Sachs v. Cantwell , 667 F. App'x 1 ( 2016 )

14-1985
Sachs v. Cantwell
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 17th day of June, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Jennifer Sachs,
Plaintiff-Cross-Claimant-
Appellant,
v. 14-1985
William Cantwell, in his individual capacity,
Fourth Wall Restaurants, LLC, Smith &
Wollensky Operating Corporation, City of New
York, Aaron Sagendorf, Patrick Ford, Joseph
Musa, in his individual capacity, Alexandra
Paquette, in her individual capacity,
Defendants-Cross-Claimants-
Cross-Defendants-Appellees,
John Does 1 through 3, each in his individual
capacity, John Doe #4,
Defendants-Cross-
Defendants-Cross-Claimants.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Jennifer Sachs, pro se, Herndon, VA.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Antonella Karlin, Assistant Corporation Counsel
(Pamela Seider Dolgow, Assistant Corporation
Counsel, on the brief), for Zachary W. Carter,
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New
York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees City of New
York, William Cantwell, Joseph Musa, and
Alexandra Paquette.
Nicole Y. Brown, Wade Clark Mulcahy, New York,
NY, for Defendants-Appellees Fourth Wall
Restaurants, LLC, Smith & Wollensky Operating
Corporation, Aaron Sagendorf, and Patrick Ford.
Appeal from a judgment and order of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Oetken, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment and order of the district court are AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-appellant Jennifer Sachs, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment
in favor of defendants-appellees, following the court’s grant of partial summary judgment in
defendants-appellees’ favor with respect to her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and related state claims,
its denial of her motions for spoliation sanctions, reconsideration, and to reopen the evidence, and,
ultimately, a jury verdict in defendants-appellees’ favor on Sachs’s remaining claims. Sachs also
appeals the district court’s post-judgment order denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or a new trial. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review a district court’s decisions on motions for summary judgment and judgment as
a matter of law de novo, Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 332-33 (2d Cir. 2011) (judgment as
a matter of law); Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003)
(summary judgment), and its decisions on motions for sanctions, reconsideration, a new trial, and
to reopen discovery for abuse of discretion, Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684
F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (reconsideration); Perez v. Posse Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 326 (2d Cir.
2004) (sanctions); In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P’ship Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (reopening
discovery); Song v. Ives Labs. Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (new trial).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on
Sachs’s malicious prosecution claim, and properly denied her motion for spoliation sanctions and
her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Except as noted below, we
affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough September 4, 2012
and May 8, 2014 orders.
The district court incorrectly found that Sachs’s reconsideration motion was untimely
because it had granted her an extension until December 18, 2012, the day that she filed her motion.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court correctly denied Sachs’s motion on its alternate
ground that she failed to identify any data or law that the court overlooked. See Shrader v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the standard for granting a motion to
reconsider “is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked”).
We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen
discovery for Sachs to depose Officer Joseph Musa or obtain an expert witness because she could
have done so before the close of discovery. Further, her request to reopen discovery came
nineteen months after the close of discovery, and after the district court decided the summary
judgment motions, Sachs’s motion for reconsideration, and set a trial date. See Jackson v. Fed.
3
Exp., 766 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to reopen discovery where “[t]he scheduled time for discovery was over, and
a fully briefed motion for summary judgment was pending”).
Finally, because Sachs did not challenge on appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor
of the police officers; the City of New York on her Monell claim; the Wollensky’s defendants on her
negligent retention claim; and the dismissal of her claims against the John Doe defendants, she has
abandoned those claims. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998); LoSacco v.
City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995).
We have considered Sachs’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and order of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
4