Qindi Zhu v. Holder , 531 F. App'x 31 ( 2013 )


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  •     12-889
    Zhu v. Holder
    BIA
    A096 011 152
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 25th day of July, two thousand thirteen.
    PRESENT:
    RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    QINDI ZHU, AKA QUIN PA ZHU,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                     12-889
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General; James A. Hunolt
    and Erica B. Miles, Senior
    Litigation Counsel, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, Civil
    Division, United States Department
    of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
    hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for
    review is DENIED.
    Qindi Zhu, a native and citizen of the People’s
    Republic of China, seeks review of a February 13, 2012,
    decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen.     In re
    Qindi Zhu, No. A096 011 152 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2012).     We
    assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    and procedural history of this case.   We review the BIA’s
    denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.        See
    Kaur v. BIA, 
    413 F.3d 232
    , 233 (2d Cir. 2005).    We find no
    abuse of discretion in this case.
    Zhu concedes that his motion to reopen was filed more
    than 90 days after his administrative removal order became
    final in 2005.   It is therefore untimely unless it falls
    within an exception to the time limitation that generally
    governs motions to reopen.   See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(2).    Zhu contends
    that the limitation does not apply here because his motion
    is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8
    2
    U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(3)(ii).
    His arguments are unpersuasive.
    Zhu’s motion to reopen is premised on a renewed claim
    for asylum based on his alleged political activities with
    the Chinese Democratic Party in the United States, beginning
    after he was ordered removed in 2005.   Zhu’s political
    activities constitute a change in personal circumstances
    arising in the United States, not a change of conditions
    arising in China, and are therefore insufficient to
    establish an exception to the 90-day time limitation.     See
    Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 
    538 F.3d 143
    , 155 (2d Cir. 2008); Wei
    Guang Wang v. BIA, 
    437 F.3d 270
    , 273-74 (2d Cir. 2006).
    Zhu alleges that conditions in China have changed as a
    result of his political activities in the United States.
    The BIA concluded that Zhu’s documentation failed to
    establish changed conditions in China, and that conclusion
    is supported by substantial evidence.   See Jian Hui Shao v.
    Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewing BIA’s
    factual findings regarding changed country conditions under
    the substantial evidence standard).
    The BIA’s decision indicates that it considered all of
    the evidence included with Zhu’s third motion to reopen,
    3
    including a letter from his wife. Contrary to Zhu’s
    assertions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding
    the unsworn, uncorroborated letter unpersuasive and entitled
    to limited evidentiary weight in light of a prior finding
    that Zhu was not a credible witness.   See Qin Wen Zheng v.
    Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 143
    , 148 (2d Cir. 2007)(holding that the
    BIA did not abuse is discretion in declining to credit
    unauthenticated documents submitted with a motion to reopen
    where alien had been found not credible in the underlying
    proceedings).
    The BIA also reasonably concluded that Zhu’s other
    evidence failed to establish changed conditions in China, as
    it reflected a continuation of, rather than a change in,
    China’s treatment of political dissidents since the time of
    Zhu’s hearing.   Finally, Zhu’s argument that the BIA applied
    an erroneously high burden of proof fails to recognize that
    a petitioner seeking to reopen immigration proceedings must
    meet a “heavy burden,” INS v. Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    , 110
    (1988).
    4
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, Zhu’s pending
    motion for a stay of removal is DISMISSED as moot.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5