCE C OMPANY , T HE P AUL R EVERE L IFE I NSURANCE
    C OMPANY , S YMETRA L IFE I NSURANCE C OMPANY , T RANSAMERICA F INANCIAL
    L IFE I NSURANCE C OMPANY , T RANSAMERICA L IFE I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
    W ACHOVIA C APITAL M ARKETS , LLC, W ILTON R EASSURANCE L IFE C OMPANY OF
    N EW Y ORK , J OHN D OES , 1-50, D EUTSCHE B ANK AG,
    Appellees.
    Before:
    C HIN   AND    L OHIER , Circuit Judges,
    AND   S WAIN , District Judge. *
    Appeal from a judgment of the United States
    District Court for the Southern District of New York
    (Furman, J.), affirming an order of the United States
    Bankruptcy Court (Peck, J.) dismissing appellant's
    adversary complaint.            Appellant sought to avoid and recover
    certain payments made to appellees in exchange for private
    placement notes that had been issued by one of debtor's
    affiliates.    Both lower courts held that the payments were
    exempt from avoidance under section 546(e) of the
    Bankruptcy Code.
    A FFIRMED .
    J OHN K. S HERWOOD (Jason E. Halper and
    Natalie J. Kraner, on the brief),
    Lowenstein Sandler LLP, Roseland,
    New Jersey, for Appellant.
    *
    The Honorable Laura Taylor Swain, United States
    District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
    designation.
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    J OSHUA D ORCHAK (Dina Kaufman and Jonathan
    B. Alter, on the brief), Bingham
    McCutchen LLP, New York, New York,
    for Appellees.
    C HIN , Circuit Judge:
    In this case, appellant Official Committee of
    Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. (the
    "Committee") sought to avoid and recover certain payments
    made by debtor Quebecor World (USA) Inc. ("QWUSA") to the
    appellee noteholders in exchange for private placement
    notes that had been issued by one of QWUSA's affiliates . 1
    The bankruptcy court granted appellees' motion for summary
    judgment, holding that the payments were exempt from
    avoidance because they were both "settlement payment[s]"
    and "transfer[s] made . . . in connection with a securities
    contract," within the meaning of section 546(e) of the
    Bankruptcy Code.    
    11 U.S.C. § 546
    (e).   The district court
    affirmed both holdings.    We need not decide whether the
    payments fall within the "settlement payments" safe harbor
    because we conclude that they clearly fall within the safe
    1
    The parties dispute whether the payments at issue in
    this case were made to purchase, redeem, or extinguish these
    notes. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that, in
    the circumstances of this case, QWUSA purchased the notes.
    - 3 -
    harbor for "transfers made . . . in connection with a
    securities contract."    Accordingly, we affirm the district
    court's judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    The relevant facts are undisputed and may be
    summarized as follows:
    QWUSA and Quebecor World Capital Corp. ("QWCC")
    are subsidiaries of Quebecor World, Inc. ("QWI"), a
    Canadian printing company.   In 2000, QWCC raised $ 371
    million for the Quebecor entities by issuing private
    placement notes (the "Notes") to the appellees pursuant to
    two nearly identical Note Purchase Agreements (the "NPAs").
    QWI and QWUSA guaranteed the Notes and the funds were
    eventually transferred, at least in part, to QWUSA.
    Section 8.2 of the NPAs gave QWCC the option to
    prepay the Notes so long as QWCC paid the outstanding
    principal, accrued interest, and a specified "Make -Whole
    Amount."   Section 8.6 prohibited any Quebecor affiliate
    from purchasing the Notes unless they, inter alia, complied
    with the prepayment provisions in section 8.2.    Once the
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    Notes were paid in full, section 8.5 required that they be
    surrendered to QWCC for cancellation.
    The NPAs also provided for the acceleration of the
    Notes' maturity if QWI's debt-to-capitalization ratio fell
    below a certain threshold.   Pursuant to the terms of QWI's
    separate $1 billion revolving credit facility, any default
    with respect to the Notes would have in turn triggered a
    default under the credit facility agreement, with
    calamitous results for Quebecor.     When QWI began having
    financial difficulty in May 2007, it offered to purchase
    just over half of the Notes in exchange for increasing the
    debt-to-capitalization ratio, but the appellees rejected
    this offer.   Instead, they entered a Noteholder Cooperation
    Agreement and Right of First Refusal Agreement (the
    "Cooperation Agreement"), in which they agreed not to sell
    their Notes to anyone but an existing noteholder.
    In September 2007, QWI approved the prepayment of
    all the Notes and QWCC issued a notice of its intent to
    redeem the Notes early.   After realizing redemption would
    have severe tax implications under Canadian law, however,
    QWI restructured the prepayment so that first QWUSA would
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    purchase the notes from the appellees for cash and then
    QWCC would redeem the notes from QWUSA in exchange for
    forgiveness of debt QWUSA owed to QWCC.    QWUSA issued a new
    notice to appellees indicating that it -- not QWCC -- would
    pay the "Redemption Price" set out in the NPAs, and that
    the payment would "result in the purchase of the Notes by
    Quebecor World (USA) Inc."
    On October 29, 2007, QWUSA transferred
    approximately $376 million to the appellees' trustee, CIBC
    Mellon Trust Co. ("CIBC Mellon").    CIBC Mellon distributed
    the funds to appellees and the appellees eventually
    surrendered the Notes directly to QWI in Canada.     QWUSA
    filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York
    on January 21, 2008, less than ninety days after making the
    payment for the Notes.
    The Committee then commenced this adversary
    action, seeking to avoid and recover the October 29
    transfer pursuant to section 547 of the Code.     Appellees
    moved for summary judgment, arguing that the transfer was
    exempt from avoidance under section 546(e).     Before that
    motion was resolved, this Court decided Enron Creditors
    - 6 -
    Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V. (In re Enron
    Creditors Recovery Corp.), 
    651 F.3d 329
     (2d Cir. 2011), in
    which we held that payments made to redeem commercial paper
    before its maturity date were "settlement payments," within
    the meaning of section 546(e), because they were
    "transfer[s] of cash made to complete a securities
    transaction."    
    Id. at 339
     (quotation and alteration
    omitted).
    After additional briefing, the bankruptcy court
    granted appellees' motion, holding primarily that QWUSA's
    payment fit the definition of "settlement payment"
    announced in Enron.    Furthermore, because Enron had applied
    section 546(e) to redemptions of commercial paper, the
    bankruptcy court held that the payment also qualified as a
    "transfer made . . . in connection with a securities
    contract" regardless of whether QWUSA "redeemed" or
    "purchased" the Notes.    The district court affirmed,
    agreeing that QWUSA's payment was a "settlement payment"
    under Enron.    The court did not agree that a transfer to
    "redeem" securities could qualify as a "transfer made . . .
    in connection with a securities contract" because the Code
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    defines a "securities contract" as one "for the purchase,
    sale, or loan of a security."   
    11 U.S.C. § 741
    (7)(A)(i).
    Nevertheless, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
    court's alternative holding on the basis that the
    transaction was in fact a "purchase," not a "redemption."
    The Committee appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    A.   Applicable Law
    "We exercise plenary review over a district
    court's rulings in its capacity as an appellate court in
    bankruptcy," independently reviewing the bankruptcy court's
    factual findings for clear error and its lega l conclusions
    de novo.   Super Nova 330 LLC v. Gazes, 
    693 F.3d 138
    , 141
    (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
    Under section 547 of the Code, the bankruptcy
    trustee may avoid any transfer of a debtor's property
    interest that is:
    (1) to or for the benefit of a
    creditor;
    (2) for or on account of an
    antecedent debt owed by the debtor
    before such transfer was made;
    (3) made while the debtor was
    insolvent;
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    (4) made . . . [inter alia] on or
    within 90 days before the date of
    the filing of the petition . . . .
    
    11 U.S.C. § 547
    (b).     Section 546(e) exempts some transfers,
    however, if they fall within certain safe harbors:
    Notwithstanding section[] . . . 547
    . . . of this title, the trustee may
    not avoid a transfer [1] that is a
    margin payment . . . or settlement
    payment . . . made by or to (or for
    the benefit of) a . . . financial
    institution, . . . or [2] that is a
    transfer made by or to (or for the
    benefit of) a . . . financial
    institution . . . in connection with
    a securities contract, as defined in
    section 741(7), commodity contract,
    . . . or forward contract . . . that
    is made before the commencement of
    the case . . . .
    
    Id.
     § 546(e).    In Enron, we defined a "settlement payment"
    as a "transfer of cash made to complete a securities
    transaction."    In re Enron, 
    651 F.3d at 339
     (quotation and
    alterations omitted).     Section 741(7) of the Code defines a
    "securities contract" as "a contract for the purchase,
    sale, or loan of a security . . . including any repurchase
    or reverse repurchase transaction on any such security."
    
    11 U.S.C. § 741
    (7)(A)(i).
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    There is a split of authority regarding what role
    a financial institution must play in the transaction for it
    to qualify for the section 546(e) safe harbor.     Three
    circuit courts have concluded that the plain language
    includes any transfer to a financial institution, even if
    it is only serving as a conduit or intermediary.     See QSI
    Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 
    571 F.3d 545
    , 550-51 (6th Cir. 2009); Contemporary Indus. Corp.
    v. Frost, 
    564 F.3d 981
    , 987 (8th Cir. 2009); Lowenschuss v.
    Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 
    181 F.3d 505
    , 516 (3d Cir. 1999).   Only the Eleventh Circuit has
    held that the financial institution must acquire a
    beneficial interest in the transferred funds or securities
    for the safe harbor to apply.    See Munford v. Valuation
    Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 
    98 F.3d 604
    , 610
    (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).    In Enron, we cited the
    Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits' decisions with approval
    and concluded that "the absence of a financial intermediary
    that takes title to the transacted securities during the
    course of the transaction is [not] a proper basis on which
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    to deny safe-harbor protection."     In re Enron, 
    651 F.3d at 338
    .
    B.     Application
    We need not reach the "settlement payments" issue
    because, based on the undisputed facts, QWUSA's payment on
    October 29 fits squarely within the plain wording of the
    securities contract exemption, as it was a "transfer made
    by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial
    institution . . . in connection with a securities
    contract." 2   
    11 U.S.C. § 546
    (e).
    QWUSA transferred funds to appellee's trustee CIBC
    Mellon, in the amount and manner prescribed by the NPAs for
    purchasing the Notes.    The parties agree that CIBC Mellon
    is a financial institution.    The NPAs wer e clearly
    "securities contracts" because they provided for both the
    original purchase and the "repurchase" of the Notes.     
    Id.
    2
    We note that the Court in Enron had no occasion to
    consider the "securities contract" safe harbor, which was added
    after Enron filed for bankruptcy and after the adversary
    proceeding commenced. See Financial Netting Improvements Act of
    2006 § 5(b)(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 109-390, 
    120 Stat. 2692
    ; Enron
    Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V. (In re Enron
    Creditors Recovery Corp.), 
    651 F.3d 329
    , 331-32 (2d Cir. 2011)
    (noting that Enron filed for bankruptcy in 2001 and adversary
    proceeding commenced in 2003).
    - 11 -
    § 741(7).    Accordingly, this was a transfer made to a
    financial institution in connection with a securities
    contract that is exempt from avoidance.
    We need not decide whether the transfer would
    still be exempt if QWUSA had "redeemed" its own securities
    because we agree with the district court that QWUSA made
    the transfer to "purchase" the Notes.       Generally, "[t]o
    redeem is defined as to purchase back; to regain possession
    by payment of a stipulated price; to repurchase; to regain,
    as mortgage property, by paying what is due; to receive
    back by paying the obligation."       In re United Educ. Co.,
    
    153 F. 169
    , 171 (2d Cir. 1907) (quotation omitted).       Here,
    QWUSA was not "regaining" its own Notes; it was acquiring
    for the first time the securities of another corporation,
    QWCC.   In fact, under the terms of the NPAs, only QWCC had
    the right to "pre-pay" or redeem the Notes; its affiliates
    could only "purchase" the Notes if they complied with the
    pre-payment provisions.    Therefore, QWUSA was not
    "redeeming" its affiliate's Notes, but "purchasing" them.
    The Committee contends that QWUSA could not have
    "purchased" the Notes for two reasons.      First, it points to
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    evidence in the record showing that some of the appellees
    believed the transaction was a redemption, not a purchase.
    But it made no difference to appellees at the time of the
    transfer whether QWUSA was "redeeming" or "purchasing" the
    Notes because, from their perspective, the NPAs treated
    both the same way and appellees received the same "pre-
    payment" price.   Thus, their subjective understanding of
    the transaction at the time is not dispositive.
    Second, the Committee argues that the Cooperation
    Agreement prohibited appellees from selling the Notes, and
    therefore QWUSA could not have "purchased" the Notes.     But
    the Cooperation Agreement explicitly allowed for the sale
    of the Notes to a "Constituent Company Guarantor" like
    QWUSA pursuant to an amended offer to purchase the Notes.
    Moreover, neither QWUSA nor any other Quebecor entity was a
    party to the Cooperation Agreement.   Thus, nothing
    prohibited the noteholders as a group from selling -- and
    QWUSA from purchasing -- all of the Notes in a single
    transaction.   Even if appellees had breached the
    Cooperation Agreement by selling to QWUSA, that would only
    mean that appellees are liable to each other; the breach
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    would have no effect on the validity of the transaction
    with QWUSA.
    Finally, the Committee argues that even if QWUSA
    "purchased" the Notes, not all of the transfers are exempt
    because CIBC Mellon was merely a conduit and some of the
    appellees are not financial institutions.     Enron rejected a
    similar argument, holding that the financial intermediary
    need not have a beneficial interest in the trans fer.     See
    In re Enron, 
    651 F.3d at 338-39
    .    To the extent Enron left
    any ambiguity in this regard, we expressly follow the
    Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits in holding that a
    transfer may qualify for the section 546(e) safe harbor
    even if the financial intermediary is merely a conduit.
    See In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 
    571 F.3d at 551
    ; Frost, 
    564 F.3d at 987
    ; In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 
    181 F.3d at 516
    .
    The plain language of the statute refers to
    transfers made "by or to (or for the benefit of)" a
    financial institution.    
    11 U.S.C. § 546
    (e) (emphasis
    added). 3   Because we generally prefer a construction that
    3
    The phrase "(or for the benefit of)" was added by the
    2006 amendments to section 546(e). See Financial Netting
    Improvements Act of 2006 § 5(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 109-390, 120
    - 14 -
    does not render parts of a statute superfluous, see Marx v.
    Gen. Revenue Corp., 
    133 S. Ct. 1166
    , 1177-78 (2013), we
    conclude that a transfer may be either "for the benefit of"
    a financial institution or "to" a financial institution,
    but need not be both.
    Finally, we note that this construction furthers
    the purpose behind the exemption.    As we explained in
    Enron, in the context of the "settlement payment" prong of
    section 546(e):
    Congress enacted § 546(e)'s safe
    harbor in 1982 as a means of
    'minimiz[ing] the displacement
    caused in the commodities and
    securities markets in the event of a
    major bankruptcy affecting those
    industries.' If a firm is required
    to repay amounts received in settled
    securities transactions, it could
    have insufficient capital or
    liquidity to meet its current
    securities trading obligations,
    placing other market participants
    Stat. 2692. Because this change was made after the circuit
    split arose, it is arguable that Congress intended to resolve
    the split with the 2006 Amendments. See, e.g., United States v.
    Mele, 
    117 F.3d 73
    , 75 (2d Cir. 1997). But the legislative
    history does not mention, let alone explain the reasoning
    behind, this change. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-648 (Part I) at 8
    (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1585, 1593. We need not,
    however, rely on this legislative history, as the words of the
    statute are unambiguous.
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    and the securities markets
    themselves at risk.
    In re Enron, 
    651 F.3d at 334
     (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
    Charles Schwab & Co., 
    913 F.2d 846
    , 849 (10th Cir. 1990)).
    A transaction involving one of these financial
    intermediaries, even as a conduit, necessarily touches upon
    these at-risk markets.    Moreover, the enumerated
    intermediaries are typically facilitators of, rather than
    participants with a beneficial interest in, the underlying
    transfers.   A clear safe harbor for transactions made
    through these financial intermediaries promotes stability
    in their respective markets and ensures that otherwise
    avoidable transfers are made out in the open, reducing the
    risk that they were made to defraud creditors. 4
    Accordingly, it was sufficient that QWUSA's transfer was
    made to CIBC Mellon as appellees' trustee, even though CIBC
    Mellon did not take title to the transferred funds.
    4
    Of course, the "securities contract" safe harbor is
    not without limitation, and, for example, mere structuring of a
    transfer as a "securities transaction" may not be sufficient to
    preclude avoidance. See, e.g., 
    11 U.S.C. § 546
    (e) (providing
    safe harbor relief from avoidance under section 548(a)(1)(B)
    but not from avoidance under section 548(a)(1)(A)).
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    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude QWUSA's
    payment was a "transfer made . . . in connection with a
    securities contract" and is exempt from avoidance pursuant
    to section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.    Accordingly, we
    AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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