Tripathy v. Lockwood ( 2022 )

22-949-pr
Tripathy v. Lockwood
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 19th day of December, two thousand twenty-two.
PRESENT:
DENNY CHIN,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
BETH ROBINSON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Sanjay Tripathy,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 22-949-pr
Captain Lockwood, Reverend Harris,* Susan
R. Kickbush, D.O.C.C.S., Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision of
New York State, Andrea N. Schneider,
Defendants-Appellees,
* The Clerk of Court is directed to correct the spelling of “Reverand Harris” in the official caption
to “Reverend Harris.”
SORC R. Hoffman, IGRC Chairperson,
Stachowiol, IGRC Staff Member, C.O.
Costienwachs, IGRC Staff Member, J.
Keleher, Din # 15R2316, Inmate Rep IGRC, C.
Florea, Din # 15R1307, Inmate Rep IGRC,
CORC Director, IGP, CORC Member #2,
Deputy Commissioner & Counsel, CORC
Member #2, Deputy Commissioner for
Correctional Facilities, CORC Member #3,
Deputy Commissioner for Program Services,
CORC Member #4, Deputy Commissioner for
Administrative Services, CORC Member #5,
Deputy Commissioner & Chief Medical
Officer, CORC Member #6, Rep of The Office
of Diversity Management, Member #7,
Anthony J. Annucci, Commissioner of
DOCCS; representing DOCCS,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Sanjay Tripathy, pro se,
Collins, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Barbara D. Underwood,
Solicitor General, Victor
Paladino, Senior Assistant
Solicitor General, Sean P.
Mix, Assistant Solicitor
General, for Letitia James,
Attorney General, State of
New York, Albany, NY.
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Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District
of New York (Geraci, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the order is VACATED.
Appellant Sanjay Tripathy, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s April 8,
2022 decision and order, which denied his motion for a preliminary injunction.
Tripathy also moves for an injunction pending appeal, and seeks to appeal the district
court’s November 15, 2021 order denying his motion to amend.
Tripathy is an adherent of Hinduism and is currently incarcerated at the Collins
Correctional Facility in Collins, New York. Tripathy was previously incarcerated at
Gowanda Correctional Facility and Fishkill Correctional Facility, also in New York.
He claims that the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision (“DOCCS”) violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc). Specifically, he alleges the
prison laundry policy in effect at DOCCS facilities requires him to launder his clothes
with clothing of other inmates who consume beef or pork products. This policy forces
him to either hand wash his clothes, go long periods without washing his clothes, or
violate his religious belief that his clothes may not come into close contact with beef or
pork. Based on these alleged violations, Tripathy’s amended complaint asserts three
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claims for relief: (1) a free exercise claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Gowanda prison officials in their individual capacities, (2) a Section 1983 claim for
prospective injunctive relief against Gowanda prison officials in their official capacities
for violations of Tripathy’s free exercise rights, and (3) a RLUIPA claim against DOCCS,
seeking injunctive relief and damages. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
I. Jurisdiction and Scope of the Appeal
We have jurisdiction over Tripathy’s appeal of the April 8, 2022 order because
we have jurisdiction over appeals from “[i]nterlocutory orders . . . granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions.” 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1). However,
because Tripathy is currently incarcerated at Collins and has not amended his
complaint to name Collins officials, his Section 1983 claim seeking injunctive relief
against the Gowanda officials for their alleged violations of Tripathy’s free exercise
rights is moot. See Booker v. Graham, 974 F.3d 101, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2020). However, his
claim for injunctive relief under RLUIPA against DOCCS is not moot. See Salahuddin v.
Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006).
We do not have jurisdiction over the order denying leave to amend or Tripathy’s
RLUIPA damages claim. We have appellate jurisdiction over “final decisions of the
district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision “is one that conclusively
determines all pending claims of all the parties to the litigation, leaving nothing for the
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[district] court to do but execute its decision.” Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 113 (2d
Cir. 2008). Because the district court has not entered a final decision, we lack
jurisdiction over the order denying leave to amend. See Richardson Greenshields Sec.,
Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 650–51 (2d Cir. 1987). We also lack jurisdiction to consider the
RLUIPA damages claim because the district court has not issued an appealable order
addressing that issue. Moreover, exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is
unwarranted because these two non-final issues are not “inextricably intertwined” with
the preliminary injunction denial and review of the non-final issues is not necessary to
ensure “meaningful review” of the preliminary injunction denial. Ogunkoya v.
Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal citation omitted).
II. Applicable Standard
We review without deference the district court’s legal conclusions in deciding
whether to grant a preliminary injunction and review the district court’s “ultimate
decision” of whether to grant a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Yang v.
Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2020).
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of
right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must ordinarily establish
(1) irreparable harm; (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or
(b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to make
them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in favor of the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary
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injunction is in the public interest.
Green Haven Prison Preparative Meeting of the Religious Soc’y of Friends v. N.Y. State Dep’t
of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 16 F.4th 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III. Irreparable Harm
We address only irreparable harm because the district court’s decision and order
addressed only that prong. The district court erred in holding that Tripathy’s 29-
month delay in moving for a preliminary injunction was, on its own, a sufficient reason
to deny the motion.
“To satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that
absent a preliminary injunction they will suffer an injury that is neither remote nor
speculative, but actual and imminent, and one that cannot be remedied if a court waits
until the end of trial to resolve the harm.” Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor,
481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court erred in relying on Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276
(2d Cir. 1985) and Majorica, S.A. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 762 F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir. 1985) (per
curiam)—both intellectual property cases—for the proposition that Tripathy’s delay in
seeking enforcement of his rights was by itself sufficient to deny his motion for
preliminary injunction. Rather, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time,” is “unquestionably” considered irreparable injury for the
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purposes of a preliminary injunction. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); accord
Green Haven, 16 F.4th at 80 (concluding that violation of plaintiffs’ religious liberty
would constitute irreparable harm in case in which plaintiffs raised free exercise claims
under the First Amendment as well as RLUIPA claims). “Religious adherents are not
required to establish irreparable harm independent of showing a Free Exercise Clause
violation because a presumption of irreparable injury flows from a violation of
constitutional rights.” Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 636 (2d Cir. 2020)
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). While Tripathy’s remaining non-
moot claim for injunctive relief against DOCCS is brought under RLUIPA, not the First
Amendment (via Section 1983), RLUIPA protects a similar set of interests as does the
Free Exercise Clause. See Sabir v. Williams, 52 F.4th 51, 59–60 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2022).
These interests, coupled with the particular facts of this case—including the logistical
difficulties that Tripathy has described in litigating his action from prison—compel us
to conclude that the district court erred in ruling that Tripathy’s delay in moving for a
preliminary injunction by itself demonstrates the absence of irreparable injury. On
remand, in considering Tripathy’s reinstated preliminary injunction motion, the district
court should address whether Tripathy is likely to succeed on the merits of his
remaining claims. See New Hope Family Servs., Inc. v. Poole, 966 F.3d 145, 181 (2d Cir.
2020) (citation omitted) (noting that, in the First Amendment context, likelihood of
success on the merits is “the dominant, if not the dispositive, factor”).
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IV. Injunction Pending Appeal
A party seeking an injunction pending appeal “must ordinarily move first in the
district court” for an injunction pending appeal or show that “moving first in the
district court would be impracticable.” Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(A)(i).
Having failed to meet this threshold requirement of Rule 8, Tripathy is not entitled to
immediate relief from this Court. See Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 222, 225
(2d Cir. 2020) (denying an injunction where the movants did not first move for an
injunction pending appeal in the district court and did not justify their failure to do so).
Accordingly, we DENY the motion for an injunction pending appeal. However,
we VACATE the district court’s April 8, 2022 decision and order denying Tripathy’s
motion for preliminary injunction. We REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this order, including prompt consideration of the reinstated preliminary injunction
motion. To facilitate prompt review, we ORDER any party wishing to supplement its
initial preliminary injunction filings in the district court to do so within forty-five days
of the issuance of this Court’s mandate.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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