United States v. Vaca-Perez , 180 F. App'x 779 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 10, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-2244
v. District of New Mexico
RICARDO VACA-PEREZ, (D.C. No. CR-05-00392-JP)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, SEYMOUR, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Ricardo Vaca-Perez pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States
after deportation for an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(b)(2).
The district court concluded that his previous felony, a state court conviction for
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
committing lewd and lascivious acts with a child, was a crime of violence, and the
court enhanced Mr. Vaca-Perez’s offense level with a net upward adjustment of
thirteen levels and sentenced him to a prison term of forty-one months. On
appeal, Mr. Vaca-Perez argues that (1) the district court erred in determining that
the prior felony was a crime of violence; (2) the court erred under United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), by increasing his sentence based on the fact, not
proved to a jury, that the prior conviction was a crime of violence; (3) the court
abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence; and (4) the Supreme
Court should reverse Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
AFFIRM.
I. Background
A border patrol agent encountered and arrested Mr. Vaca-Perez in Luna
County, New Mexico, on December 29, 2004. Mr. Vaca-Perez is a Mexican
citizen who was convicted in California in 1998 for committing lewd and
lascivious acts with a child, was deported, and subsequently reentered the United
States illegally. Mr. Vaca-Perez pleaded guilty to the reentry charge, and a
probation officer prepared a presentence report recommending that Mr. Vaca-
Perez—whose base offense level was eight—receive a sixteen-level upward
adjustment because the prior felony conviction was a crime of violence, and a
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three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an
adjusted offense level of twenty one.
At sentencing, the district court ruled, over Mr. Vaca-Perez’s objection,
that the prior offense was a crime of violence. The court sentenced Mr. Vaca-
Perez to forty-one months’ imprisonment, a term at the bottom of the Sentencing
Guidelines range.
II. Discussion
1. The district court properly held that the prior felony was a crime of violence
Mr. Vaca-Perez argues that his prior criminal conviction for committing
lewd and lascivious acts with a child was not a crime of violence because the
offense did not include, as a necessary element, the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of force. Mr. Vaca-Perez interprets Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1262 (2005), as standing for the proposition that unless
force was unambiguously an element of the prior offense, a sentencing court may
only consider the charging documents in deciding whether the prior felony
offense was a crime of violence. Therefore, he argues, the absence of a force
element in California Penal Code § 288(a), under which he was previously
convicted, should have prevented the court’s finding of a crime of violence and
the concomitant sentencing enhancement.
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Mr. Vaca-Perez’s argument is precluded by a November 2003 amendment
to the Sentencing Guidelines, which included sexual abuse of a minor in the list
of offenses that are always crimes of violence for sentencing. U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2005). In explaining the 2003
amendment, the Sentencing Commission noted that “[t]he previous definition
often led to confusion over whether the specified offenses listed in that definition,
particularly sexual abuse of a minor and residential burglary, also had to include
as an element of the offense ‘the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another.’” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C
(vol. II), amend. 658, at 401-02 (Supp.2003). After the amendment, “the
enumerated offenses are always classified as ‘crimes of violence,’ regardless of
whether the prior offense expressly has as an element of the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Id. at 402.
We held in Munguia-Sanchez, 365 F.3d 877 (10th Cir. 2004), that the
enumerated offenses in § 2L1.2 do not require proof of the use or threatened use
of force for sentencing adjustment purposes. Id. at 880-81. Accordingly, the
district court correctly found that Mr. Vaca-Perez’s prior offense was a crime of
violence. Accord United States v. Medina-Maella, 351 F.3d 944, 946-47 (9th Cir.
2003) (concluding that a conviction under § 288(a) of the California Penal Code
was a prior conviction for a crime of violence under § 2L1.2).
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2. The court did not commit constitutional Booker error
Mr. Vaca-Perez argues that a district court may not find additional facts
regarding a prior conviction that will significantly increase a sentence unless
those facts are alleged in the indictment, admitted by the defendant, or proved to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He concedes that the district court could
properly enhance his sentence because his prior felony offense was an aggravated
felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(c), but he argues that the sixteen-level
enhancement for a crime of violence required additional fact-finding prohibited
by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
While Booker does require that certain facts be found by a jury or admitted
by a defendant, that requirement does not apply to the fact of a defendant’s prior
conviction nor to the district court’s characterization of that prior offense as a
crime of violence. United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2005).
The characterization of prior convictions as crimes of violence is “a question of
law and not fact and therefore does not implicate the Sixth Amendment for the
purpose of requiring the characterization of the offense to be charged in the
indictment and proven to a jury.” Id. As discussed above, Mr. Vaca-Perez’s
previous conviction was, on its face, a crime of violence. Consequently, the
district court did not need to engage in any fact-finding to characterize it as such.
Therefore, Mr. Vaca-Perez’s rights were not violated.
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3. The court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence
Mr. Vaca-Perez argues that the Sentencing Guidelines allow sentences for
illegal reentry that are unreasonably severe. In support of his argument, he cites
United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 821 (10th Cir. 2005), as
standing for the proposition that a sixteen-level increase for a crime of violence
calls into question the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings. And Mr. Vaca-Perez claims that the Guidelines’ sixteen-level
enhancement for a crime of violence classifies murderers and rapists in the same
category as immigrants who illegally reenter the United States regardless of the
violence actually employed in the prior felony offense, and that the Guidelines are
especially unreasonable when compared to the sentences imposed for similarly
situated offenders who commit far more violent offenses.
When sentencing Mr. Vaca-Perez, the district court knew that Booker made
the Guidelines advisory and gave the court discretion to impose a sentence outside
the Guidelines range. In considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
however, the court decided that a sentence within the range was reasonable.
While a Guidelines sentence is not per se reasonable, we have held that “a
sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness.” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054
(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have considered
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Appellants’ arguments and find no basis for concluding either that the district
court erred in calculating Mr. Vaca-Perez’s sentence or that the sentence imposed
was unreasonable.
4. Almendarez-Torres v. United States is binding law
Mr. Vaca-Perez acknowledges that the Supreme Court decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), is binding authority on
this Court. He challenges it merely to preserve the issue for possible review by
the Supreme Court.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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