Shou Chun Ou v. Holder , 531 F. App'x 150 ( 2013 )

12-1713
Ou v. Holder
BIA
A099 928 392
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 5th day of September, two thousand thirteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SHOU CHUN OU,
Petitioner,
v. 12-1713
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Norman Kwai Wing Wong, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier,
Assistant Director; Matt A. Crapo,
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Shou Chun Ou, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 6,
2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to remand. In
re Shou Chun Ou, No. A099 928 392 (B.I.A. Apr. 6, 2012). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history of this case.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for
abuse of discretion. See Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2005). An abuse of
discretion may be found where the BIA’s decision “provides
no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from
established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or
contains only summary or conclusory statements; that is to
say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.” Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2005)
(per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). A motion to
remand may be denied when the movant fails to establish his
prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. See Li Yong
Cao, 421 F.3d at 156-57.
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In this case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
denying Ou’s motion to remand based on his failure to
establish his prima facie eligibility for relief because the
evidence he presented did not demonstrate a pattern or
practice of persecution of Christians in China. See
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2)(i) (providing that an applicant
shall not be required to show that he will be singled out
individually for persecution if he establishes that there is
a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of similarly
situated persons); Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d
Cir. 2007) (noting that the standard that persecution be
“systemic, pervasive, or organized” to constitute a pattern
or practice appeared reasonable). Although suppression of
religious groups in China occurs, because religious freedom
varies widely within China, substantial evidence supports
the BIA’s conclusion that Ou did not show that the
persecution of Christians in China was so systemic,
pervasive, or organized as to constitute a pattern or
practice of persecution of all Chinese Christians. See
Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
no error in agency’s pattern and practice finding when its
determination was supported by country conditions evidence
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in the record); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168
(2d Cir. 2008)(we review the agency’s factual findings under
the substantial evidence standard); id. at 150 & n.6
(upholding BIA’s determination that where persecution
varies, the applicant is required to show a pattern or
practice in his home province); Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at
156.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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