Sunoco, Inc. v. United States , 908 F.3d 710 ( 2018 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    SUNOCO, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2017-1402
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00587-TCW, Judge Thomas C.
    Wheeler.
    ______________________
    Decided: November 1, 2018
    ______________________
    GREGORY G. GARRE, Latham & Watkins LLP, Wash-
    ington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represent-
    ed by ELANA NIGHTINGALE DAWSON, BENJAMIN SNYDER;
    GEORGE MILLINGTON CLARKE, III, ERIC M. BISCOPINK,
    VIVEK ASHWIN PATEL, KATHRYN E. RIMPFEL, Baker &
    McKenzie LLP, Washington, DC; DANIEL ALLEN ROSEN,
    New York, NY.
    JUDITH ANN HAGLEY, Tax Division, United States
    Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for
    2                             SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES
    defendant-appellee. Also represented by GILBERT STEVEN
    ROTHENBERG, RICHARD FARBER, DAVID A. HUBBERT.
    ______________________
    Before REYNA, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
    REYNA, Circuit Judge.
    This case concerns whether, under 26 U.S.C. § 6426, a
    taxpayer that is entitled to an alcohol fuel mixture credit
    may treat the credit as a tax-free direct payment regard-
    less of excise-tax liability, or whether a taxpayer must
    first use the mixture credit to reduce any excise-tax
    liability before receiving payment for any amount of
    mixture credit exceeding excise-tax liability. Sunoco, Inc.
    appeals from the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of the
    United States’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and
    denial of Sunoco, Inc.’s cross-motion for partial summary
    judgment. The Court of Federal Claims determined that
    the alcohol fuel mixture credit must first be applied to
    reduce a taxpayer’s gasoline excise-tax liability, with any
    remaining credit amount treated as a tax-free payment.
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    1. Statutory Framework
    Since 1932, the United States has imposed an excise
    tax on various types of fuel, including gasoline. See
    Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 617(a), 47 Stat. 169 (1932)
    (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 4081). 1 Excise taxes are
    taxes collected on the “manufacture, sale, or use of goods,”
    or “on an occupation or activity.” Excise, Black’s Law
    Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Under § 4081, the United
    1    Unless otherwise specified, all sections referenced
    in this opinion are to the Internal Revenue Code set forth
    in Title 26 of the United States Code.
    SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES                             3
    States imposes an excise tax upon the occurrence of
    events involving the removal of gasoline from a refinery or
    terminal; the entry of gasoline into the United States for
    consumption, use, or warehousing; and the sale of gaso-
    line to certain purchasers. § 4081(a)(1)(A). In particular,
    § 4081 imposes an excise tax of 18.3 cents per gallon of
    gasoline (other than aviation gasoline). § 4081(a)(2)(A)(i). 2
    Pursuant to § 9503, the § 4081 gasoline excise tax is
    used to fund the Highway Trust Fund, created by the
    Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 (“Highway Revenue
    Act”), Pub. L. No. 84-627, § 209, 70 Stat. 374, 397 (codified
    at 26 U.S.C. § 9503). These funds are used to construct
    and maintain the nation’s highways and other infrastruc-
    ture.
    In 1978, Congress started enacting tax incentives for
    renewable fuels, such as alcohol fuel blends. See Energy
    Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 221, 92 Stat. 3174,
    3185. One of these tax incentives was a reduced excise-
    tax rate for alcohol fuel mixtures. See Highway Im-
    provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097.
    While these tax incentives popularized the production of
    alcohol fuel mixtures, the lower excise-tax rate resulted in
    fewer tax dollars flowing into the Highway Trust Fund.
    Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, Moonshine to Motor-
    fuel: Tax Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 Duke Envtl. L. &
    Pol’y F. 43, 49 (2008). The depletion of funds caught the
    attention of Congress and triggered a legislative response.
    H.R. Rep. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 141–42 (2004) (“Commit-
    tee Report”).
    2   The 18.3 cents per gallon excise tax for gasoline
    increases to 18.4 cents per gallon after accounting for the
    0.1 cents per gallon amount diverted to the Leaking
    Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund. § 9503(a)(2)(B).
    Certain exhibits thus refer to the excise-tax rate under
    § 4081 as being 18.4 cents per gallon.
    4                              SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES
    On October 22, 2004, the American Jobs Creation Act
    of 2004 (“Jobs Act”) passed. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118
    Stat. 1418. In the Jobs Act, Congress sought to increase
    the flow of revenue to the Highway Trust Fund, but did
    not want to eliminate the monetary incentives for produc-
    ers to blend alcohol with fuel. Congress thus restructured
    the relevant statutory framework in three respects: (1) it
    eliminated the reduced excise-tax rate for alcohol fuel
    blends under § 4081(c), thus leaving an 18.3 cents per
    gallon excise tax on all non-aviation gasoline; (2) it enact-
    ed an alcohol fuel mixture credit for producers of alcohol
    fuel blends set forth in § 6426(b) (the “Mixture Credit”);
    and (3) it amended § 9503 to appropriate all excise taxes
    imposed under § 4081 to the Highway Trust Fund “with-
    out reduction for credits under section 6426.” Jobs Act
    §§ 301, 853. Congress stated that the Mixture Credit
    “provide[s] a benefit equivalent to the reduced tax rates,
    which are being repealed under the provision.” Commit-
    tee Report, at 142.
    By amending § 9503 of the Highway Revenue Act to
    require the 18.3 cents per gallon excise tax be deposited
    into the Highway Trust Fund in its entirety, and mandat-
    ing that the new Mixture Credit be given to producers at
    an amount equivalent to the now-eliminated reduced
    excise-tax rate, Congress manufactured a way to shift
    funds from the General Fund at the U.S. Department of
    the Treasury (“Treasury”) to the Highway Trust Fund
    without affecting revenue. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-755, at
    305 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (“Conference Report”) (“The provi-
    sion also authorizes the full amount of fuel taxes to be
    appropriated to the Highway Trust Fund without reduc-
    tion for amounts equivalent to the excise-tax credits
    allowed for alcohol fuel mixtures, and the Trust Fund is
    not required to reimburse any payments with respect to
    qualified alcohol fuel mixtures.”); see also Staff of Joint
    Committee On Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the
    Conference Agreement for H.R. 4520, the “American Jobs
    SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES                           5
    Creation Act of 2004” (JCX-69-04) at Provision III.A.1
    (listing the “excise tax credit (in lieu of reduced tax rate
    on gasoline) to certain blenders of alcohol mixtures” as
    having “No Revenue Effect”). Under this new regime, the
    Highway Trust Fund would consistently receive 18.3
    cents per gallon under § 4081 regardless of whether the
    excise tax was actually paid by the taxpayer or obtained
    from the General Fund at Treasury. In return, alcohol
    fuel producers would receive the Mixture Credit without
    impacting the Highway Trust Fund.
    The statutory changes to §§ 4081, 6426, and 9503 also
    led to the creation of § 6427(e)—added to account for the
    Mixture Credit—which requires the Secretary of the
    Treasury to pay, interest-free, to an alcohol fuel producer
    “an amount equal to the alcohol fuel mixture credit.”
    § 6427(e)(1). But “[n]o amount shall be payable . . . with
    respect to any mixture or alternative fuel with respect to
    which an amount is allowed as a credit under section
    6426.” 
    Id. § 6427(e)(3).
                        2. Procedural History
    Sunoco, Inc. (“Sunoco”), a petroleum and petrochemi-
    cal company, blends ethanol with gasoline to create
    alcohol fuel mixtures. Sunoco filed consolidated tax
    returns for 2004 through 2009, and claimed the Mixture
    Credit under § 6426 as a credit against its gasoline excise-
    tax liability for the years 2005 through 2008. 3
    In 2013, Sunoco changed its tax position by submit-
    ting both informal and formal claims with the Internal
    3    Sunoco only sought to recover income tax pay-
    ments for the years 2005 through 2008, but included its
    claims for years 2004 and 2009 because “changes to the
    taxable income in those years affect the amount of the
    refunds for the other years at issue in this case.” J.A.
    1001–02.
    6                             SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES
    Revenue Service (IRS) to recover over $300 million based
    on excise-tax expenses for the years 2005 through 2008.
    Sunoco claimed that it erroneously reduced its gasoline
    excise tax by the amount of Mixture Credit it received,
    which had the effect of including the Mixture Credit in its
    gross income. In its view, Sunoco was entitled to deduct
    the full amount of the gasoline excise tax under § 4081—
    without regard to the Mixture Credit—and keep the
    Mixture Credit as tax-free income. 4 On March 11, 2015,
    the IRS issued a statutory notice of disallowance denying
    Sunoco’s claims. 5 On June 10, 2015, Sunoco filed its
    refund suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims
    (“COFC”). Sunoco, Inc. v. United States, 
    129 Fed. Cl. 322
    ,
    324 (2016); J.A. 16, 1001–13.
    On February 12, 2016, the Government moved for
    judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the
    Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, 6 arguing that the
    4   As a taxpayer that sells inventory in its trade or
    business, a gasoline producer and fuel supplier like Suno-
    co can recover expenses related to the gasoline excise tax
    under § 4081 by subtracting, or deducting, the expense
    from its gross income. These deductions are also known
    as “cost of goods sold.” §§ 162, 263A; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
    3(a)(“Gross income derived from business.”). Applying
    any such deduction under § 4081, i.e., including the
    gasoline excise tax in the cost of goods sold, results in a
    decrease in income tax liability.
    5  The IRS also denied Sunoco’s request to increase
    its 2009 net operating loss for additional deductions based
    on its claim for an increased gasoline excise-tax deduc-
    tion. J.A. 1011.
    6  Rule 12(c) of the Rules of the Court of Federal
    Claims is identical to its counterpart Rule 12(c) of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We apply the same law
    to these comparable Rules. Kraft, Inc. v. United States,
    SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES                             7
    Jobs Act requires a two-step, or “bifurcated,” approach, in
    which first, the Mixture Credit reduces any excise-tax
    liability, and then the taxpayer is compensated for any
    remaining Mixture Credit via a direct payment pursuant
    to § 6427. 
    Sunoco, 129 Fed. Cl. at 325
    –26. Under the
    Government’s interpretation, applying the Mixture Credit
    to first reduce the excise-tax liability turns the Mixture
    Credit into taxable income up to the point in which excise-
    tax liability is reduced to zero. 
    Id. at 329.
        Sunoco responded with a cross-motion for partial
    summary judgment on liability, arguing that the Mixture
    Credit does not affect its excise-tax liability under § 4081.
    Sunoco maintained that although the Mixture Credit can
    be used to offset excise-tax liability, such liability remains
    constant and does not reduce the cost of goods sold under
    the statute, therefore making the excise-tax liability fully
    deductible. 
    Id. at 325–26.
    In Sunoco’s view, the entirety
    of the Mixture Credit is a tax-free payment to the taxpay-
    er under § 6427. 
    Id. at 326.
        The COFC found the statutory scheme to be ambigu-
    ous, but agreed with the Government’s interpretation and
    granted the Government’s motion for judgment on the
    pleadings. 7
    
    85 F.3d 602
    , 605 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996), opinion modified on
    other grounds on denial of reh’g, 
    96 F.3d 1428
    (Fed. Cir.
    1996).
    7   During the pendency of this action before the
    COFC, the IRS published a notice informing claimants
    that they must apply fuel credits awarded under § 6426 to
    their § 4081 excise-tax liability, and that a claimant can
    only receive direct payments for credits under § 6427 for
    fuel credits exceeding the claimant’s § 4081 liability.
    I.R.S. Notice 2015-56, 
    2015 WL 4779497
    (Aug. 15, 2015).
    As part of the resolution of a discovery dispute, the COFC
    8                              SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES
    Sunoco appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1295(a)(3).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo the COFC’s grant of judgment on
    the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Xianli Zhang v. United
    States, 
    640 F.3d 1358
    , 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We accept
    the facts alleged by Sunoco as true and draw all reasona-
    ble inferences in its favor. 
    Id. (citing Cary
    v. United
    States, 
    552 F.3d 1373
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Statutory
    interpretation is a legal question that we review de novo.
    
    Id. (citing Norfolk
    Dredging Co. v. United States, 
    375 F.3d 1106
    , 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); Shoshone Indian Tribe of
    Wind River Reservation v. United States, 
    364 F.3d 1339
    ,
    1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
    DISCUSSION
    Sunoco asks this court to permit it to deduct, as a cost
    of goods sold, an excise-tax expense that it never incurred
    or paid. Neither the text of the Jobs Act nor its legislative
    history supports such a reading of the Internal Revenue
    Code.
    A. Statutory Language
    The parties agree there is no dispute as to the materi-
    al facts in this case. J.A. 1044, 1085. Therefore, to de-
    termine the tax treatment of the Mixture Credit, we start
    with the plain language of the statute. Robinson v. Shell
    Oil Co., 
    519 U.S. 337
    , 340 (1997). Our inquiry ends there
    “if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statu-
    tory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 
    489 U.S. 235
    , 240
    (1989)); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 
    503 U.S. 249
    , 254
    determined that the IRS’s notice was not entitled to
    deference under Skidmore v. Swift, 
    323 U.S. 134
    (1944).
    Sunoco, Inc. v. United States, 
    128 Fed. Cl. 345
    , 346 (2016).
    SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES                           9
    (1992) (“When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
    then, this first canon is also the last.”). Whether the
    statutory language is unambiguous is determined by the
    text itself, the context in which the language is used, and
    the statutory scheme as a whole. 
    Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341
    (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 
    505 U.S. 469
    , 477 (1992), and McCarthy v. Bronson, 
    500 U.S. 136
    , 139 (1991)).
    Relevant here is the interrelationship among three
    statutory sections of the Internal Revenue Code: §§ 6426,
    6427, and 9503. Section 6426 provides for the Mixture
    Credit, in relevant part, as follows:
    (a) Allowance of credits.—There shall be al-
    lowed as a credit—
    (1) against the tax imposed by section 4081 an
    amount equal to the sum of the credits described
    in subsections (b), (c), and (e) 8 . . .
    (b) Alcohol fuel mixture credit.—
    (1) In general.—For purposes of this section, the
    alcohol fuel mixture credit is the product of the
    applicable amount and the number of gallons of
    alcohol used by the taxpayer in producing any al-
    cohol fuel mixture for sale or use in a trade or
    business of the taxpayer.
    § 6426 (a), (b) (emphasis added).
    Section 6427(e) grants an interest-free payment to
    taxpayers of an amount equal to the Mixture Credit,
    when alcohol, biodiesel, or alternative fuels are used to
    produce a mixture. Section 6427(e) states in relevant part
    8    Subsections (c) and (e) refer to the biodiesel mix-
    ture credit and the alternative fuel mixture credit, respec-
    tively.
    10                              SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES
    (e) Alcohol, biodiesel, or alternative fuel.—
    Except as provided in subsection (k)—
    (1) used to produce a mixture.—If any person
    produces a mixture described in section 6426 in
    such person’s trade or business, the Secretary
    shall pay (without interest) to such person an
    amount equal to the alcohol fuel mixture cred-
    it. . . with respect to such mixture.
    ....
    (3) coordination with other repayment pro-
    visions.—No amount shall be payable under par-
    agraph (1) or (2) 9 with respect to any mixture or
    alternative fuel with respect to which an amount
    is allowed as a credit under section 6426.
    § 6427(e)(1), (e)(3) (emphasis added). The IRS does not
    tax as income direct payments to taxpayers made under
    this subsection.
    Section 6426(a)(1) explicitly provides that the “credit,”
    i.e., the Mixture Credit, is applied “against” the gasoline
    excise tax imposed under § 4081. In other words, the
    Mixture Credit works to reduce the taxpayer’s overall
    excise-tax liability. “[A] credit is any amount that is
    allowable as a subtraction from tax liability for the pur-
    pose of computing the tax due or refund due.” James
    Edward Maule, 506-3rd T.M., Tax Credits: Concepts and
    Calculation 43 (BNA 2018); see also 
    id. at 1
    (“Generally,
    items that are allowable as credits decrease tax liability
    by that amount.”); Tax Credit, Black’s Law Dictionary
    (10th ed. 2014) (“An amount subtracted directly from
    one’s total tax liability, dollar for dollar, as opposed to a
    deduction from gross income.—Often shortened to cred-
    it.”).
    9   Subsection (e)(2) refers to alternative fuel.
    SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES                          11
    Sunoco argues that a “credit” under § 6426 is a “pay-
    ment” of its § 4081 excise-tax liability. We disagree. The
    Jobs Act treats “credits” differently from “payments,” as
    evidenced by the language in § 6427(e)(1), which grants
    payment to a taxpayer in the same amount as the Mix-
    ture Credit, to the extent the taxpayer’s excise-tax liabil-
    ity is zero. Appellant’s Br. 10 (stating taxpayer receives
    “tax-free payment” of the outstanding credit amount when
    taxpayer has no excise-tax liability or the Mixture Credit
    amount exceeds excise-tax liability); Appellee’s Br. 7–8
    (same). That payment, however, is reduced by the
    amount of Mixture Credit applied to offset the taxpayer’s
    excise-tax liability: “No amount shall be payable under
    paragraph (1) . . . with respect to which an amount is
    allowed as a credit under section 6426.” § 6427(e)(3)
    (emphasis added). The plain language of § 6427(e)(3)
    therefore distinguishes the § 6426 “credit” from the “pay-
    ment” allowable under § 6427(e)(1).        See Randall v.
    Loftsgaarden, 
    478 U.S. 647
    , 657 (1986) (stating benefit of
    tax credit is the “use [of] tax credits to reduce the taxes
    otherwise payable”); Schaeffler v. United States, 
    889 F.3d 238
    , 248–49 (5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting argument that
    foreign tax credit is a payment under the Internal Reve-
    nue Code).
    Section 9503 only reinforces this reading of § 6426.
    Section 9503 directs that the entirety of the 18.3 cents per
    gallon gasoline excise tax under § 4081 be appropriated to
    the Highway Trust Fund. In this particular instance—
    financing the Highway Trust Fund—“taxes received
    under sections 4041 and 4081 shall be determined without
    reduction for credits under section 6426.” § 9503(b)(1)
    (emphasis added).
    Sunoco contends that this language shows Congress
    did not intend the Mixture Credit to reduce excise-tax
    liability because the Treasury would not “receive” the
    amount of tax offset by the Mixture Credit. Sunoco’s
    argument fails for a number of reasons. First, the statute
    12                             SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES
    explicitly states that for § 9503(b) purposes only, the
    amount of funds deposited into the Highway Trust Fund
    is “equivalent to the” gasoline excise tax imposed under
    § 4081 “without reduction” for the Mixture Credit, mean-
    ing that the funds deposited into the Highway Trust Fund
    are not diminished by any amount of Mixture Credit that
    might act against a taxpayer’s excise-tax liability. This is
    a logical reading of the statute given that the Jobs Act
    was enacted with the intention of maximizing funds
    deposited into the Highway Trust Fund. Second, to
    interpret § 9503 as Sunoco proposes would render a
    portion of the statutory language unnecessary; there
    would be no reason to explicitly state that the amount to
    be deposited in to the Highway Trust Fund “shall be
    determined without reduction for credits under section
    6426” if the Mixture Credit were not to serve as an offset
    of a taxpayer’s excise-tax liability imposed under § 4081.
    Expressed differently, if the Mixture Credit were a tax-
    free payment regardless of excise-tax liability, rather than
    a reduction of the 18.3 cents per gallon gasoline excise
    tax, portions of § 9503 would lack meaning. See TRW Inc.
    v. Andrews, 
    534 U.S. 19
    , 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal prin-
    ciple of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon
    the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented,
    no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
    insignificant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Sunoco contends that where Congress intended a
    credit to reduce a taxpayer’s excise-tax liability, it explic-
    itly said so. Specifically, Sunoco points to §§ 45H and
    280C, where a taxpayer’s deductions are “reduced by the
    amount of the credit determined for the taxable year
    under section 45H(a).” Appellant’s Br. 29. Indeed, no
    such explicit language appears with respect to the Mix-
    ture Credit, but §§ 45H and 280C operate differently from
    §§ 4081 and 6426. Section 45H concerns income tax
    credit for low sulfur diesel fuel production. § 45H(a).
    Section 280C, titled “Certain expenses for which credits
    SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES                             13
    are allowable,” simply prevents the taxpayer from obtain-
    ing a double benefit by forbidding a deduction for expens-
    es already contemplated by the § 45H income tax credit.
    Cf. § 162(a) (allowing deduction of business expenses). In
    contrast, the Mixture Credit described in § 6426 is a
    credit, not an expense—Sunoco never pays it. See 6
    William H. Byrnes, IV et al., Mertens Law of Fed. Income
    Tax’n § 25:1 (Sept. 2018) (“Section 162 requires that
    deductions for a business expense must have been paid or
    incurred during the taxable year.”). Consequently, there
    is no need to expressly include a provision prohibiting a
    taxpayer from deducting the Mixture Credit because it is
    not an expense incurred by the taxpayer.
    B. Legislative History
    The plain meaning of the statute is clear—the Mix-
    ture Credit is a credit, not a payment, which must first be
    used to decrease a taxpayer’s gasoline excise-tax liability
    before receiving any payment under § 6427(e). To over-
    come the plain meaning of the statute, Sunoco must show
    that the legislative history “embodies an ‘extraordinary
    showing of contrary intentions.’” Sharp v. United States,
    
    580 F.3d 1234
    , 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Glaxo
    Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 
    894 F.2d 392
    , 396 (Fed. Cir.
    1990) (looking at legislative history “only to determine
    whether a clear intent contrary to the plain meaning
    exists”)). Sunoco has failed to satisfy this heavy burden.
    Sunoco relies on a single sentence from the legislative
    history to show that Congress intended the Mixture
    Credit to be a payment of excise-tax liability, as opposed
    to a reduction in that liability: “[t]he credit is treated as a
    payment of the taxpayer’s tax liability received at the
    time of the taxable event.” Conference Report, at 304.
    But other relevant portions of the Conference Report belie
    Sunoco’s position: “In lieu of the reduced excise tax rates,
    the provision provides that the alcohol mixture credit
    provided under section 40 may be applied against section
    14                             SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES
    4081 excise tax liability.” 
    Id. (describing the
    Mixture
    Credit as “a benefit equivalent to the reduced tax rates”);
    see also 
    id. at 308
    (“These payments are intended to
    provide an equivalent benefit to replace the partial exemp-
    tion for fuels to be blended with alcohol and alcohol fuels
    being repealed by this provision.” (emphasis added)).
    Thus, the tax benefit of the Mixture Credit is a reduction
    in excise-tax liability intended to match the excise-tax
    rate reduction in place prior to the enactment of the Jobs
    Act.
    In addition, the only payments contemplated by Con-
    gress refer to those made to the taxpayer under § 6427(e):
    Payments with respect to qualified alcohol fuel
    mixtures
    To the extent the alcohol fuel mixture credit ex-
    ceeds any section 4081 liability of a person, the
    Secretary is to pay such person an amount equal
    to the alcohol fuel mixture credit with respect to
    such mixture. These payments are intended to
    provide an equivalent benefit to replace the par-
    tial exemption for fuels to be blended with alcohol
    and alcohol fuels being repealed by the provision.
    
    Id. at 304;
    see also 
    id. at 308
    . The Conference Report
    further states that “if the person has no section 4081
    liability, the credit is totally refundable.” 
    Id. at 308;
    see
    also 
    id. at 303.
    Thus, Congress intended for any payment
    of the Mixture Credit to go to the taxpayer only if the
    taxpayer’s excise-tax liability is zero. The legislative
    history is therefore at odds with Sunoco’s position and
    supports the plain reading of the statute—that the Mix-
    ture Credit must first be applied to reduce any § 4081
    excise-tax liability, with any remaining Mixture Credit
    paid to the taxpayer under § 6427(e).
    The reason for this is simple: a taxpayer can claim
    either an excise-tax benefit, i.e., the Mixture Credit, or an
    SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES                           15
    income tax benefit, but not both. See 
    id. at 304
    (“The
    benefit obtained from the excise tax credit is coordinated
    with the alcohol fuels income tax credit.”); § 40(c); J.A.
    1003. In Sunoco’s case, it wishes both to pocket the
    Mixture Credit as a tax-free refundable payment and to
    claim an income tax benefit by including in full its gaso-
    line excise-tax liability in its cost of goods sold, thereby
    reducing its total taxable income. But such double-
    dipping was not intended by Congress. Cf. Conference
    Report at 305–06 (stating biodiesel fuel credit, which is
    similar to the Mixture Credit, “cannot be claimed for both
    income and excise tax purposes”). Indeed, while not
    probative of congressional intent in 2004, in 2009, mem-
    bers of the Joint Committee on Taxation read § 6426 the
    same way as this court does: “[t]he alcohol fuel mixture
    credit must first be taken to reduce excise tax liability for
    gasoline, diesel fuel or kerosene. Any excess credit may
    be taken as a payment or income tax credit.” Joint Com-
    mittee on Taxation, Tax Expenditures for Energy Produc-
    tion & Conservation, JCX-25-09R at 24 (2009).
    Sunoco wishes to treat the Mixture Credit as a de-
    ductible expense because it considers the Mixture Credit
    as a payment of its tax liability. But Sunoco never incurs
    a cost equal to the Mixture Credit. Such a method of
    accounting would result in an overall lower taxable in-
    come, resulting in a windfall to Sunoco. We have already
    established that Congress does not generally allow tax-
    payers to receive a tax benefit twice. Nor has Sunoco
    shown that Congress intended the Jobs Act to increase
    excise-tax subsidies for fuel blenders. Sunoco has failed
    to show that the legislative history extraordinarily con-
    tradicts the plain reading of the Jobs Act.
    CONCLUSION
    In light of the plain language of the Jobs Act, we con-
    clude that the § 6426(a) Mixture Credit is a reduction of
    § 4081 excise-tax liability, with any credit amount exceed-
    16                          SUNOCO, INC.   v. UNITED STATES
    ing said excise-tax liability to be paid to the taxpayer
    under § 6427(e).
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.