State v. Wager , 372 P.3d 91 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                          
    2016 UT App 97
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee,
    v.
    TIM G. WAGER,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20140812-CA
    Filed May 12, 2016
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg
    No. 121908651
    Paul E. Remy, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Daniel W. Boyer, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W.
    BENCH concurred.1
    VOROS, Judge:
    ¶1    Tim G. Wager was convicted of possession of
    methamphetamine and marijuana. The principal issue on appeal
    concerns the authentication at trial of a photograph obtained
    from Wager’s ex-girlfriend. The photograph appears to show
    Wager sitting in his bathroom smoking a meth pipe.
    Uncontroverted trial testimony established that the person in the
    photograph was Wager and that the bathroom in the
    1. Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as
    authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).
    State v. Wager
    photograph was his bathroom. The trial court admitted the
    photograph. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     Wager testified during cross-examination that no one had
    used drugs at his residence. In rebuttal, the prosecution offered a
    photograph taken by an informant (Wager’s ex-girlfriend)
    showing Wager sitting in a bathroom holding in one hand what
    appears to be a meth pipe to his mouth and in the other a small
    torch. Wager objected to the admission of the photograph and
    argued that it lacked sufficient authentication in violation of rule
    901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Specifically, he argued that
    the State did not have a witness with personal knowledge of the
    contents of the photograph.
    ¶3     The State proffered the testimony of a police detective
    who had taken a photograph of Wager’s bathroom during his
    search of Wager’s residence and would testify that the
    informant’s photograph accurately depicted Wager in that
    bathroom. Wager argued that although the detective could
    accurately identify the bathroom, he could not testify to the
    activity depicted in the photograph. The trial court overruled the
    objection and admitted the photograph.
    ¶4      The jury convicted Wager of possession of
    methamphetamine, which was enhanced to a second-degree
    felony, and possession of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor. See
    Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (LexisNexis 2012). He was
    sentenced to one to fifteen years for the methamphetamine
    possession and 365 days for the marijuana possession. The court
    suspended the sentence and ordered Wager to serve ten days in
    jail and three years on probation.
    20140812-CA                     2                 
    2016 UT App 97
    State v. Wager
    ISSUES ON APPEAL
    ¶5    First, Wager contends that the trial court erred by
    ‚admitting, without authentication, a prejudicial photograph
    purported to be [Wager] using drugs.‛
    ¶6    Second, Wager contends that the trial court failed to
    address his objection to the photograph under rule 608 of the
    Utah Rules of Evidence.
    ¶7     Third, Wager contends that the trial court erred in
    admitting the photograph because, without evidence of the date
    it was taken, the photograph was irrelevant.
    ¶8     Fourth, Wager contends that the trial court erred by
    failing to mention, address, or follow rules 1002, 1004, and 1007
    of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
    ¶9    Finally, Wager contends that the trial court erred because
    the photograph, ‚if indeed offered as a specific incident of
    criminal conduct, should have been handled by a Motion in
    Limine.‛
    ANALYSIS
    I. Authentication
    ¶10 Wager contends that the trial court erred by ‚admitting,
    without authentication, a prejudicial photograph purported to
    be [Wager] using drugs.‛ This court grants a trial court ‚broad
    discretion to admit or exclude evidence and will disturb its
    ruling only for abuse of discretion.‛ Robinson v. Taylor, 
    2015 UT 69
    , ¶ 8, 
    356 P.3d 1230
     (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    ¶11 ‚To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or
    identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce
    evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
    20140812-CA                     3               
    2016 UT App 97
    State v. Wager
    proponent claims it is.‛ Utah R. Evid. 901(a). Such evidence may
    include ‚testimony of a witness with knowledge.‛ 
    Id.
     R.
    901(b)(1). ‚*I+f a competent witness with personal knowledge of
    the facts represented by a photograph testifies that the
    photograph accurately reflects those facts, it is admissible.‛ State
    v. Purcell, 
    711 P.2d 243
    , 245 (Utah 1985).
    ¶12 ‚Proper authentication does not require conclusive proof
    but, instead, requires only that the trial court determine that
    there is evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment
    of *a+ condition of fact.‛ State v. Woodard, 
    2014 UT App 162
    , ¶ 17,
    
    330 P.3d 1283
     (alteration in original) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). Thus, the trial court performs a
    ‚screening function.‛ 
    Id.
     (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). If the evidence is admitted, it then falls to the jury to
    determine ‚whether the evidence is in fact authentic.‛ 
    Id.
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶13 In State v. Bloomfield, this court stated that ‚[t]he general
    rule in Utah is that when ‘a competent witness with personal
    knowledge of the facts represented by a photograph . . . testifies
    that the photograph accurately reflects those facts, it is
    admissible.’‛ State v. Bloomfield, 
    2003 UT App 3
    , ¶ 24, 
    63 P.3d 110
    (quoting Purcell, 711 P.2d at 245). A surveillance camera
    recorded Bloomfield robbing a restaurant. Id. ¶ 22. At trial, a
    detective testified that he had obtained the videotape from the
    restaurant employees the night of the robbery and that it
    accurately depicted the interior of the restaurant that night. Id.
    He also identified Bloomfield in the video. Id. His testimony of
    the restaurant’s interior was ‚substantially corroborated‛ by an
    eyewitness of the robbery. Id. ¶ 24.
    ¶14 On appeal, this court held that although the detective
    ‚lacked personal knowledge as to the actual events as they
    occurred,‛ he knew the videotape had been given to him the
    night of the incident and that the interior of the restaurant
    shown on the video matched his knowledge of it. Id. The
    detective’s knowledge sufficiently supported a finding that ‚the
    20140812-CA                     4                 
    2016 UT App 97
    State v. Wager
    matter in question *was+ what its proponent claim*ed+.‛ 
    Id.
    (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). In addition, an eyewitness corroborated the activity
    depicted on the tape. 
    Id. ¶15
     The case before us presents similar facts, though without
    the corroboration. The detective had not witnessed the event
    depicted in the photograph, but knew that the photograph had
    been given to him by an informant and that it depicted Wager
    and his bathroom. No trial witness saw the event depicted in the
    photograph. But we conclude that additional eyewitness
    testimony is not necessary for proper authentication. The
    Washington Court of Appeals has held that photographs were
    adequately authenticated when a witness identified the
    individuals in the photographs, their approximate ages, and the
    location depicted. See State v. Sapp, 
    332 P.3d 1058
    , 1062 (Wash.
    Ct. App. 2014) (interpreting the substantively similar
    Washington Rule of Evidence). Thus, Washington ‚does not
    require photographs and other recordings to be authenticated by
    a witness present for their creation.‛ 
    Id.
     Our supreme court
    tacitly followed the same rule in affirming the admission of
    photographs of stolen property based on testimony ‚that the
    photographs depicted furniture belonging to [the victim] and
    seized from defendant, and that they were taken after the
    seizure.‛ Purcell, 711 P.2d at 245.2
    ¶16 Here, the detective was not the photographer and did not
    witness the events depicted in the photograph. But he had talked
    2. A more exacting rule could yield incongruous results.
    Imagine, for example, a photograph depicting a murder suspect
    standing over the recognizable corpse of a murder victim,
    holding the apparent murder weapon, in the room where the
    victim’s body was later found. Excluding this photograph on the
    ground that no one had witnessed and could be called to testify
    to the event it depicts would impose a high cost on the justice
    system without serving a rational purpose.
    20140812-CA                    5               
    2016 UT App 97
    State v. Wager
    to Wager in person, searched Wager’s residence, and taken his
    own photograph of Wager’s bathroom. Thus, the trial court
    could reasonably conclude that he possessed sufficient personal
    knowledge to testify that the informant’s photograph fairly and
    correctly depicted Wager and his bathroom. Based on this
    testimony, a reasonable juror could find the photograph
    authentic based on the comparison evidence—i.e., the detective’s
    own photograph—and the circumstantial evidence, which
    included the detective’s uncontroverted testimony.
    ¶17 The trial court properly fulfilled its screening function
    and acted within its discretion in ruling that the photograph met
    the standard for authentication.
    II. Wager’s Remaining Claims Are Inadequately Briefed and
    Unpreserved
    ¶18 Wager contends that the trial court failed to address his
    objection to the photograph under rule 608 of the Utah Rules of
    Evidence.
    ¶19 Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states
    that the appellant’s brief ‚shall contain the contentions and
    reasons with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to
    the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.‛ Utah
    R. App. P. 24(a)(9). ‚An issue is inadequately briefed when the
    overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of
    research and argument to the reviewing court.‛ State v. Sloan,
    
    2003 UT App 170
    , ¶ 13, 
    72 P.3d 138
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    ¶20 Wager’s argument that the trial court failed to address his
    rule 608 objection consists of a single paragraph without citation
    to the record or legal authority other than rule 608. Moreover,
    our own review of the record reveals that the trial court
    addressed Wager’s rule 608 objection twice. We therefore decline
    to further address Wager’s inadequately briefed rule 608
    argument.
    20140812-CA                      6                 
    2016 UT App 97
    State v. Wager
    ¶21 Wager next contends that the trial court erred in
    admitting the photograph because it was ‚completely
    irrelevant.‛ It was irrelevant, he argues, because the detective
    ‚was not able to testify that *the photograph] was taken on the
    date alleged in the information.‛
    ¶22 Under the foregoing authorities, we decline to address
    this issue on the ground that it is inadequately briefed. In any
    event, the photograph’s relevance did not depend on its date.
    Wager had testified that he would not allow drug use in the
    house, that he had never smelled any drug use in the house, and
    that no one had used meth in his house from the time he moved
    in to the time the police came. Because the photograph
    appearing to show Wager smoking a meth pipe in his bathroom
    tended to make Wager’s testimony ‚less probable than it would
    be without the evidence,‛ it was relevant. See Utah R. Evid.
    401(a); cf. State v. Purcell, 
    711 P.2d 243
    , 245 (Utah 1985) (‚Any
    minor discrepancies in the testimony went only to the details of
    the time and place the pictures were taken. . . . [S]ince they were
    not material to the purpose for which the evidence was
    introduced, they did not undermine the adequacy of the
    foundation.‛).
    ¶23 Wager next contends that the trial court erred by failing to
    mention, address, or follow rules 1002, 1004, and 1007 of the
    Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 1002 states that ‚an original . . .
    photograph is required to prove its content.‛ Rules 1004 and
    1007 state exceptions to this rule.
    ¶24 We decline to address this unpreserved issue. An
    appellant’s brief must contain a ‚citation to the record showing
    that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or . . . a statement
    of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the
    trial court.‛ Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). To preserve an issue for
    appeal, ‚the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a
    way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.‛
    438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 
    2004 UT 72
    , ¶ 51, 
    99 P.3d 801
    (citations, and quotation marks omitted). This means that ‚(1)
    20140812-CA                      7                 
    2016 UT App 97
    State v. Wager
    the issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be
    specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce
    supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.‛ 
    Id.
     (brackets,
    citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). ‚We will not
    address the merits of an argument that has not been preserved
    absent either plain error or exceptional circumstances.‛ Duke v.
    Graham, 
    2007 UT 31
    , ¶ 28, 
    158 P.3d 540
    .
    ¶25 Here, Wager fails to cite to the record to show that the
    issue was preserved in the trial court. In reviewing the record,
    we note that the question of originality was never mentioned, let
    alone timely and specifically raised with supporting evidence or
    legal authority. And Wager fails to offer any grounds that would
    justify our review of this issue.
    ¶26 Wager next contends that the trial court erred because the
    photograph, ‚if indeed offered as a specific incident of criminal
    conduct, should have been handled by a Motion in Limine.‛
    Wager apparently refers to rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
    Evidence, which prohibits the admission of ‚evidence of a crime
    . . . to prove a person’s character‛ except under certain
    circumstances and with ‚reasonable notice.‛ Utah R. Evid.
    404(b). Wager again fails to cite to the record to show that the
    issue was preserved in the trial court. And our review of the
    record shows that rule 404(b) was never mentioned in
    connection with the photograph. In addition, Wager’s brief fails
    to provide any citation to the record or legal authorities. The rule
    404(b) issue is therefore unpreserved and inadequately briefed,
    and we do not address it further.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶27 For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial
    court is affirmed.
    20140812-CA                     8                 
    2016 UT App 97
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20140812-CA

Citation Numbers: 2016 UT App 97, 372 P.3d 91

Filed Date: 5/12/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023