Zerega Avenue Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transportation, LLC , 513 F. App'x 30 ( 2013 )


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  • 12-1543-cv
    Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Horneck Offshore Transp., LLC
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
    CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
    EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY
    ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    StatesthCourthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on
    the 28 day of February, two thousand thirteen.
    PRESENT:  DENNY CHIN,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges,
    JANE A. RESTANI,*
    Judge.
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    ZEREGA AVENUE REALTY CORPORATION, FRED
    TODINO & SONS, INCORPORATED,
    Plaintiffs-Counter-
    Defendants-Appellees,
    -v.-                                  12-1543-cv
    HORNBECK OFFSHORE TRANSPORTATION, LLC,
    Defendant-Counter-
    Claimant-Cross-
    Defendant-Appellant,
    -and-
    HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, MASSACHUSETTS
    BAY INSURANCE COMPANY, FIREMAN'S FUND
    INSURANCE COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
    Defendants-Cross-
    Claimants.
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    *
    The Honorable Jane A. Restani, of the United States
    Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    FOR PLAINTIFFS-COUNTER-        ALEX SPIZZ (Stephen D. Oestreich,
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:          Rebecca Hollis, on the brief),
    Todtman, Nachamie, Spizz & Johns,
    P.C., New York, New York.
    FOR DEFENDANT-COUNTER-         GINO ANTHONY ZONGHETTI (Kenneth B.
    CLAIMANT-CROSS-DEFENDANT-      Danielsen, on the brief), Kenny &
    APPELLANT:                     Zonghetti, LLC, New York, New York.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of New York (Fox, M.J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Appellant Hornbeck Offshore Transportation, LLC
    ("Hornbeck") appeals from the March 23, 2012 judgment of the
    United States District Court for the Southern District of New
    York (Fox, M.J.), entered pursuant to the court's March 14, 2012
    Opinion and Order and March 22, 2012 Order finding Hornbeck
    liable for damage to the relieving platform and building owned by
    plaintiffs Zerega Avenue Realty Corporation and Fred Todino &
    Sons, Inc.   Hornbeck principally argues that the district court
    erred by (1) finding that Hornbeck's barge allided1 with
    plaintiffs' relieving platform on October 29, 2012; (2) finding
    that the allision caused plaintiffs' relieving platform to
    collapse, resulting in damage to the relieving platform and
    plaintiffs' office building; and (3) failing to apply the
    doctrine of comparative fault based on plaintiffs' decision to
    excavate the relieving platform.   We assume the parties'
    1
    "[I]n admiralty law an allision is the violent
    encounter of a moving vessel and a stationary object such as
    another vessel, a bridge, a pier, a wharf, or other shore side
    installation." II Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Jessica L. McClellan,
    Admiralty & Maritime Law § 14-1 (5th ed. 2012) (citing Oxford
    English Dictionary (1971)).
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    familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
    the case, and the issues on appeal.
    On appeal from a judgment following a bench trial, we
    review findings of fact for clear error and legal issues de novo.
    See Grace v. Corbis-Sygma, 
    487 F.3d 113
    , 118 (2d Cir. 2007).       We
    "must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge
    the witnesses' credibility."    Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); see also
    Vasquez v. GMD Shipyard Corp., 
    582 F.3d 293
    , 297 (2d Cir. 2009).
    In addition, while "a district court's understanding of the
    standard of causation is a question of law, reviewed de novo,"
    where the district court applied the correct legal standard, we
    review its findings of causation for clear error.     Otal Invs.
    Ltd. v. M.V. Clary, 
    494 F.3d 40
    , 59 (2d Cir. 2007).     We affirm.
    First, the district court's finding that Hornbeck's
    barge allided with plaintiffs' relieving platform was based on
    the eyewitness testimony of Michael Justino, a disinterested
    witness who the court determined was credible.     See Zerega Ave.
    Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, No. 04 Civ. 9651
    (KNF), 
    2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38536
    , at *76-77, *88-89 (S.D.N.Y.
    Mar. 14, 2012).   That finding was not clearly erroneous.
    Second, under New York law, plaintiffs "need not prove
    . . . that the defendant's conduct was the sole cause of the
    injuries."    Prunier v. City of Watertown, 
    936 F.2d 677
    , 679 (2d
    Cir. 1991).   Rather, "[t]he common law of torts . . . instructs
    that the existence of additional factors causing an injury does
    not necessarily negate the fact that the defendant's wrong is
    also the legal cause of the injury.     In assessing whether one
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    cause among many constitutes proximate cause, courts have engaged
    in inquiries such as whether a cause is a substantial factor in
    bringing about the harm, or whether the cause is too remotely or
    insignificantly related to the harm to be a legal basis for
    liability."   Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 
    331 F.3d 261
    , 278-79 (2d
    Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see
    also Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 
    227 F.3d 8
    ,
    15 (2d Cir. 2000) ("A proximate cause determination does not
    require a jury to identify the liable party as the sole cause of
    harm; it only asks that the identified cause be a substantial
    factor in bringing about the injury.").   Nevertheless, "[w]here
    the facts proven at trial demonstrate that there are several
    possible causes of an injury, for one or more of which the
    defendant was not responsible, and it is just as reasonable and
    probable that the injury was the result of one cause as the
    other, plaintiff cannot have a recovery since he has failed to
    establish that the negligence of the defendant substantially
    caused his injury."    Silverman v. United States, No. 04-CV-5647
    (ETB), 
    2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25041
    , at *37 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
    2008) (quoting Bernstein v. City of New York, 
    69 N.Y.2d 1020
    ,
    1021 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In this case, the district court found that the
    allision caused the damage to plaintiffs' relieving platform and
    building.    See Zerega, 
    2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38536
    , at * 100-01.
    Although the district court did not determine that the allision
    was the sole cause of plaintiffs' injury, it expressly found, "by
    a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's negligence
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    in operating the tug pulling the barge and alliding with the
    plaintiffs' platform was a substantial cause of damage to the
    bulkhead and the office building and the platform's collapse."
    Id. at *101.    The district court based these findings on the
    expert testimony of Steven Schneider, who was the only expert to
    observe the relieving platform and the building before the
    allision -- and did so more than 50 times between 2001 and July
    or August of 2002 -- and who the court determined was credible.
    See id. at *95, *100.    In particular, the court gave weight to
    Schneider's testimony that the allision "damaged the entire frame
    of the relieving platform, which sprung in and then sprang out,
    resulting in a structural deformation and creating structural
    instability within the relieving platform and, consequently, its
    collapse and ensuing damage."    Id. at *95.   We discern no legal
    error in the district court's application of the law, and no
    clear error in its factual findings.
    Third, the district court found that "the allision
    caused the cracks and sinkholes in the relieving platform," id.
    at *100, and that "the plaintiffs excavated a test pit prior to
    November 6, 2002, in order to determine the cause of the crack(s)
    and sinkhole(s) that developed on the relieving platform," id. at
    *90.   Although the district court did not explicitly reject
    Hornbeck's claim that plaintiffs were at least partially at
    fault, the district court did so implicitly, as it implicitly
    rejected the notion that plaintiffs' excavation of the platform
    was tortious.    Because this finding was not clearly erroneous,
    the district court did not err in holding Hornbeck liable for the
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    full amount of the damages.   Cf. Otal Invs. Ltd., 
    494 F.3d at 62
    (liability for damage from a maritime collision is to be
    allocated among the parties when both parties have contributed by
    their fault to cause such damage).
    We have considered Hornbeck's remaining arguments and
    conclude that they lack merit.    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
    judgment of the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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