United States v. Travis Buckner ( 2018 )


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  •                Case: 17-11082   Date Filed: 10/09/2018   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-11082
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20556-WPD-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    TRAVIS BUCKNER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (October 9, 2018)
    Before ROSENBAUM, HULL and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Following a jury trial, Travis Buckner was convicted of one count of
    aggravated sexual abuse of a child, two counts of attempted aggravated sexual
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    abuse of a child, and one count of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual
    conduct.    The district court sentenced him to life in prison.            Buckner now
    challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a continuance of the trial, its
    admission of certain evidence during trial, its denial of his motions for mistrial, and
    the sentence he received. After careful review of the record and consideration of
    the parties’ arguments, and with the benefit of oral argument, we now affirm.
    I.
    On December 13, 2016, a federal jury convicted defendant Travis Buckner
    on four criminal counts arising from the sexual abuse of his fourteen-year-old
    daughter, A.B. Overwhelming evidence at trial showed that from the time A.B.
    was twelve years old, Buckner frequently pressured her into performing sexual acts
    with him.
    The charges against Buckner stemmed from two particular incidents of
    abuse: one that occurred on a church-led mission trip to Haiti, and another that
    happened on a cruise vacation. Though Buckner had urged A.B. to keep their
    sexual interactions over the prior two years a secret, on the cruise, in July of 2016,
    A.B. reported the two years of abuse.
    The district court delayed Buckner’s trial so he could undergo a competency
    evaluation, but a court-appointed psychologist found him to be feigning symptoms
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    of mental impairment. 1 The district court concluded he was competent to stand
    trial. Buckner’s attorney then moved for a continuance, citing the need for extra
    preparation time. The court denied the motion, noting that the trial had already
    been delayed two months—partly because of Buckner’s malingering. At trial, in
    addition to presenting physical evidence, the government called A.B. and her
    mother as its primary witnesses. Over Buckner’s objections, the government also
    called Buckner’s niece and his younger brother, both of whom testified that
    Buckner sexually abused them as children, though Buckner never faced criminal
    charges for doing so. The jury found Buckner guilty on all four counts against
    him.
    At Buckner’s sentencing, the district court applied several enhancements to
    his base offense level. These included a five-level increase for his history of
    sexual assault against minors, a four-level increase for engaging in aggravated
    sexual abuse in the special maritime jurisdiction of the United States, a two-level
    increase because A.B. was under his custody, another two-level increase because
    Buckner knew or should have known A.B. was a vulnerable victim, and one final
    two-level increase for obstruction of justice. All together, these enhancements put
    Buckner well above the Sentencing Guidelines’ maximum offense level, giving
    1
    For example, the psychologist gave Buckner a test in which a subject must engage in
    simple counting of up to four objects. The psychologist testified that even individuals with
    actual brain damage typically do not miss more than one out of the entire set of 28 questions.
    Buckner missed twenty-one.
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    him a recommended sentence of life in prison for three out of the four counts
    against him. The court imposed a life sentence on those three, as well as the
    maximum sentence of thirty years (to run concurrently) on the fourth.
    Buckner now challenges several components of his proceedings: the denial
    of his pre-trial continuance motion, the admission of his brother’s testimony, the
    admission of his niece’s testimony, the denial of two mistrial motions, his
    sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, and the reasonableness of his
    life sentence. All of these matters we review for abuse of discretion. See United
    States v. Jeri, 
    869 F.3d 1247
    , 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (denial of a continuance);
    United States v. Edouard, 
    485 F.3d 1324
    , 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (evidentiary
    rulings); United States v. Snyder, 
    291 F.3d 1291
    , 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (mistrial
    motion); Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007) (reasonableness of criminal
    sentence). Buckner also alleges that cumulative error marred his trial, a claim we
    review de novo. United States v. Dohan, 
    508 F.3d 989
    , 993 (11th Cir. 2007).
    After thorough review, we find no abuse of discretion as to any of the claims
    Buckner raises, nor do we find cumulative error in his trial.
    II.
    We begin with Buckner’s trial-related claims. To demonstrate that a district
    court has reversibly erred in denying a motion for continuance of trial to permit
    more preparation, a defendant must show not only an abuse of discretion but also
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    “specific, substantial prejudice.” See United States v. Saget, 
    991 F.2d 702
    , 708
    (11th Cir. 1993). To do this, a defendant must point to “relevant, non-cumulative
    evidence that would have been presented if [the defendant’s] request for a
    continuance had been granted.” 
    Id. Buckner has
    identified neither evidence he
    would have obtained nor strategic opportunities he would have pursued had the
    court granted his motion for a pre-trial continuance. The court had already granted
    Buckner two continuances he had sought before that, and it found he had tried to
    prolong his proceedings by feigning mental incompetence. We see no error in the
    court’s decision that further delay was unwarranted.
    Turning to the admission of Buckner’s niece’s and brother’s testimony, we
    find no error there, either. As we have mentioned, their testimony focused on how
    Buckner sexually abused them while they were children. Where a defendant
    stands accused of sexual assault or child molestation, the trial court can allow
    evidence of similar past acts “on any matter to which it is relevant.” See Fed. R.
    Evid. 413(a), 414(a). Buckner effectively concedes relevance here and instead
    challenges the testimony as unduly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
    We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s implicit determination
    to the contrary. See Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 
    765 F.3d 1277
    , 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2014) (trial court’s “discretion is particularly broad with
    respect to Rule 403 determinations”). Both witnesses offered testimony highly
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    probative of Buckner’s history of sexually abusing children, a relevant purpose
    under Rule 414. See United States v. McGarity, 
    669 F.3d 1218
    , 1224 (11th Cir.
    2012) (noting Rule 414 exempts child molestation cases from Federal Rules’
    general ban on propensity evidence).          Any risk of unfair prejudice did not
    outweigh the probative value of their testimony.
    We also find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Buckner’s
    mistrial motions. His first motion, made during trial, alleged that prosecutors
    impermissibly elicited testimony from his brother about Buckner’s abuse of other
    children. But we find no prosecutorial misconduct because the trial transcripts
    show Buckner’s brother brought up these incidents unprompted. See Trial Tr.
    (12/13/16) at 315-16. And we find no actionable prejudice because the judge
    instructed the jury to ignore Buckner’s brother’s testimony on this matter. See 
    id. We must
    presume the jury followed these instructions. See United States v. Stone,
    
    9 F.3d 934
    , 938 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Few tenets are more fundamental to our jury
    trial system than the presumption that juries obey the court’s instructions.”).
    Buckner’s second motion, made after the government rested, alleged that
    prosecutors had failed to disclose the substance of his niece’s testimony ahead of
    time. But a review of the government’s pretrial filings reflects that the government
    did, in fact, disclose her material testimony well in advance. See ECF No. 29 at 5.
    So the district court committed no error in denying that motion for mistrial.
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    Finally, with respect to alleged trial-related errors, Buckner contends that the
    cumulative effect of all of these alleged errors warrants reversal. But since we
    observe no error in any of these claims, we also find no cumulative error in
    Buckner’s trial proceedings. See United States v. Waldon, 
    363 F.3d 1103
    , 1110
    (11th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause no individual errors . . . have been demonstrated,
    there can be no cumulative error.”).
    As for Buckner’s sentence, we find it was both procedurally and
    substantively reasonable. First, with respect to Buckner’s challenge to the district
    court’s application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, the record
    demonstrates that the district court had two independently sufficient grounds on
    which to find the enhancement warranted: Buckner’s use of threats to convince
    A.B. not to report his abuse, and Buckner’s feigning mental incompetence ahead of
    trial.
    And concerning the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, the life
    sentence fell within, though at the upper end of, the Guidelines range for three of
    Buckner’s four counts of conviction. But the district court expressly found no
    mitigating circumstances and no reason to depart downward from the Guidelines
    recommendation. Given the severity of Buckner’s crimes and the record in this
    case, the district court was well within its discretion to sentence Buckner as it did.
    AFFIRMED.
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