United States v. Napper , 385 F. App'x 57 ( 2010 )


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  •          09-3366-cr
    U.S. v. Napper
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . C ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1,
    2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1.1.
    W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
    ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of                                      Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick                                      Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the                                      City of
    4       New York, on the 20 th day of July, two thousand and                                    ten.
    5
    6       PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    7                PETER W. HALL,
    8                         Circuit Judges,
    9                RICHARD W. GOLDBERG,
    10                         Judge. *
    11
    12
    13
    14       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    15
    16                                       Appellee,
    17
    18                       -v.-                                                   09-3366-CR
    19
    20       TROY NAPPER, a/k/a TROY MOTE,
    21
    22                                       Defendant-Appellant.
    23
    24
    25
    26
    *
    The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, of the United States Court of
    International Trade, sitting by designation.
    1   FOR APPELLANT:       GARY D. WEINBERGER, Assistant Federal
    2                        Defender (Thomas McCudden, on the brief)
    3                        for Thomas G. Dennis, Federal Defender,
    4                        Hartford, CT.
    5
    6   FOR APPELLEE:        DAVID E. NOVICK, Assistant United States
    7                        Attorney (William J. Nardini, Assistant
    8                        United States Attorney, of counsel), for
    9                        David B. Fein, United States Attorney for
    10                        the District of Connecticut, New Haven,
    11                        CT.
    12
    13        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    14   District of Connecticut (Arterton, J.).
    15
    16       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    17   AND DECREED that the judgment of said district court be
    18   AFFIRMED.
    19       Appellant Troy Napper appeals from a judgment of the
    20   United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
    21   (Arterton, J.), which sentenced Napper principally to 188
    22   months’ imprisonment.     We assume the parties’ familiarity
    23   with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the
    24   issues presented for review.
    25       We review a district court’s sentencing decision under
    26   a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”     United States
    27   v. Cavera, 
    550 F.3d 180
    , 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v.
    28   United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007)).     We examine the
    29   sentence for reasonableness, both procedural and
    30   substantive.     United States v. Avello-Alvarez, 
    430 F.3d 543
    ,
    31   545 (2d Cir. 2005).
    1        To the extent that Napper’s argument may be construed
    2    to challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence,
    3    he presents no evidence that the prosecution’s decision to
    4    file a 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
     notice was based on improper factors.
    5    See United States v. Sanchez, 
    517 F.3d 651
    , 671 (2d Cir.
    6    2008).   Nor does he present sufficient evidence that there
    7    exists a geographical variance in the volume of filings of §
    8    851 notices such that there is a sentencing disparity
    9    between similarly-situated defendants.     Napper analogizes
    10   the alleged variance in filing of § 851 notices with
    11   geographically-limited “fast track” programs authorized in
    12   U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1.     We have expressly rejected that
    13   differences between sentences in jurisdictions with and
    14   without a “fast track” program render a sentence
    15   unreasonable.     See United States v. Mejia, 
    461 F.3d 158
    , 164
    16   (2d Cir. 2006).
    17       Napper claims that his below-Guidelines sentence was
    18   substantively unreasonable because the district court failed
    19   to consider adequately the factors detailed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 20
       3553(a) and thus his sentence was “greater than necessary.”
    21   Our review of the sentencing hearing belies this position.
    22   Though Napper himself would have weighed the factors
    23   differently, that does not mean the district court abused
    1   its discretion when it conducted its balancing.
    2       The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
    3
    4                              FOR THE COURT:
    5                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    6
    7
    8
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-3366-CR

Citation Numbers: 385 F. App'x 57

Judges: Goldberg, Hall, Peter, Richard, Wesley

Filed Date: 7/20/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023