Priel v. Astrue , 453 F. App'x 84 ( 2011 )

10-566-cv
Priel v. Astrue
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day
of December, two thousand eleven.
Present:
JON O. NEWMAN,
RALPH K. WINTER,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Circuit Judges.
________________________________________________
RYAN J. PRIEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-566-cv
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: RAYMOND J. RIGAT, Clinton, Conn.
For Defendant-Appellee: MICHELLE L. CHRIST, Special Assistant United States
Attorney (Stephen P. Conte, Regional Chief Counsel,
Region II, Office of the General Counsel, Social
Security Administration, on the brief), for William J.
Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney for the Western
District of New York
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
(Telesca, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Ryan J. Priel appeals from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York (Telesca, J.) entered on January 19, 2010, affirming
the determination by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that Priel was not disabled and was
therefore ineligible for Disabled Adult Child and Supplemental Security Income benefits. On
appeal, Priel contends that the ALJ’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ (1) erroneously failed to accord controlling weight to the medical opinions of
Priel’s treating psychiatrist and nurse and (2) considered only Priel’s ability to read and write,
not the cumulative effect of his mental impairments, on his ability to work. Priel argues also that
the ALJ improperly relied on a vocational expert witness’s response to a hypothetical question
that did not accurately reflect Priel’s mental limitations. We assume the parties’ familiarity with
the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
“In reviewing the denial of [Social Security] benefits by the [Commissioner], ‘our focus
is not so much on the district court’s ruling as it is on the administrative ruling.’” Rosa v.
Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (alterations in original) (quoting Schaal v. Apfel, 134
F.3d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is not our function to
determine de novo whether [a plaintiff] is disabled . . . .” Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d
Cir. 1996). Instead, “[w]e set aside [an] ALJ’s decision only where it is based upon legal error
or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 77 (alterations in original)
(quoting Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pratts, 94 F.3d at 37(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We “may not substitute [our] own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if [we] might
justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
An individual is “considered to be disabled” if “he is unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
. . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Regulations enacted by the Social Security Administration set forth
a five-step analysis for evaluating whether an individual’s impairment meets this definition of
disability.
The first step in the process requires the Secretary to ascertain whether the
claimant is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” . . . If the applicant
is not engaged in such activity, the second step requires a decision whether the
claimant’s medical condition or impairment is “severe,” i.e., one that significantly
limits his ability to work. . . .
If the impairment is severe, step three requires a determination of whether
the damage is of sufficient gravity to meet or equal the definitions found in the
Listing of Impairments (the “Listings”). See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1
(1987). . . . If, however, a claimant has a severe impairment that is not considered
per se disabling under the Listings, step four compels the Secretary to ascertain
his residual functional capacity (“RFC”), a measure of employment capabilities. .
. . If the applicant is unable to perform his past work, he is then evaluated at the
fifth step in the process, which requires a finding of whether, given his functional
ability (RFC), age, education and past work experience, he could perform other
jobs that exist in the national economy.
State of N.Y. v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1990).
We begin with Priel’s contention that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by
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substantial evidence on the ground that the ALJ erroneously failed to accord controlling weight
to the medical opinions of Dr. Robert Young, his treating psychiatrist. A treating physician’s
opinion is accorded “controlling weight” when it is “well[]supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial [record]
evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Nevertheless, “[a] treating physician’s statement that
the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.” See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133
(2d Cir. 1999). It is the Commissioner who is “responsible for making the determination or
decision about whether [the claimant] meet[s] the statutory definition of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(e)(1).
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ properly declined to accord
controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. Young because it was inconsistent in material respects
with other substantial evidence. For example, Dr. Thomas Ryan, a consultative examiner, noted
that Priel reported no depressive symptoms and that medication relieved his “paranoid ideation.”
R. at 204-05. He observed also that Priel was “generally cooperative,” his speech was
intelligible and his thought process was coherent without hallucinations, delusions or paranoia.
Id. Dr. Herman V. Szymanski, the state agency psychiatrist, likewise found that Priel was able
to understand and execute simple instructions, maintain concentration for an adequate period of
time, relate to co-workers and supervisors and “adapt to routine changes in a low contact
setting.” Id. at 451. Dr. Wilberforce Tamaklo, a treating psychiatrist, noted that Priel’s “level of
lethality” was “[e]ssentially nil” and that Priel “will do very well if he continues to maintain
sobriety.” Id. at 124. Dr. Shabbir A. Chowdhury, another treating psychiatrist, noted that Priel’s
prognosis was “relatively fair if [he] remains medication compliant and addresses his
polysubstance abuse.” Id. at 177. The results of both Dr. Chowdhury’s and Dr. Muhammad
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Ali’s mental status examinations were normal. In addition, Lynn Beltz, Priel’s “job trainer,”
repeatedly noted that Priel was productive, worked with speed and efficiency, retained what he
had learned and could follow instructions. She observed that Priel’s employers, in turn, were
satisfied with his work.
Priel does not dispute that the findings of Drs. Ryan, Szymanski, Tamaklo, Chowdhury
and Ali and Ms. Beltz substantially support the ALJ’s RFC determination and are materially
inconsistent with Dr. Young’s opinion. Moreover, the results of Dr. Young’s “mental status
examination” were normal; Priel was “alert and oriented” and “cooperative,” and there were “no
signs of psychosis, hallucinations or delusions.” Id. at 461. Dr. Young further observed that
Priel’s cognitive ability was consistent with that of a person of “general intelligence” and was
“certainly adequate for his work.” Id. at 541. In these circumstances, we conclude that Dr.
Young’s opinion that Priel was disabled are “inconsistent with the other substantial [record]
evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Therefore, the ALJ properly declined to accord it
controlling weight.
We turn next to Priel’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider the cumulative effect of
his impairments, including his schizoaffective disorder and learning disability. As an initial
matter, the ALJ expressly found that Priel’s schizoaffective disorder and “unspecified learning
disability” constituted severe impairments. R. at 19. The ALJ noted also that he had considered
Priel’s mental impairments “singly and in combination.” Id. Pursuant to the psychiatric review
technique set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a and 416.920a, the ALJ found that Priel’s
schizoaffective disorder was well controlled with Haldol. As for Priel’s learning disability, the
ALJ found, in view of a discrepancy between Priel’s intelligent quotient scores and academic
performance, that Priel was learning disabled. The ALJ’s RFC determination was based upon an
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evaluation of both medical and non-medical evidence and the “total limiting effects” of Priel’s
medically determinable impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(e), 416.945(e). In these
circumstances, Priel’s contention that the ALJ failed to consider the cumulative effect of all of
his impairments is without merit.
Finally, we conclude that the hypothetical question addressed by Dr. Peter Manzi, a
vocational expert witness, accurately reflected Priel’s vocational profile and RFC. In
determining Priel’s RFC, the ALJ properly evaluated the entirety of the record, including both
medical and non-medical evidence, and discounted Dr. Young’s opinion insofar as it conflicted
with other substantial evidence. At the same time, the ALJ properly declined to include in his
hypothetical question symptoms and limitations that he had reasonably rejected. See, e.g.,
Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1554 (2d Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the ALJ properly relied
upon Dr. Manzi’s testimony in determining that Priel was not disabled.
We have considered Priel’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For
the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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