Lee v. Tanoue , 76 F. App'x 575 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    October 6, 2003
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Charles R. Fulbruge III
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                                       Clerk
    _______________________
    No. 03-10239
    Summary Calendar
    _______________________
    LEROY LEE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    DONNA TANOUE, Chairman
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    Fort Worth Division
    Civil Docket 4:01-CV-835-BE
    _________________________________________________________________
    Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    LeRoy Lee appeals the denial of his post-judgment motion
    for new trial.            Because Lee filed his motion more than ten days
    after the district court entered final judgment, the motion is
    properly characterized as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion.                                   Harcon
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
    published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Barge Co., Inc. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 
    784 F.2d 665
    , 667 (5th
    Cir. 1986).   Lee’s notice of appeal, which specifically designates
    the post-judgment motion as the order being appealed, is timely
    only as to the denial of that motion.        Thus, this Court reviews the
    district court’s denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.
    See Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 
    151 F.3d 465
    , 470
    (5th Cir. 1998).
    The district court granted the FDIC’s motion for summary
    judgment, concluding that Lee failed to commence his civil action
    within the applicable 90-day window and also failed to exhaust his
    disability discrimination claim.          Lee reasserted in his post-
    judgment    motion   the   same   argument   as   was   contained   in   his
    opposition to the motion for summary judgment, namely, that his
    civil action was not time-barred.        After reviewing the briefs and
    record, we find no error and affirm the district court’s denial of
    the 60(b) motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-10239

Citation Numbers: 76 F. App'x 575

Judges: Benavides, Clement, Jones, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 10/6/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/1/2023