Lauck v. Cosby , 3 F. App'x 789 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 24 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PAMELA ANNE LAUCK and JOHN
DAVID LAUCK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Appellees,
v.
Nos. 99-1285 and 99-1309
MICHAEL P. COSBY, D.D.S., M.D., (D.C. No. 96-S-2660)
individually; COSBY & JAMES, P.C., (Colorado)
a professional corporation and
successors in interest,
Defendants-Appellees-Cross-
Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and
JENKINS **, District Judge.
On February 3, 1997, Pamela Anne Lauck and her husband, John David
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior District Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Utah, sitting by designation.
Lauck, filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, naming as defendants Michael P. Cosby, D.D.S., M.D.,
individually, and Cosby & James, P.C., a professional corporation. Jurisdiction
was based on diversity of citizenship, the plaintiffs then being citizens of Arizona
and the defendants being citizens of Colorado. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In their
amended complaint plaintiffs alleged that on or about October 1, 1985, Dr. Cosby
performed upon Pamela Lauck in Denver, Colorado, a bilateral
temporomandibular joint proplast implant reconstruction utilizing Vitek implants.
The gist of the complaint was that subsequent to the implantation procedure, Dr.
Cosby, starting in about 1991, received various and sundry notices and warnings
relating to the dangers of Vitek proplast implants, and that Dr. Cosby “made no
reasonable effort to contact the plaintiffs to warn them of the associated dangers
except, according to the defendants, to send a form letter, dated January, 1991,
which the defendants claim was sent by Certified Mail, but was returned without
delivery.” (Plaintiffs moved from Denver, Colorado, to New Jersey in 1989, and
later moved to Arizona.) The plaintiffs went on to allege that, as a result of the
defendants’ failure to take reasonable steps to warn them of the dangers of the
procedure, they suffered damages. In due time the defendants filed an answer to
the amended complaint.
The case was tried to a jury of twelve persons from March 15 to 19, 1999.
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On March 19, 1999, the jury returned its verdict. By special verdict the jury
found that the plaintiffs had incurred injuries, but that the defendants were not
negligent, and, alternatively, if the defendants were in any way guilty of
negligence such was not the cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Judgment was duly
entered on the jury’s verdict and plaintiffs appeal.
Because of the nature of plaintiffs’ argument on appeal, the evidentiary
facts adduced at trial need not be set forth in any detail. As indicated, the crucial
issue in the case was whether defendants took reasonable steps to promptly warn
plaintiffs of their after acquired knowledge of dangers in the Vitek procedure. In
this appeal, the plaintiffs do not, for example, challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Rather, on appeal they only challenge the
giving, over objection, of instruction No. 14 on the “failure to mitigate damages”
and the refusal of the district court to give their tendered instruction on “duty to
warn.” This is not a malpractice case. Rather, the plaintiffs rely on so-called
common law negligence.
In a diversity case, the substance of a jury instruction is a matter of state
law, but the grant or denial of a tendered instruction is governed by federal law.
Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir.
1997). The admission or exclusion of a particular jury instruction is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. City of Wichita v. United States Gypsum Co.,
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72 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996).
Over objection, the district court gave the following instruction on failure
to mitigate damages:
If you find that the Plaintiff, Pamela A. Lauck,
has incurred actual damages, then you must consider
whether the Defendants, Michael P. Cosby, D.D.S.,
M.D. and Cosby & James, P.C., has proved their
affirmative defense of Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate or
minimize damages. The Plaintiff has the duty to take
reasonable steps under the circumstances to mitigate or
minimize her damages. Damages, if any, caused by
Plaintiff’s failure to take such reasonable steps cannot
be awarded to the Plaintiff.
This affirmative defense is proved if you find both
of the following have been proven by a preponderance
of the evidence:
1. Pamela A. Lauck failed to follow the advice of
Dr. Keiser and specifically failed to obtain the x-rays
he requested and/or Pamela A. Lauck failed to call
Dr. Cosby when she began to experience pain in
her temporomandibular joints.
2. Such failures caused the Plaintiff to incur more
injuries, damages and losses than she
otherwise would have; and
3. The amount of damages caused by such failure.
If you find that any one or more of these
propositions has not been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence, then you shall make no deduction from
Plaintiff’s damages.
On the other hand, if you find that both of these
propositions have been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, then you must determine the amount of
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damages caused by the Plaintiff’s failure to take such
reasonable steps. This amount must not be included in
your award of damages.
Plaintiffs argue that the evidence did not support the giving of the
instruction, and they particularly complain about the language in the instruction to
the effect that defendants’ affirmative defense is proven if Pamela Lauck failed to
follow the advice of a Dr. Keiser and if she failed to call Dr. Cosby. Defendants
argue that the evidence did support the giving of the instruction, and that in any
event the instruction related to mitigation of damages which otherwise might be
awarded plaintiffs, and that the jury never reached the question of damages, since
the jury returned a verdict that the defendants were not negligent in their efforts
to try and warn the plaintiffs and were not otherwise liable to the plaintiffs in any
amount. We agree with this latter argument. The instruction by its very terms
related to the amount of damages issue, which issue the jury never reached
because of its finding that the defendants were not negligent.
Plaintiff tendered the following instruction concerning the “duty to warn:”
The defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs to
warn the plaintiffs of the potential dangerous nature of
the implants and of the FDA warnings about such
implants when subsequent to the insertion for the
implants, the defendants obtained actual knowledge of
the hazards related to the implants.
The district court declined to accept the tendered instruction, and, on
appeal, plaintiffs contend such denial constitutes reversible error. We do not
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agree. Counsel for defendants concedes that the defendants had a duty to attempt
to warn plaintiffs of the after-the-operation acquired knowledge as to the danger
inherent in the procedure, and their defense was that they did take reasonable
steps to notify the plaintiffs but were simply unsuccessful in the efforts to locate
plaintiffs, who by that time were residing in New Jersey. The tendered
instruction, if taken literally, seems to mean that the defendants had an absolute
duty to warn, no matter what, and that a reasonable attempt to warn was no
defense. That is not the way the plaintiffs couched their action. As stated, this is
not a malpractice action in which the plaintiffs claim that Dr. Cosby, as of the
date of the implant procedure, knew of the dangers inherent in the procedure and
failed to warn plaintiffs. Dr. Cosby’s awareness of such dangers came several
years later.
In instruction No. 2, the plaintiffs’ theory of the case was set forth as
follows:
Plaintiff Pamela A. Lauck claims that Dr. Cosby,
and Cosby & James, P.C., were negligent in failing to
take
reasonable steps to locate her and warn her about the
Vitek Proplast Temporomandibular Joint implants placed
by Dr. Cosby on October 1, 1985. Plaintiff claims that
the negligence of Dr. Cosby, and Cosby & James, P.C.,
caused her pain and suffering, inconvenience, emotional
stress, impairment of the quality of life, physical
impairment and disfigurement, past and future medical
and other health care expenses and past lost earnings.
(emphasis ours).
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In denying plaintiffs’ post trial motion for a new trial, the district court
explained its reasons for denying plaintiffs’ tendered instruction on duty to warn
as follows:
Under those circumstances, the Court does not
find the case law cited by Plaintiff persuasive. Where
Plaintiff brought her claim as a common law negligence
cause of action, the Court finds that it would have been
inappropriate to instruct the jury on a duty that is
generally considered to arise from a professional
standard of care. Plaintiffs chose not to present the case
as a medical malpractice case depending on an expert’s
testimony of standard of care. In addition, as stated
during trial, the Court believes that giving the requested
instruction would have been tantamount to directing a
verdict for the Plaintiffs in that it was undisputed that
Defendants had not reached Plaintiff Pamela Lauck to
inform her of the need to have the implants removed.
In our view, the district court, under the circumstances, did not err in
refusing to instruct the jury on the so-called “duty to warn.” Plaintiffs did not
plead, or attempt to prove, that as of the date of the implant procedure, Dr. Cosby
knew of any danger inherent in the procedure and failed to warn plaintiffs of the
danger involved. Rather, plaintiffs’ theory was that several years after the
procedure, Dr. Cosby became aware of the danger inherent in the Vitek
procedure, and that he thereafter failed to take reasonable steps to so advise the
plaintiffs. That is the way the case was presented to the jury.
By what they label as a conditional cross-appeal, defendants appeal the
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district court’s ruling wherein it excluded defendants’ proffered expert testimony
concerning the reasonableness of their efforts to notify plaintiffs, and others,
about the potential problems with the Vitek procedure. No. 99-1309. The
defendants agree that if we affirm the judgment of the district court, as we do,
their cross-appeal is moot. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed and the cross-
appeal is dismissed as being moot.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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