Zeng Nong Chen v. Holder , 531 F. App'x 74 ( 2013 )


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  •     11-5245
    Chen v. Holder
    BIA
    Nelson, IJ
    A089 918 955
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 15th day of August, two thousand thirteen.
    PRESENT:
    DENNIS JACOBS,
    Chief Judge,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    ZENG NONG CHEN,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                    11-5245
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Benjamin B. Xue, Law Offices of
    Benjamin B. Xue, P.C., New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
    General; Eric Warren Marsteller,
    Senior Litigation Counsel; Daniel
    Eric Goldman, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, United States Department
    of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Zeng Nong Chen, a native and citizen of
    China, seeks review of a November 28, 2011, order of the
    BIA, affirming the May 5, 2010, decision of an Immigration
    Judge (“IJ”), pretermitting his application for asylum, and
    denying withholding of removal and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1    In re Zeng Nong Chen,
    No. A089 918 955 (B.I.A. Nov. 28, 2011), aff’g No. A089 918
    955 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 5, 2010).    We assume the
    parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    procedural history in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA.    See Yan Chen
    v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).    “The
    substantial evidence standard of review applies and we
    uphold the IJ's factual findings if they are supported by
    1
    Chen does not challenge the IJ’s denial of this CAT
    claim.
    2
    reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the
    record.”   Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir.
    2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).     For
    asylum applications such as Chen’s, governed by the
    amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by
    the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the
    totality of the circumstances . . . base a credibility
    determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
    the applicant,” or any inconsistency or omission in the
    applicant’s statements, “without regard to whether an
    inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of
    the applicant’s claim.”   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see
    also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 163 (2d Cir.
    2008) (same).
    Chen challenges the agency’s adverse credibility
    determination.   However, the agency, in making its
    determination, reasonably relied on the inherent
    implausibility of Chen’s claim that, following a police raid
    on his regular Falun Gong practice group in front of a
    friend’s house, in which Chen narrowly escaped arrest, the
    group relocated to a public park to continue their Falun
    Gong practice, despite Chen’s fear of arrest.   See Xiao Ji
    3
    Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 336 n.16 (2d
    Cir. 2006) (upholding an implausibility finding as to a
    petitioner’s claim that she went into hiding to avoid
    officials and yet continued working in a location where the
    officials were likely to find her).   Because the IJ’s
    implausibility finding was based on the record, we cannot
    conclude that a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
    find otherwise.   See Siewe v. Gonzales, 
    480 F.3d 160
    , 168-69
    (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that, while “bald” speculation is an
    impermissible basis for an adverse credibility finding,
    “[t]he speculation that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’
    if the inference is made available to the factfinder by
    record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of
    common sense and ordinary experience”); Wensheng Yan v.
    Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 63
    , 67 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that if
    “the reasons for the [IJ’s] incredulity are evident,” the
    implausibility finding is supported by substantial
    evidence).
    The agency also reasonably relied, in part, on Chen’s
    demeanor in finding him not credible, noting that while he
    was initially forthright in answering questions, he later
    hesitated for long periods before answering questions, gave
    4
    unresponsive answers, or gave no answer at all.       Because
    demeanor is “virtually always evaluated subjectively and
    intuitively,” an IJ’s assessment of an applicant’s demeanor
    merits “great deference.”     Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 
    446 F.3d 395
    ,
    400 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 
    510 F.3d 377
    , 381 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that an IJ, as a first-hand
    observer, is best situated to assess demeanor).       This is
    especially true when, as here, the agency has identified
    other testimonial bases for its credibility determination.
    See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    453 F.3d 99
    , 109
    (2d Cir. 2006) (“We can be still more confident in our
    review of observations about an applicant’s demeanor
    where . . . they are supported by specific examples of
    inconsistent testimony.”).
    The agency found that Chen’s failure to provide
    sufficient objective corroborative evidence further
    undermined his credibility.     See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant's failure to
    corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
    because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
    applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
    been called into question.”).       Though Chen submitted letters
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    from his mother and from a friend, Jing Rong Shi, the agency
    reasonably accorded minimal weight to this evidence because
    the letters were unsworn and prepared by interested parties
    who could not be cross-examined.    See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d
    at 342 (finding that the weight accorded to an applicant’s
    evidence lies largely within the discretion of the agency).
    In light of the demeanor, implausibility, and
    corroboration findings, the agency’s adverse credibility
    determination is supported by substantial evidence, and
    provided a valid basis for the denial of withholding of
    removal.    See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.    As we have completed our review, Petitioner’s
    motions for a stay of removal are DENIED as moot.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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