Cornelius Martin, II v. Warden Michael Zenk , 244 F. App'x 974 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                      FILED
    ________________________           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    August 9, 2007
    No. 07-10439                   THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                  CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 06-01498-CV-RLV-1
    CORNELIUS MARTIN, II,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    WARDEN MICHAEL ZENK,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (August 9, 2007)
    Before DUBINA, CARNES and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Cornelius Martin, II, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
    district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     for failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies. For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. The BOP’s Grievance and Administrative Remedy Process
    The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) makes available to all inmates a
    process for filing grievances and seeking review of any resolution of those
    grievances. The inmate must first submit a formal administrative remedy request
    on the appropriate form (BP-9) within 20 days of the event forming the basis of the
    request. 
    28 C.F.R. § 542.14
    (a). After the Warden has responded to the inmate’s
    request, the inmate may submit an appeal on the appropriate form (BP-10) to the
    Regional Director for the BOP geographic region in which the inmate is
    incarcerated. 
    Id.
     § 542.15(a). This appeal must be filed within 20 days after the
    date the Warden signed the response to the inmate’s administrative request. Id.
    Once the Regional Director has responded, the inmate may submit an appeal on the
    appropriate form (BP-11) to the BOP’s General Counsel within 30 days of the date
    the Regional Director signed the response. Id. “Appeal to the General Counsel is
    the final administrative appeal.” Id.
    In responding to an inmate’s administrative request, the BOP must adhere to
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    the following time limits:
    Once [a Request is] filed, response shall be made by the Warden or
    CCM within 20 calendar days; by the Regional Director within 30
    calendar days; and by the General Counsel within 40 calendar
    days. . . . Staff shall respond in writing to all filed Requests or
    Appeals. If the inmate does not receive a response within the time
    allotted for reply, including extension, the inmate may consider the
    absence of a response to be a denial at that level.
    Id. § 542.18 (emphasis added).
    B. Facts Underlying Martin’s Habeas Petition
    On June 22, 2006, Martin, who is currently serving a 37-month sentence for
    wire fraud, filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    seeking relief from the BOP’s denial of his request to be transferred to a
    Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”).
    According to Martin, he submitted an informal administrative remedy
    request using a BP-8 form regarding his entry into the RDAP to “Counselor
    Fairley” on May 24, 2006, but Fairley advised him that there was no remedy at the
    “informal level.” Martin claims that after Fairley provided him with a BP-9, he
    personally delivered both a BP-8 (informal request) and a completed BP-9 (formal
    request) to Fairley’s office on May 25, 2006. Martin attached a copy of a BP-9,
    dated May 24, 2006, to his § 2241 habeas petition as “Exhibit L.”
    On June 15, 2006, Martin received a response to his BP-8 request from BOP
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    officials, advising Martin to submit his original BP-8 request to the Unit Manager
    when resolution is accepted or to forward the BP-8 request with a BP-9 if informal
    resolution cannot be reached. The response also indicated that a BP-9 form was
    provided to Martin on June 15th. Martin submitted a BP-9 request on June 15,
    2006, which the BOP received on June 20th.
    In addition to the May BP-9 request, Martin also attached a copy of a BP-10
    request to his habeas petition as “Exhibit P.” In this BP-10, dated June 19th,
    Martin stated that:
    On May 24, 2006, I submitted a BP-9 to Counselor Fairley at DCU
    Atlanta, for re-consideration of my disqualification to the RDAP. It
    was returned to me on June 15, 2006 unanswered. Per the ARP § 542
    I am to consider such time passage to be a denial. I therefore seek the
    following relief.
    REQUESTED RELIEF
    I request reconsideration for qualification for the RDAP. . . .
    As stated above, on June 22, 2006, Martin filed a petition for habeas corpus
    pursuant to § 2241 challenging the BOP’s failure to place him in a RDAP based on
    his status as a disabled inmate. On June 30th, the Warden denied Martin’s June
    15th BP-9.
    On July 8th, Martin submitted a BP-10 appealing the Warden’s denial of his
    June 15th BP-9 request. On July 13th, the Regional Remedy Coordinator sent
    Martin a rejection notice advising Martin that his BP-10 had been received, but that
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    he had failed to provide a copy of his BP-9 or the Warden’s response to that BP-9.
    The regional rejection notice also advised Martin that he could resubmit his BP-10
    appeal with the proper forms within 10 days.
    Rather than resubmit the rejected BP-10, Martin submitted a BP-11 appeal.
    On July 28th, the Central Office Administrative Remedy Coordinator issued a
    rejection notice advising Martin that his BP-11 had been received, but that he had
    failed to provide copy of his BP-10 or the official response to that BP-10. This
    rejection notice also advised Martin that he could resubmit his BP-11 in the proper
    form within 15 days.
    The Government filed a motion to dismiss Martin’s habeas petition on the
    ground that he failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies provided by
    the BOP before filing his petition. The magistrate judge entered a Report and
    Recommendation, concluding that Martin failed to exhaust all available
    administrative remedies and that he failed to show grounds to excuse him from the
    exhaustion requirement. The magistrate judge thus recommended that the district
    court dismiss Martin’s petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust. In a
    written order, the district court adopted the magistrate’s Report and
    Recommendation. The court also held that even had Martin exhausted all
    administrative remedies, the petition was denied on the merits because he failed to
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    show that successful completion of the RDAP would result in a decrease of his
    sentence. Martin now appeals.
    II. DISCUSSION
    When reviewing the district court’s denial of a habeas petition, we review
    questions of law de novo, mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of
    fact for clear error. LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 
    421 F.3d 1237
    , 1259
    (11th Cir. 2005).
    Prisoners seeking habeas relief pursuant to § 2241 are subject to
    administrative exhaustion requirements. Skinner v. Wiley, 
    355 F.3d 1293
    , 1295
    (11th Cir.) (“[A] prisoner is . . . required to exhaust his administrative remedies in
    all habeas cases.”), cert. denied, 
    541 U.S. 1036
    , 
    124 S.Ct. 2112
    , 
    158 L.Ed.2d 722
    (2004). And this court has held that “[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies is
    jurisdictional.” Gonzalez v. United States, 
    959 F.2d 211
    , 212 (11th Cir. 1992)
    (holding that prisoner who was denied parole was required to exhaust
    administrative remedies before filing a § 2241 petition).
    A. Martin’s May 24, 2006 Administrative Remedy Request
    On appeal, Martin first asserts that he submitted a BP-9 request on May 25,
    2006, but he received this BP-9 from the Warden unanswered on June 15, 2006.
    Thus, according to Martin, when “the Warden flouted” federal rules and
    6
    regulations by failing to answer his request, this constituted a full exhaustion of all
    available remedies regarding that request so that the Government should be
    estopped from raising “failure to exhaust” as an affirmative defense. We disagree.
    Even assuming that Martin’s BP-9 request was properly submitted on or
    about May 25th, and that he properly submitted a BP-10 appeal of the Warden’s
    apparent denial of that request on or about June 19th, Martin did not complete the
    exhaustion of his BOP remedies regarding the May 25th BP-9, as he did not submit
    a BP-11 appeal before he filed his § 2241 habeas petition on June 22nd. Thus,
    regarding his May 24th BP-9 request, Martin failed to exhaust all of his available
    administrative remedies. See Skinner, 
    355 F.3d at 1295
     (agreeing with the
    reasoning of sister circuits that have held that “prisoners must exhaust
    administrative remedies before habeas relief can be granted” (emphasis added)).
    B. Martin’s June 15, 2006 Administrative Remedy Request
    Martin also argues that he fully exhausted all administrative remedies
    regarding the BP-9 request he submitted on June 15, 2006.1 We disagree.
    Martin did not submit a BP-10 appealing the Warden’s denial of his June
    15th BP-9 until July 8th—16 days after he filed his § 2241 habeas petition on June
    1
    Because Martin does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that he failed to show
    grounds to excuse him from the exhaustion requirement, we do not address this issue. See Irwin
    v. Hawk, 
    40 F.3d 347
    , 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that a pro se litigant abandons an issue
    by failing to challenge it on appeal).
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    22nd. And he did not submit a BP-11 appeal regarding the July 8th BP-10 until
    July 19th—nearly one month after he filed his habeas petition. Thus, Martin did
    not fully exhaust all of his available administrative remedies regarding his June
    15th BP-9 request before filing his habeas petition on June 22nd. See Skinner, 
    355 F.3d at 1295
    .
    Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Martin’s petition.2
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
    2
    “[W]e may affirm the district court on any ground that appears in the record, whether or
    not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.” Rowell v. BellSouth
    Corp., 
    433 F.3d 794
    , 797-98 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
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