United States v. Chester Byrd , 166 F. App'x 460 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-13546                FEBRUARY 10, 2006
    Non-Argument Calendar            THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 04-00081-CR-WDO-5
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CHESTER BYRD,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (February 10, 2006)
    Before BIRCH, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Defendant-appellant, Chester Byrd appeals his conviction for possession
    with intent to distribute more than 20 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . By entering an
    unconditional guilty plea without reserving in writing the right to appeal the denial
    of his motion to suppress, Byrd has waived his right to appeal the district court’s
    adverse determination of his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained after an
    allegedly improper search and seizure. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A federal grand jury indicted Chester Byrd on one count of possession with
    intent to distribute more than 20 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . Initially, Byrd pled not guilty to
    this charge and moved to suppress the evidence obtained when, after his car was
    stopped in an area known for high drug activity, an officer reached into Byrd’s
    pant pocket and removed a piece of clear plastic wrap containing crack cocaine.
    After the government responded and a hearing was held, the district court denied
    Byrd’s motion to suppress evidence. Byrd then changed his plea to guilty,
    pursuant to a written plea agreement. In his written plea agreement, Byrd agreed to
    plead guilty as charged in the indictment. R1-28 at 2-3. Byrd generally waived his
    right to appeal and did not reserve in writing the right to have us review the denial
    of his motion to suppress. See 
    id. at 4-5
    . The district court then sentenced Byrd to
    2
    57 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Byrd filed a
    timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Byrd argues that the district court erred in
    denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. The
    government responds that a challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress
    evidence is a nonjurisdictional issue, which Byrd waived when he entered his
    unconditional guilty plea.
    II. DISCUSSION
    We review whether a voluntary unconditional guilty plea waives a
    defendant’s ability to appeal adverse rulings of pre-trial motions de novo. United
    States v. Patti, 
    337 F.3d 1317
    , 1320 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003). By entering a voluntary
    unconditional guilty plea, a defendant “waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the
    proceedings.” 
    Id. at 1320
    . A district court’s refusal to suppress evidence is
    nonjurisdictional and is waived by a guilty plea. United States v. McCoy, 
    477 F.2d 550
    , 551 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). “A defendant who wishes to preserve
    appellate review of a non-jurisdictional defect while at the same time pleading
    guilty can do so only by entering ‘a conditional plea’ in accordance with [Federal
    Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11(a)(2).” United States v. Pierre, 
    120 F.3d 1153
    ,
    1155 (11th Cir. 1997). Rule 11 provides that “[w]ith the consent of the court and
    the government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo
    3
    contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an
    adverse determination of a specified pre-trial motion.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).
    In this case, Byrd failed to make his guilty plea conditional. Thus, he has
    waived his right to appellate review of the district court’s denial of his motion to
    suppress.
    III. CONCLUSION
    Byrd appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack
    cocaine. Because he entered an unconditional guilty plea without reserving in
    writing the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, Byrd waived his
    right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
    Accordingly, his conviction and sentence must be AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-13546; D.C. Docket 04-00081-CR-WDO-5

Citation Numbers: 166 F. App'x 460

Judges: Barkett, Birch, Black, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/10/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023