Sivulich v. WFSV , 348 P.3d 748 ( 2015 )


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    2015 UT App 101
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    JAMISON SIVULICH,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES; WORKFORCE APPEALS
    BOARD; AND AAA OF CALIFORNIA, NEVADA, AND UTAH,
    Respondents.
    Memorandum Decision
    No. 20140015-CA
    Filed April 23, 2015
    Original Proceeding in this Court
    Jamison Sivulich, Petitioner Pro Se
    Amanda B. McPeck, Attorney for Respondent
    Department of Workforce Services
    JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Memorandum Decision, in
    which JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH and JOHN A. PEARCE concurred.
    TOOMEY, Judge:
    ¶1     Jamison Sivulich challenges the Workforce Appeals
    Board’s (the Board) decision affirming the Administrative Law
    Judge’s (the ALJ) judgment denying his claim for unemployment
    benefits. AAA of California, Nevada, and Utah (Employer)
    terminated Sivulich’s employment after discovering that he
    violated its credit card policies by purchasing several high-priced
    non-business items with company credit cards. The Board found
    that because Employer discharged Sivulich for just cause, Sivulich
    was not entitled to unemployment benefits and Employer was
    relieved from benefit charges associated with Sivulich’s claim. We
    decline to disturb the Board’s decision.
    ¶2     ‚‘Whether the [Board] correctly or incorrectly denied
    benefits is a traditional mixed question of law and fact.’‛ Jex v.
    Labor Comm’n, 
    2013 UT 40
    , ¶ 15, 
    306 P.3d 799
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). We review the Board’s conclusions of
    Sivulich v. Department of Workforce Services
    law for correctness. Drake v. Industrial Comm’n, 
    939 P.2d 177
    , 181
    (Utah 1997). But we defer to the Board’s factual findings ‚if they
    are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
    whole record before the court.‛ Uintah County v. Department of
    Workforce Servs., 
    2014 UT App 44
    , ¶ 5, 
    320 P.3d 1103
     (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). ‚*A+ party challenging the
    Board’s findings of fact must marshal[] all of the evidence
    supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting
    facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
    findings are not supported by substantial evidence.‛ 
    Id.
    (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted); cf. State v. Nielsen, 
    2014 UT 10
    , ¶ 42, 
    326 P.3d 645
     (the
    Utah Supreme Court reiterating ‚that a party challenging a
    factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence . . . will almost
    certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails
    to marshal‛).
    ¶3     Sivulich seems to argue that the Board misinterpreted
    Employer’s ‚Travel & Entertainment‛ and ‚American Express
    Card‛ policies, erroneously found that Employer terminated
    Sivulich’s employment with just cause, and inappropriately
    refused to allow Sivulich to submit new information and
    documents for consideration.1 In his petition for judicial review,
    1. On appeal from the ALJ’s decision, Sivulich presented several
    pages of new evidence and several new allegations to the Board.
    The new evidence included a spreadsheet of Sivulich’s approved
    expense reports, an email from a human resources employee, a
    letter he wrote to a coworker, and notes from a March 2013
    meeting. Among other things, Sivulich alleged that his supervisor
    accused him of inappropriate expenses to cover the supervisor’s
    own mistakes. Because the new evidence was available to Sivulich
    at the time of his hearing before the ALJ and he did not provide
    any explanation for failing to present this evidence before, the
    Board did not consider the new evidence on appeal, concluding
    that doing so ‚would be unfair to the other party if *it+ accepted
    such new evidence, except under unusual or extraordinary
    circumstances.‛
    20140015-CA                      2                
    2015 UT App 101
    Sivulich v. Department of Workforce Services
    he simply reargues his position that the Board’s findings were
    wrong but does not identify how the evidence does not support
    the Board’s findings. Moreover, Sivulich fails to carry his burden
    of persuasion on appeal because he inadequately briefs his
    arguments. Thus, we decline to address the merits of Sivulich’s
    arguments.2
    ¶4      ‚If an appellant fails to adequately brief an issue on appeal,
    the appellate court may decline to consider the argument.‛ Jacob v.
    Cross, 
    2012 UT App 190
    , ¶ 2, 
    283 P.3d 539
     (per curiam). Rule 24 of
    the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that an
    appellant’s brief include a table of authorities, Utah R. App. P.
    24(a)(3); a ‚statement of the issues presented for review,‛ 
    id.
     R.
    24(a)(5); a ‚citation to the record showing that the issue was
    preserved,‛ 
    id.
     R. 24(a)(5)(A); a ‚statement of the facts relevant to
    the issues presented for review . . . . supported by citations to the
    record,‛ 
    id.
     R. 24(a)(7); and an addendum with, among other
    things, ‚those parts of the record on appeal that are of central
    importance . . . , such as the . . . findings of fact and conclusions of
    law . . . or the contract or document subject to construction,‛ 
    id.
     R.
    24(a)(11). Most importantly, rule 24(a)(9) requires an appellant to
    support the argument with the ‚authorities, statutes, and parts of
    the record relied on‛ including ‚all record evidence that supports
    the challenged finding*s+.‛ 
    Id.
     R. 24(a)(9). Sivulich did not comply
    with any of these requirements.
    ¶5     First, Sivulich failed to identify where in the record the
    issues presented on appeal were preserved for review. This is
    2. Even if we were to address the merits of Sivulich’s arguments,
    based on the record, the Board’s findings and conclusions of law
    are supported by substantial evidence. The evidence establishes
    that Sivulich made numerous non-business purchases using
    company credit cards, knowing he was not authorized to do so,
    and thereby jeopardized Employer’s interests. Moreover, Sivulich
    had a full and fair opportunity to provide his evidence to the ALJ,
    and the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider
    new evidence.
    20140015-CA                       3                 
    2015 UT App 101
    Sivulich v. Department of Workforce Services
    especially important because ‚*i+t is well settled that issues not
    raised before the *forum below+ are waived on appeal.‛ Whitear v.
    Labor Comm’n, 
    973 P.2d 982
    , 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Second,
    although Sivulich repeatedly referred to Employer’s ‚Travel
    & Entertainment‛ and ‚American Express Card‛ policies, he did
    not attach the documents in an addendum and largely failed to
    cite the record as the rule requires. By not citing the record, the
    task of combing through the record is improperly left to this
    court. Finally, Sivulich failed to cite any legal authority to support
    his argument. ‚As a result, the issues are inadequately briefed
    because he has completely shifted the burden of researching the
    record and applicable law to the court.‛ Jacob, 
    2012 UT App 190
    ,
    ¶ 3; see also Phillips v. Hatfield, 
    904 P.2d 1108
    , 1109–10 (Utah Ct.
    App. 1995). ‚An appellate court is not a depository in which [a
    party+ may dump the burden of argument and research.‛ Allen v.
    Friel, 
    2008 UT 56
    , ¶ 9, 
    194 P.3d 903
     (alteration in original) (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶6      We recognize that Sivulich is a self-represented party and
    is therefore ‚entitled to ‘every consideration that may reasonably
    be indulged.’‛ Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 
    669 P.2d 1207
    ,
    1213 (Utah 1983)). But ‚reasonable indulgence is not unlimited
    indulgence‛ and does not require this court ‚to redress the
    ongoing consequences of the party’s decision to function in a
    capacity for which he is not trained.‛ 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Moreover, ‚a party who represents himself will be held
    to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified
    member of the bar.‛ 
    Id.
     (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). Therefore, even considering Sivulich has appeared pro
    se, he fails to meet his burden of demonstrating error because he
    provided too little information for the court to analyze the issues
    raised on appeal.
    ¶7     We decline to disturb the Board’s decision.
    20140015-CA                       4                
    2015 UT App 101
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20140015-CA

Citation Numbers: 2015 UT App 101, 348 P.3d 748

Filed Date: 4/23/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023