United States v. Kelen Buchan ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 27 2021
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.   19-50272
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
    2:13-cr-00469-CJC-2
    v.
    KELEN MAGAEL BUCHAN,                             MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 31, 2021
    Pasadena, California
    Before: IKUTA, BENNETT, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
    Concurrence by Judge R. NELSON
    Kelen Magael Buchan appeals his conviction and sentence following a
    guilty plea to one count of wire fraud in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    . We have
    jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Even if the district court erred when it applied the preponderance standard
    instead of the clear and convincing standard at sentencing to the two disputed
    enhancements, see United States v. Jordan, 
    256 F.3d 922
    , 928–29 (9th Cir. 2001),
    any error was harmless because the district court held that it would have reached
    the same conclusion had it applied the clear and convincing standard, and this
    conclusion is not clearly erroneous. Cf. United States v. Hymas, 
    780 F.3d 1285
    ,
    1292 (9th Cir. 2015). Given the evidence in the record that scheme-related
    materials were located in Buchan’s bedroom dating back to the beginning of the
    scheme in December 2011, including a managerial cell phone that contained
    outgoing messages with the same pattern of speech as Buchan’s prison
    communications, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the loss
    from the entire scheme was attributable to Buchan as “(i) within the scope of the
    jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
    (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G.
    § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); see also United States v. Blitz, 
    151 F.3d 1002
    , 1012 (9th Cir.
    1998). Therefore, the district court did not err in applying a 12-level upward
    adjustment for the loss. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G).
    Likewise, given evidence in the record that Buchan had control over at least
    one person in the scheme through Buchan’s use of the managerial cell phone, the
    2
    district court did not clearly err in finding that a 3-level adjustment under U.S.S.G.
    § 3B1.1(b) applied. See United States v. Camper, 
    66 F.3d 229
    , 231 (9th Cir.
    1995); United States v. Gadson, 
    763 F.3d 1189
    , 1222 (9th Cir. 2014).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Buchan’s below-
    Guidelines sentence of 51 months, and such a sentence was not substantively
    unreasonable, because the district court adequately weighed the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors, took into account the “unique evils” of the scam to which
    Buchan pleaded guilty, and took into account Buchan’s mitigating factors. See
    United States v. Scrivener, 
    189 F.3d 944
    , 951–52 (9th Cir. 1999). Buchan’s co-
    defendants who received lighter sentences were not similarly situated as managers.
    Buchan waived his objection regarding the restitution order because he
    failed to raise that objection to the district court. See United States v. Van Alstyne,
    
    584 F.3d 803
    , 819 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court did not plainly err in finding
    that Buchan was involved in the scheme from December 2011 to February 2012,
    and therefore ordering $519,400 in restitution and imposing joint and several
    liability.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    FILED
    OCT 27 2021
    USA v. Kelen Buchan, No. 19-50272
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    R. NELSON, Circuit Judge, with whom IKUTA, Circuit Judge, joins as to Part IV,
    concurring:
    I join in full the court’s memorandum disposition affirming the district court.
    I write separately because I would also hold that (1) the district court properly
    applied a preponderance standard to factual questions decided at sentencing; (2)
    our clear and convincing evidence rule (for factual findings that have an extreme
    impact on the sentence) is clearly irreconcilable with Beckles v. United States, 
    137 S. Ct. 886
     (2017); and (3) regardless, the clear and convincing evidence rule
    should be reversed en banc because it is incorrect, unmoored from its original basis
    in the mandatory nature of the Guidelines, and contrary to the law of every other
    circuit.
    I
    Kelen Magael Buchan and his co-schemers participated in a scheme to scam
    money from victims. Buchan was charged with twenty-five counts of wire fraud
    and attempted wire fraud. He pleaded guilty to a single count of wire fraud.
    At sentencing, the district court described the scheme as “over a half million
    dollars” of “money taken from senior citizens and their life savings and their
    retirement,” as “about as aggravating as a fraud scheme as I’ve seen,” and as so
    “horrible” that “gang-on-gang violence to me is more understandable than
    something like this.”
    Buchan’s indictment charged him with participation in a scheme that lasted
    for at least several months. But in his plea and at sentencing, he admitted only that
    he participated in the scheme for at least a few days.
    “As a general rule, a preponderance of the evidence standard applies” to
    factual findings at sentencing. United States v. Valle, 
    940 F.3d 473
    , 479 (9th Cir.
    2019). But when the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, this court, along with
    several others, adopted a due process rule requiring that factual findings with “an
    extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence relative to the offense of
    conviction” be proven by clear and convincing evidence. United States v.
    Valensia, 
    222 F.3d 1173
    , 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
    Restrepo, 
    946 F.2d 654
     (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Restrepo II), judgment vacated
    by Valensia v. United States, 
    532 U.S. 901
     (2001). The district court applied a
    preponderance standard because it reasoned that its factual findings about the
    extent of the fraudulent scheme arose from the offense of conviction and therefore
    could not have “an extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence relative to the
    offense of conviction.” Valensia, 
    222 F.3d at
    1178–79.
    Buchan argues that the district court should have applied the clear and
    convincing evidence standard.
    2
    II
    A
    “[W]here the sentencing enhancements are based on . . . the offense of
    conviction, the preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient.” United
    States v. Hymas, 
    780 F.3d 1285
    , 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 
    978 F.2d 1520
    , 1524 (9th Cir. 1992)). We impose a higher burden of proof only “when
    the challenged sentencing factor had an extremely disproportionate effect on the
    defendant’s sentence relative to the offense of conviction.” United States v. Parlor,
    
    2 F.4th 807
    , 816–17 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (emphasis added) (citing United
    States v. Jordan, 
    256 F.3d 922
    , 927, 929 (9th Cir. 2001)). Only when the
    enhancement is not based on the offense of conviction may a higher burden of
    proof be imposed, see, e.g., Hymas, 780 F.3d at 1291.
    The question, then, is whether factual findings about the scope of wire fraud
    are findings that go to the offense of conviction. Circuit precedent in the context
    of conspiracy suggests that they do. Clear and convincing evidence is never
    required to prove the scope of a conspiracy because the scope of the conspiracy
    goes to “the nature and extent of the offense to which [the defendant] pled guilty.”
    United States v. Riley, 
    335 F.3d 919
    , 926 (9th Cir. 2003).
    3
    Conspiracy requires proof of an overt act taken in furtherance of the
    conspiracy. United States v. Gonzalez, 
    786 F.3d 714
    , 718 (9th Cir. 2015). But the
    scope of a conspiracy is not confined to the facts admitted in a defendant’s plea.
    Instead, once the underlying offense of a conspiracy has been proven, everything
    relating to “the extent of the conspiracy” is based on the offense of conviction and
    thus can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing. Riley, 
    335 F.3d at 926
    .
    The “offense of conviction” rule is not limited to the extent of a conspiracy:
    it applies to all crimes, including wire fraud. In Valle, 940 F.3d at 480 n.8, we
    noted that the rule applies “where a defendant has been convicted . . . as a
    participant in a fraudulent scheme and the extent of the . . . fraudulent scheme is
    the basis of the enhanced sentence.” See also United States v. Garro, 
    517 F.3d 1163
    , 1168–69.
    Like the conspiracy statute, the wire fraud statute does not criminalize each
    specific instance of wrongful conduct. The conspiracy statute criminalizes an
    agreement to pursue unlawful ends and an overt act in furtherance of the
    agreement. 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    . Once these elements are proven, then other acts
    relating to the extent of the conspiracy are based on the offense of conviction.
    Riley, 
    335 F.3d at
    926–27. In the same way, the wire fraud statute criminalizes
    knowing participation in a scheme or plan to defraud and use of the wires in
    4
    furtherance of that scheme or plan. 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    ; Ninth Circuit Model Jury
    Instructions 8.124; United States v. Jinian, 
    725 F.3d 954
    , 960 (9th Cir. 2013).
    Once these elements are proven, then other acts relating to the extent of the
    fraudulent scheme are based on the offense of conviction, too.
    Hymas says nothing to the contrary. What Hymas says is that if a defendant
    pleads guilty and admits only one fraudulent transaction, then the court will not
    consider other transactions. 780 F.3d at 1291–92. Hymas says nothing about
    defendants who admit schemes involving multiple transactions.
    B
    Buchan pleaded guilty to and admitted participating in an international
    scheme involving multiple transactions and multiple victims. To be sure, in his
    plea agreement, he only admitted to participating in that scheme for “at least” four
    days. But that makes no difference: the actual degree of his participation goes to
    the extent of the scheme, not to the fact of his participation itself. Whether Buchan
    admitted participating in the scheme for four days, or four months, or four minutes
    didn’t matter: Once he participated and used the wires one time in furtherance of it,
    he was guilty of wire fraud. At that point, the extent of his participation in the
    fraudulent scheme became a fact based on his offense of conviction that could be
    proven at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.
    5
    III
    The government also argues that the clear and convincing evidence rule is
    clearly irreconcilable with Beckles, and therefore has been overruled. I agree.
    A
    “[W]here the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly
    irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a three-
    judge panel should consider itself bound by the later and controlling authority, and
    should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been effectively overruled.” Miller
    v. Gammie, 
    335 F.3d 889
    , 893 (9th Cir. 2003).
    The clearly irreconcilable analysis does not focus solely on the issues or
    holdings of the cases. “Rather, the relevant court of last resort must have undercut
    the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that
    the cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Gonzalez v. Barr, 
    955 F.3d 762
    , 768 (9th Cir.
    2020) (emphasis added) (citing Miller, 
    335 F.3d at 900
    ), cert. granted sub nom
    Garland v. Gonzalez, No. 20-322, 
    2021 WL 3711642
     (Aug. 23, 2021). In
    evaluating whether our prior precedent has been overruled by intervening
    precedent, the court must consider the “overall analytical framework” of the case
    and “focus on the reasoning and analysis in support of a holding, rather than the
    holding alone.” Lair v. Bullock, 
    697 F.3d 1200
    , 1206 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing In re
    Flores, 
    692 F.3d 1021
    , 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2012)).
    6
    To be sure, this court has also held that to be clearly irreconcilable, the
    intervening authority “would need to be so fundamentally inconsistent with our
    prior cases that our prior cases cannot stand” and that if the court “can apply [its]
    prior circuit precedent without running afoul of the intervening authority, [it] must
    do so.” In re Gilman, 
    887 F.3d 956
    , 962 (9th Cir. 2018). But it is not just the
    holdings that must be fundamentally inconsistent: it is the cases’ “reasoning and
    principles.” 
    Id.
     If this court’s prior reasoning is clearly inconsistent with
    intervening precedent, then the case has been overruled, even if the holdings
    themselves do not expressly conflict.
    B
    In Beckles, the Supreme Court held that because the Guidelines “merely
    guide the exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence
    within the statutory range,” they “are not amenable to a vagueness challenge”
    under the Due Process Clause. 
    137 S. Ct. at 892, 894
    . The Court’s reasoning
    relied on the observation that “in the long history of discretionary sentencing, this
    Court has never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in
    imposing a sentence within a statutory range.” 
    Id. at 893
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted) (citing United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 233 (2005)). The Court
    noted that “the system of purely discretionary sentencing that predated the
    Guidelines was constitutionally permissible.” 
    Id. at 894
    . The Court reasoned that
    7
    “[i]f a system of unfettered discretion is not unconstitutionally vague, then it is
    difficult to see how the present system of guided discretion could be.” 
    Id.
    Of course, Beckles concerned a void-for-vagueness due process challenge.
    But the Supreme Court itself did not confine its reasoning to that context: On top
    of discussing other kinds of due process challenges, it even supported its reasoning
    with a similar case from the Eighth Amendment context. 
    Id.
     at 895–96 (citing
    Espinosa v. Florida, 
    505 U.S. 1079
    , 1082 (1992) (per curiam)).
    Every analytical element of the Supreme Court’s reasoning applies directly
    to this court’s clear and convincing evidence rule. District judges are now free to
    sentence anywhere within the statutory range, with or without making any
    additional factual findings. “If a system of unfettered discretion is not
    unconstitutional[]” when there are no factual findings at all, “then it is difficult to
    see how the present system of guided discretion could be.” 
    Id.
     The Supreme
    Court’s exact reasoning, principles, and analytical framework all apply here.
    Before the Sentencing Guidelines existed, a defendant’s due process rights
    were violated “when a court relie[d] on extensively and materially false evidence
    to impose a sentence on an uncounseled defendant.” Id. at 896 (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (citing Townsend v. Burke, 
    334 U.S. 736
    , 741 (1948)). This rule is
    still good law because it did not depend on the mandatory nature of the Guidelines.
    Now that they are advisory, Beckles means that due process rules rooted in the
    8
    mandatory nature of the Guidelines are no longer valid. That reasoning applies
    here: this court’s clear and convincing evidence rule is rooted in the mandatory
    nature of the Guidelines, is clearly irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s
    reasoning and analysis in Beckles and has been overruled.
    IV
    In the alternative, the clear and convincing evidence rule should be reversed
    en banc because it is incorrect, unmoored from its original basis in the mandatory
    nature of the Guidelines and contrary to the law of every other circuit.
    A
    The origin of the clear and convincing evidence rule line of cases is
    McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
    477 U.S. 79
     (1986), which held that due process did not
    require a sentencing enhancement to be proven by anything more than a
    preponderance of the evidence. In dicta, the Court observed that the sentencing
    provision at issue in that case—a state enhancement for visible possession of a
    firearm—“gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible
    possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.” 
    Id. at 88
    .
    A few years later, in United States v. Kikumura, the Third Circuit confronted
    a sentencing enhancement that increased the sentence “from about 30 months to 30
    years.” 
    918 F.2d 1084
    , 1100 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Fisher,
    9
    
    502 F.3d 293
    , 305–07 (3d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit observed that this
    enhancement was “perhaps most the dramatic example of a sentence hearing that
    functions as a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense” and held “that in
    such situations, the factfinding underlying that departure must be established at
    least by clear and convincing evidence.” 
    Id.
     at 1100–01 (citing McMillan, 
    477 U.S. at 88
    ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We first noted the possibility of such a potential due process requirement the
    next year in Restrepo II, 
    946 F.2d at
    660–61, but did not hold that there was such a
    requirement until eight years later in United States v. Hopper, 
    177 F.3d 824
    , 833
    (9th Cir. 1999).
    After again applying the clear and convincing test in United States v. Mezas
    de Jesus, 
    217 F.3d 638
    , 642–43 (2000), we laid out several factors to guide the
    inquiry into whether a factual finding has an extremely disproportionate effect on a
    sentence in United States v. Valensia, 
    222 F.3d at
    1181–82.
    The Supreme Court vacated Valensia after Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), in which the Court held that facts increasing the maximum statutory
    penalty for a crime must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Still, we continued to use what we began to call “the six Valensia factors”
    as a framework to determine whether clear and convincing evidence was required.
    United States v. Jordan, 
    256 F.3d 922
    , 928–29 (9th Cir. 2001).
    10
    The clear and convincing evidence rule and the Valensia factors became
    entrenched in our case law and were cited and applied many times. See, e.g.,
    United States v. Peyton, 
    353 F.3d 1080
    , 1088 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other
    grounds by United States v. Contreras, 
    593 F.3d 1135
     (9th Cir. 2010); United
    States v. Bonilla-Montenegro, 
    331 F.3d 1047
    , 1050 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Still, until the mid-2000s, this court had “applied the disproportionate impact
    test only in the case of sentence enhancements.” United States v. Gonzalez, 
    365 F.3d 796
    , 799 (9th Cir. 2004). That was the status of this court’s rule in 2005,
    when the Supreme Court decided Booker and held that the Sentencing Guidelines
    were merely advisory.
    B
    When Booker was decided, three other circuits had adopted the clear and
    convincing evidence rule. All three have now held via three judge panel that the
    rule was overruled by intervening Supreme Court precedent: Booker.
    The Third Circuit held that “concerns about the tail wagging the dog were
    valid under a mandatory guideline system” but had been “put to rest when Booker
    rendered the guidelines advisory.” Fisher, 
    502 F.3d at 305
    . The Seventh Circuit
    held that the “debate” over McMillan had been “rendered academic” by Booker,
    and that “[w]ith the guidelines no longer binding the sentencing judge, there is no
    need for courts of appeals to add epicycles to an already complex set of (merely)
    11
    advisory guidelines by multiplying standards of proof.” United States v. Reuter,
    
    463 F.3d 792
    , 793 (7th Cir. 2006). And the Eighth Circuit concluded that Booker
    “dramatically altered [the] landscape” of the sentencing guidelines and that it
    “eliminate[d] any due process concern requiring a heightened standard of proof for
    fact findings that have an extremely disproportionate impact on the defendant's
    advisory guidelines sentencing range.” United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 
    562 F.3d 892
    , 897–98 (8th Cir. 2009).
    This court, on the other hand, held that the clear and convincing evidence
    rule survived Booker in United States v. Staten, 
    466 F.3d 708
    , 717–720 (9th Cir.
    2006). And in Staten, we boldly extended the rule’s application from just factual
    findings underlying sentencing enhancements to all factual findings made at
    sentencing that have an extremely disproportionate effect on the ultimate sentence.
    
    Id. at 720
    .1
    Since Staten, only this court has continued to apply a clear and convincing
    evidence standard to factual questions decided at sentencing that have an extremely
    disproportionate effect on the ultimate sentence. See, e.g., Valle, 940 F.3d at 480–
    81; United States v. Pineda-Doval, 
    614 F.3d 1019
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2010).
    1
    In extending the rule, the Staten court relied only on Kikumura and other cases
    discussed above; it cited no example of the Ninth Circuit applying the clear and
    convincing evidence rule to a factual finding underlying a departure, rather than
    the application of a sentencing guideline. Id. at 719-20.
    12
    Staten was wrongly decided. The court in Staten relied on faulty reasoning.
    The court acknowledged that the “general baseline” for findings of fact at
    sentencing was “the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Staten, 466 F.3d at
    720. Still, the court held that its prior clear and convincing cases survived Booker
    because those cases “focused on the actual effect a given fact had on the sentence
    that the district court ultimately imposed, not on whether the district court was
    required to give a fact it found the effect it did.” Id.
    This reasoning elides the fact that those decisions all relied on the
    Guidelines’ mandatory nature. Kikumura and all this court’s previous cases in this
    line relied on the mandatory nature of the Guidelines. See Fisher, 
    502 F.3d at
    305–06 (“Kikumura’s holding was predicated on the then-mandatory nature of the
    Guidelines . . . The critical distinction [now] is the advisory nature of the
    Guidelines.”).
    Kikumura concerned factual findings made in support of an upwards
    departure from the mandatory Guidelines range. 
    918 F.2d at
    1097–98. The Staten
    court characterized the “reliance on disputed facts [in Kikumura as] discretionary
    rather than mandatory.” 466 F.3d at 719. And it’s true that even when the
    Guidelines were mandatory, district judges had discretion to depart upwards. But
    the Staten court missed the point: What was mandatory was not the departure, but
    the Guidelines range itself.
    13
    That the guidelines were mandatory was the basis for the clear and
    convincing evidence rule. Here’s why: In a case like Kikumura, the district court
    had to sentence the defendant within the Guidelines range, except if it departed
    upwards. So the factual findings underlying the upward departure were the only
    thing standing between a mandatory, lower Guidelines-range sentence and the
    higher, departed sentence. Without those factual findings, the district court would
    have had to choose a sentence within the Guidelines range. It is in that sense that
    the Guidelines were mandatory.
    Now that the Guidelines are advisory, district courts have discretion to
    sentence anywhere within the entire statutory range, full stop. And “facts found at
    sentencing merely inform the judge’s discretion; they do not increase the
    maximum sentence to which a defendant is otherwise exposed.” Villareal-
    Amarillas, 
    562 F.3d at 898
    . Accordingly, factual findings at sentencing cannot
    logically lead to a sentence that is “extremely disproportionate” relative to the
    mandatory sentence that would be imposed absent the factual finding, Staten, 466
    F.3d at 717, because there is no longer any mandatory Guideline sentence at
    all. Rather, the only “mandatory” range remaining after Booker is the statutory
    range. As long as the ultimate sentence falls within that range and meets all other
    requirements, a district court could sentence well beyond the Guidelines range
    without making any additional factual findings. The reasoning of the clear and
    14
    convincing evidence rule rested on the mandatory nature of the Guidelines: That’s
    why every other circuit got rid of the rule once the Guidelines became advisory.
    We should follow suit, en banc if necessary.
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-50272

Filed Date: 10/27/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/27/2021

Authorities (25)

United States v. Kikumura, Yu , 918 F.2d 1084 ( 1990 )

United States v. Christopher K.P. Reuter , 463 F.3d 792 ( 2006 )

United States v. Contreras , 593 F.3d 1135 ( 2010 )

United States v. Villareal-Amarillas , 562 F.3d 892 ( 2009 )

United States v. Van Alstyne , 584 F.3d 803 ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene ... , 66 F.3d 229 ( 1995 )

United States v. John Wesley Scrivener , 189 F.3d 944 ( 1999 )

United States v. Barbara Gail Harrison-Philpot , 978 F.3d 1520 ( 1992 )

United States v. Pedro Mezas De Jesus , 217 F.3d 638 ( 2000 )

United States v. Michael A. Riley , 335 F.3d 919 ( 2003 )

christine-l-miller-guardian-ad-litem-tonnie-savage-guardian-ad-litem-v , 335 F.3d 889 ( 2003 )

united-states-v-lori-blitz-aka-jackie-cross-united-states-of-america-v , 151 F.3d 1002 ( 1998 )

united-states-v-alice-hopper-united-states-of-america-v-terry-ingram , 177 F.3d 824 ( 1999 )

United States v. Delfino Lomeli Gonzalez , 365 F.3d 796 ( 2004 )

United States v. Francisco Bonilla-Montenegro , 331 F.3d 1047 ( 2003 )

United States v. Pineda-Doval , 614 F.3d 1019 ( 2010 )

United States v. Eliodoro Valensia , 222 F.3d 1173 ( 2000 )

United States v. Ronald Jordan , 256 F.3d 922 ( 2001 )

United States v. Dario Restrepo , 946 F.2d 654 ( 1991 )

United States v. Garro , 517 F.3d 1163 ( 2008 )

View All Authorities »