State v. Bridges ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-493
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 21 January 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
No. 11 CRS 214643
MARCUS XAIVER BRIDGES
Appeal by the State from order entered 21 August 2012 by
Judge Carl R. Fox in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 23 October 2013.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Kathryne E. Hathcock, for the State.
Geeta Kapur and The Law Offices of James D. Williams, Jr.,
by James D. Williams, Jr., for defendant-appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
The State of North Carolina appeals from the trial court’s
order setting aside a jury verdict finding Marcus Xaiver Bridges
(“defendant”) guilty of felony hit and run resulting in serious
injury or death (“felony hit and run”) and dismissing that
charge. We affirm.
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On 25 June 2011, defendant was driving his mother’s Pontiac
Vibe (“the Vibe”) eastbound on Interstate 40 (“I-40”) in
Raleigh, North Carolina at approximately 65 miles per hour. He
approached Exit 301, at which point I-40 divides into two right
lanes continuing as I-40 East and two left lanes exiting onto I-
440 West. Defendant, who was unfamiliar with the area, was in
one of the left lanes.
Initially, defendant believed he was supposed to continue
on I-40 and veered sharply into one of the right lanes in order
to do so. When he veered, the Vibe entered the lane already
occupied by a Chevrolet Malibu (“the Malibu”). The Vibe came
within close proximity of the Malibu, but the vehicles never
physically touched. Defendant then determined that he actually
wanted to exit to I-440, and he quickly changed lanes to the
left. Meanwhile, the driver of the Malibu lost control of her
vehicle in an attempt to avoid defendant. She swerved to the
right and struck a tree. Seventeen-year-old Morgan McKenzie, a
passenger in the Malibu, died as a result of the crash.
Law enforcement officers investigating the crash were able
to link the Vibe with defendant. Lieutenant Kyle Wescoe (“Lt.
Wescoe”) of the Raleigh Police Department (“RPD”) then went to
defendant’s home. Defendant identified himself to Lt. Wescoe
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and admitted that he had recently driven to the Triangle Town
Center mall in Raleigh. Lt. Wescoe informed defendant that he
was investigating an automobile accident. Defendant complied
with Lt. Wescoe’s request to come to the RPD for an interview
regarding the accident.
At the station, defendant was interviewed by RPD Officer
Jamie Rigsbee (“Officer Rigsbee”). Defendant told Officer
Rigsbee that he was attempting to travel to Crabtree Valley Mall
via I-40 when he approached the I-40/I-440 split at Exit 301 and
became confused as to which road to take. Defendant admitted
that he went from an I-440 lane to an I-40 lane and then back.
Defendant denied seeing another vehicle in the I-40 lane.
Officer Rigsbee informed defendant that a fatal car crash had
occurred as a result of his driving, and defendant became very
upset and started crying.
Defendant was indicted for felony hit and run and
misdemeanor death by motor vehicle. Beginning 13 August 2012,
defendant was tried by a jury in Wake County Superior Court. At
the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the
evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss both charges.
These motions were denied by the trial court.
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On 20 August 2012, the jury returned verdicts finding
defendant guilty of both charges. After the verdicts, defendant
renewed his motion to dismiss, and on 21 August 2012, the trial
court entered an order setting aside the jury’s verdict and
dismissing the felony hit and run charge. The misdemeanor death
by vehicle conviction remained undisturbed. The State appeals.
The State’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge
of felony hit and run. We disagree.
“‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for
the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each
essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator
of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.’” State
v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455
(2000)(quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914,
918 (1993)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164,
169 (1980). “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57,
62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).
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Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a),
The driver of any vehicle who knows or
reasonably should know:
(1) That the vehicle which he or
she is operating is involved in a
crash; and
(2) That the crash has resulted in
serious bodily injury, as defined
in G.S. 14-32.4, or death to any
person;
shall immediately stop his or her vehicle at
the scene of the crash. The driver shall
remain with the vehicle at the scene of the
crash until a law-enforcement officer
completes the investigation of the crash or
authorizes the driver to leave and the
vehicle to be removed, unless remaining at
the scene places the driver or others at
significant risk of injury.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a) (2013). In the instant case, the
trial court held that the State failed to provide substantial
evidence of defendant’s knowledge that (1) his vehicle was
involved in a crash and (2) the crash resulted in serious bodily
injury or death:
Here there’s no evidence that there was any
collision between the vehicles. There’s no
evidence that the defendant knew anybody --
that an accident occurred, and there’s
absolutely no evidence that the defendant
knew that death or physical injury had
occurred[.] . . . Consistently, the
defendant in this case has denied being --
any knowledge of being involved in an
accident. There’s nothing from the
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circumstances which would lead the Court to
believe there is any evidence that he knew
or reasonably should have known that this
was -- that he was involved in an accident,
in the evidence or actual, and that’s
specifically why this statute exists, so
that the Court doesn't allow a jury verdict
to stand where there's no evidence to
support it. There’s just no evidence to
support that either of these -- either of
these elements of this offense, and the
Court allows the motion to set aside the
jury’s verdict as to the felony hit and run
charge, . . . that motion is granted and set
aside . . . .
The State concedes that there was no evidence presented at
trial that defendant had actual knowledge of the crash, but
contends that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for
a jury to conclude that defendant reasonably should have known
that he caused an accident and that the accident resulted in
serious injury or death. In support of its contention that it
met its evidentiary burden as to these elements at trial, the
State cites two unpublished cases from this Court. In State v.
Barbour, this Court held that the State presented sufficient
evidence that the defendant should have known that the victim
was injured when he struck her vehicle, which was traveling at
55 miles per hour, and sent it spinning on the highway. ___
N.C. App. ___, 735 S.E.2d 452, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1320, 2012
WL 5859668 (2012)(unpublished). In State v. Williams, this
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Court held that the evidence presented did not support an
instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor hit
and run because the defendant reasonably should have known that
the victim was injured in the accident. ___ N.C. App. ___, 716
S.E.2d 90, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1940, 2011 WL 3891983(2011)(unpublished)(Finding that the following evidence
demonstrated that the defendant reasonably should have known
that the victim was injured: (1) defendant’s vehicle, which was
traveling at 55 miles per hour, rear ended the victim’s vehicle,
which was traveling at 45 miles per hour; (2) both vehicles went
off the road and into a ditch, with the victim’s vehicle
striking a tree; (3) both vehicles suffered extensive damage;
(4) the victim saw the defendant leave the scene with a third
person; and (5) the defendant himself was injured in the
accident.).
However, Barbour and Williams are both distinguishable from
this case because they both involved actual physical contact
between the defendant’s vehicle and the victim’s vehicle. While
contact is not required by our statutes in order for an accident
to have occurred, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4b) (2013)(A
“crash” is defined as “[a]ny event that results in injury or
property damage attributable directly to the motion of a motor
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vehicle or its load. The terms collision, accident, and crash
and their cognates are synonymous.”), the contact provides a
substantial basis to conclude that a defendant reasonably should
have known about an accident. Since there was no contact
between the Vibe and the Malibu in the instant case, the
evidence presented by the State at trial must have provided some
alternative basis through which defendant would reasonably have
been made aware of the accident. Additionally, this evidence
would have to demonstrate that defendant was particularly aware
of the severity of the accident such that he reasonably should
have known that it resulted in a severe injury or death. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a).
In its brief, the State relies upon eyewitness testimony to
try to establish that there was substantial evidence that
defendant reasonably should have known about the crash of the
Malibu and its severity. The State cites testimony from
multiple individuals who witnessed the crash while traveling
several hundred feet behind it and from an individual in front
of the crash who witnessed the accident in his side-view
mirrors. However, these witnesses were at substantially
different locations from defendant such that the crash was
directly within their respective lines of sight. Their
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testimony does not provide any information about what
defendant’s vantage point from I-440 would have been at the time
of the crash. The evidence at trial was that I-440, on which
defendant was traveling, immediately curved away from I-40,
where the crash ultimately occurred, after Exit 301. Thus,
witnesses who had either not reached Exit 301 at the time of the
crash or who were still traveling on I-40 after that exit could
not provide substantial evidence that defendant reasonably
should have seen the crash from his location at the time that it
occurred.
Finally, the State contends that defendant should
reasonably have heard the crash based upon the testimony of RPD
Officer John Michael Walls, III (“Officer Walls”). Officer
Walls testified that he “heard what [he] thought was a faint
sound of a vehicle crash” while stopped in traffic on an
overpass approximately one-eighth of a mile from Exit 301.
However, just as the eyewitness crash testimony did not provide
evidence of what defendant reasonably could have seen from his
location, the fact that Officer Walls could faintly hear a crash
from his precise location does not shed any light on what
defendant reasonably could have heard from his location at the
time of the crash. Thus, Officer Walls’s testimony does not
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provide substantial evidence that defendant reasonably should
have known that he was involved in a crash.
Ultimately, the State did not present substantial evidence
that defendant reasonably should have known that he was involved
in an accident which resulted in a serious injury or death.
There was no evidence that defendant could have reasonably felt,
seen, heard, or otherwise been made aware of either the crash or
its severity based upon his location when the crash occurred.
Accordingly, the trial court properly set aside the jury’s
verdict and dismissed the felony hit and run charge. The trial
court’s order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and HUNTER, Jr., Robert N. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).