Singh v. Holder , 390 F. App'x 51 ( 2010 )


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  • 09-3058-ag
    Singh v. Holder
    BIA
    Abrams, IJ
    A093 394 054
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
    A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
    FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
    BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
    States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,
    on the 25 th day of August, two thousand ten.
    PRESENT:
    DENNIS JACOBS,
    Chief Judge,
    JON O. NEWMAN,
    JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    HARJIT SINGH,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                               09-3058-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. ATTORNEY
    GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                Genet Getachew, Brooklyn, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                Tony West, Assistant Attorney General;
    James A. Hunolt, Senior Litigation
    Counsel;   Aviva   L.  Poczter,   Trial
    Attorney,    Office   of    Immigration
    Litigation, Washington D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    GRANTED.
    Petitioner Harjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,
    seeks review of the July 10, 2009, order of the BIA affirming
    the April 23, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”)Steven
    R. Abrams denying his application for asylum, withholding of
    removal,    and   relief   under   the   Convention   Against   Torture
    (“CAT”).    In re Harjit Singh, No. A093 394 054 (B.I.A. July 10,
    2009), aff’g No. A093 394 054 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City April 23,
    2008).     We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
    facts and procedural history in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s
    decision as modified by the BIA.         See Dong Gao v. BIA, 
    482 F.3d 122
    , 125 (2d Cir. 2007).     The applicable standards of review are
    well-established.     See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
    Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    The IJ found that the petitioner had not established the
    timeliness of his asylum application and therefore pretermitted
    the asylum claim.     However, the IJ also considered the merits
    of the asylum claim and rejected it. Without considering the
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    timeliness issue, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Singh failed
    to establish his eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal,
    and CAT relief based solely on his failure to sufficiently
    corroborate       his    otherwise    credible   testimony.         See   
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Kyaw Zwar Tun v. U.S. INS, 
    445 F.3d 554
    , 563 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “[a]n applicant may
    be required to provide any reasonably available documentation
    to corroborate the elements of her claim, or explain why such
    documentation is unavailable, and the [agency] may rely on the
    failure to do so in finding that the applicant has not met her
    burden of proof”).          In doing so, it affirmed the IJ’s finding
    that none of the documents in the record indicated that Singh
    had   ever    been      arrested,    detained,   or   beaten    by    the     Indian
    police.      However, as Singh contends, neither the IJ’s nor the
    BIA’s decisions indicate that they considered an affidavit from
    Parkash Kaur, the Sarpanch of Pandori Lubana village, stating
    that Singh was arrested twice in 2003, and that the police
    “tortured him during the time he was in custody.” While we
    generally “presume that [the agency] has taken into account all
    of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly
    suggests otherwise,” see Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
    
    471 F.3d 315
    , 338 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006), the agency’s evident
    failure      to   consider     documentary       evidence      in     the     record
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    constitutes reversible error, see Jorge-Tzoc v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 146
    , 150 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 272-73 (2d Cir. 2005). In this case, we cannot presume
    that the agency considered the Kaur affidavit in view of the
    IJ’s explicit statement that “[w]e do not have any documents
    that indicate that [petitioner] had in fact been beaten at any
    point in time.”         Because we cannot predict with confidence that
    the BIA would reach the same conclusion, i.e., that Singh failed
    to adequately corroborate his claim, if it considered the Kaur
    affidavit describing his arrest and torture, remand to the BIA
    is appropriate.          Cf. Mamadou Aliou Diallo v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Justice, 
    548 F.3d 232
    , 235 (2d Cir. 2008).
    For   the   foregoing      reasons,      the   petition   for   review    is
    GRANTED and the proceedings REMANDED to the BIA for further
    consideration consistent with this order.                As we have completed
    our   review,     any    stay   of   removal    that   the   Court    previously
    granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for
    a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.                       Any
    pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in
    accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2),
    and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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