United States v. Chambers , 508 F. App'x 67 ( 2013 )

11-5411-cr
United States v. Chambers
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
28th day of January, two thousand thirteen.
Present:
AMALYA L. KEARSE,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Circuit Judges,
JED S. RAKOFF,
District Judge.*
________________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 11-5411-cr
PAUL ANTHONY CHAMBERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________
For Appellee: Daniel B. Tehrani & Katherine Polk Failla, Assistant United
States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York.
*
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
For Defendant-Appellant: James M. Branden, New York, N.Y.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Jones, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the decision of the district court be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Paul Anthony Chambers appeals from the district court’s judgment
of conviction entered on December 8, 2011, sentencing Chambers to one year and one day in
prison and three years of supervised release for illegal reentry into the United States in violation
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) & (b). Chambers was born in Jamaica but, along with most of his family,
moved to the United States illegally when he was 17 years old. In 1990, he was convicted of
possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense. He fathered a child in the United States
with his future wife in the early 1990s, but, as a result of his 1990 conviction, he was ultimately
deported to Jamaica in 1996. Chambers began to fear for his safety while in Jamaica and,
because his wife was having health problems, became worried about his family as well.
Therefore, he illegally returned to the United States in March of 1997. After his return, he held a
number of steady jobs and was not arrested for any further crimes (other than the instant illegal
reentry charge). He has served his prison term and was deported to Jamaica during the pendency
of this appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural
history of this case, and the issues on appeal.
2
Chambers challenges only the supervised release term, arguing solely that its imposition
was substantively unreasonable.1 We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
imposed by a district court “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We will only “set aside a district court’s substantive
determination . . . in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within
the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008)
(en banc) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Essentially, our standard of
review requires us to defer to the district court except in the “rare case” that the sentence would
“damage the administration of justice.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir.
2009).
Chambers argues that the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) of the Sentencing
Guidelines—which guide a court’s determination of whether to impose supervised release—do
not support the imposition of supervised release in this case. He contends that his productive job
history and lack of criminal activity following his return to the United States show that he has
been completely rehabilitated and that there is no need to deter him from future criminal
1
We requested supplemental briefing from the parties on a question related to the
procedural reasonableness of the defendant’s supervised release term—whether the district court
committed procedural error when it failed to mention a new amendment to the Sentencing
Guidelines concerning the circumstances under which supervised release should be imposed on
defendants who are soon to be deported. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c). The defendant, however, not
only failed to mention this argument in his original briefing to this court but explicitly
disclaimed it by stating that “procedural reasonableness . . . is not at issue here.” Appellant’s Br.
at 6. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the issue has been forfeited. See JP Morgan
Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, 412 F.3d 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2005). The defendant has
offered no justification that would support a decision to excuse the forfeiture, and, in fact, the
defendant’s counsel explained that the failure to raise the issue on appeal was a conscious
choice. Therefore, we express no opinion concerning whether the district court satisfied its
procedural obligations to apply the correct Guidelines.
3
conduct.2 However, Chambers ignores the possibility that the district court might need to deter
him from future illegal reentry into the United States. The record contains more than enough
facts to support a conclusion that Chambers has particularly strong incentives to again return to
this country illegally. He has strong family ties in the United States. His children and his
partially disabled wife live here, and he returned the first time in large part to help them. In fact,
the court thought that his family was in “a particularly vulnerable situation.” App’x 63-64.
Additionally, Chambers previously expressed fear for his life in Jamaica after he was allegedly
the target of multiple shootings. We cannot conclude that, given these circumstances, the
imposition of supervised release was outside the broad “range of permissible decisions,” Cavera,
550 F.3d at 189, or would “damage the administration of justice,” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123.
We have considered all of Chambers’s contentions that are properly before us and have
found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
2
Indeed, the district court recognized the defendant’s significant progress by imposing a
jail term well below the recommended Guidelines level.
4