Shi v. Sessions ( 2018 )


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  •      16-4185
    Shi v. Sessions
    BIA
    Vomacka, IJ
    A205 277 778
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 17th day of August, two thousand eighteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JON O. NEWMAN,
    8            GERARD E. LYNCH,
    9            CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12   YAN LIN SHI,
    13            Petitioner,
    14                 v.                                            16-4185
    15                                                               NAC
    16   JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
    17   UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    18            Respondent.
    19   _____________________________________
    20
    21   FOR PETITIONER:                  Lee Ratner, New York, NY.
    22
    23   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Chad A. Readler Acting Assistant
    24                                    Attorney General; Nancy Friedman,
    25                                    Senior Litigation Counsel; Gregory
    26                                    A. Pennington, Jr., Trial
    27                                    Attorney, Office of Immigration
    28                                    Litigation, United States
    29                                    Department of Justice, Washington,
    30                                    DC.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is DENIED.
    5       Petitioner Yan Lin Shi, a native and citizen of the
    6   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 29,
    7   2016, decision of the BIA affirming an October 8, 2015,
    8   decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Shi’s
    9   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    10   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).      In re Yan
    11   Lin Shi, No. A 205 277 778 (B.I.A. Nov. 29, 2016), aff’g No.
    12   A 205 277 778 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 8, 2015).     We
    13   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    14   and procedural history in this case.
    15       Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    16   the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and consider only
    17   the bases that the IJ relied on for the credibility
    18   determination.   See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
    19   
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).     The applicable standards
    20   of review are well established.     See 8 U.S.C.
    21   § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165-
    2
    1   66 (2d Cir. 2008).   In making a credibility determination,
    2   the agency must “[c]onsider[] the totality of the
    3   circumstances” and may base its determination on the
    4   applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness, . . .
    5   the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s . . .
    6   account,” inconsistencies or omissions in the applicant’s
    7   statements or between her statements and other evidence
    8   “without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
    9   falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or
    10   any other relevant factor.”    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);
    11   Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64
    , 166-67.    “We
    12   defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless,
    13   from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
    14   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
    15   credibility ruling.”     Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .   We
    16   conclude that there is substantial evidence for the adverse
    17   credibility determination given the inconsistencies between
    18   Shi’s testimony and documentary evidence, her intentional
    19   misstatements during her credible fear interview, and her
    20   implausible testimony.
    21
    3
    1        Inconsistencies
    2        The agency reasonably relied on Shi’s inconsistent
    3    descriptions of church services in China.    8 U.S.C.
    4    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).    Shi testified that she never met a
    5    pastor while attending house church services, but wrote in
    6    her asylum application that “our pastor brought some Bibles
    7    for us when he came to give preaching” and that “only the
    8    pastor had [a Bible] in his hands.”    The IJ reasonably
    9    concluded that these competing descriptions called into
    10   question Shi’s actual knowledge of the services.    See Siewe
    11   v. Gonzales, 
    480 F.3d 160
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Decisions
    12   as to . . . which of competing inferences to draw are
    13   entirely within the province of the trier of fact.”
    14   (quoting Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 
    232 F.3d 38
    , 44
    15   (2d Cir. 2000))). Shi’s explanation that typically there is
    16   no pastor did not resolve the inconsistency, particularly
    17   because she repeated that there was never a pastor at the
    18   services she attended.     The IJ was not required to credit
    19   Shi’s explanation that other worshipers told her that the
    20   pastor had a Bible.     See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    ,
    21   80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a
    4
    1   plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to
    2   secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
    3   finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.”
    4   (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    5       Credible Fear Interview
    6       The agency reasonably relied on Shi’s admission that
    7   she misrepresented her Christianity to an asylum officer
    8   during her credible fear interview.    “We have frequently .
    9   . . held [that] an IJ’s application of the maxim falsus in
    10   uno, falsus in omnibus [false in one thing, false in
    11   everything] may at times be appropriate.” Siewe, 
    480 F.3d 12
      at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted).    In her asylum
    13   application, Shi admitted to misrepresenting her practice
    14   of Christianity to the asylum officer.   The agency
    15   reasonably rejected her explanation that she was following
    16   a snakehead’s advice given the frequency of Chinese
    17   Christian asylum applicants. The IJ reasonably inferred
    18   that Shi’s explanation was likely fabricated to explain her
    19   lack of knowledge of Christianity at the time of her
    20   credible fear interview, particularly as she testified—
    21   inconsistently with her application—that everything she
    5
    1    said at her interview was true, and she was unresponsive
    2    when confronted with the admission in her application that
    3    she had provided false information.       
    Siewe, 480 F.3d at 4
       168-69 (“The speculation that inheres in inference is not
    5    ‘bald’ if the inference is made available to the factfinder
    6    by record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light
    7    of common sense and ordinary experience. So long as an
    8    inferential leap is tethered to the evidentiary record, we
    9   will accord deference to the finding.”).
    10       Implausibility
    11       Finally, the agency reasonably deemed Shi’s testimony
    12   about her passport implausible.       The IJ was permitted to
    13   draw inferences “from direct and circumstantial evidence,”
    14   which is a “routine and necessary task of any factfinder.”
    15   
    Id. at 167.
      Shi was not clear about when and how she
    16   obtained her passport and then conceded that she obtained
    17   it shortly before she allegedly began attending a church.
    18   The IJ reasonably inferred that her inconsistent answers
    19   were attempts to conceal that she obtained her passport
    20   (and thus anticipated travel abroad) before she began her
    21   purported church involvement.       
    Id. at 168-69.
                                         6
    1        The agency reasonably determined that Shi’s ability to
    2    depart China using her own passport and later obtain a new
    3    passport from the Chinese consulate in the United States,
    4    despite being wanted by Chinese police, was implausible.      See
    5    Ying Li v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 529
    
    6 F.3d 79
    , 83 (2d Cir. 2008).       The IJ’s finding was grounded
    7   in the record given the report from the Australian government
    8   detailing the comprehensive database Chinese authorities use
    9   at airports to ensure that fugitives are prevented from
    10   leaving the country.    See 
    Siewe, 480 F.3d at 168-69
    .
    11       Given the inconsistencies about Shi’s actual involvement
    12   in Christianity in China, her intentional misstatements about
    13   her religion, and the implausibility of aspects of Shi’s
    14   explanations and departure from China, the “totality of the
    15   circumstances”   supports   the   agency’s   adverse   credibility
    16   determination.    See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
    17   
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .    The adverse credibility determination
    18   is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
    19   relief because all three claims are based on the same factual
    20   predicate.    See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d
    21   Cir. 2006).   Because Shi challenges only the agency’s adverse
    7
    1    credibility determination in her brief, we do not reach the
    2    agency’s separate analysis of her practice of Christianity in
    3    the United States.   See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 4
       540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that issues
    5    not raised in an opening brief are waived).
    6        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    7    DENIED. The motion for stay of removal is denied as moot.
    8                               FOR THE COURT:
    9                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    10                               Clerk of Court
    8