Jaryal v. Garland ( 2023 )

20-1612
Jaryal v. Garland
BIA
Sponzo, IJ
A208 617 571
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 3rd day of January, two thousand twenty-
three.
PRESENT:
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
STEVEN J. MENASHI,
EUNICE C. LEE,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ANIT JARYAL,
Petitioner,
v. 20-1612
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad,
Assistant Director; Carmel A.
Morgan, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Anit Jaryal, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a decision of the BIA affirming a decision of
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Anit Jaryal, No.
A 208 617 571 (B.I.A. Apr. 22, 2020), aff’g No. A 208 617 571
(Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. June 6, 2018). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions
“for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review
factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of
law de novo, see Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir.
2014), and “the administrative findings of fact are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
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compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). An asylum applicant has the burden to
demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b).
A. Past Persecution
Contrary to Jaryal’s position, the IJ provided sufficient
analysis for judicial review. See Poradisova v. Gonzales,
420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005). The IJ explained that the
two beatings Jaryal suffered at the hands of members of a
rival political party did not rise to the level of persecution
because he was not hospitalized, he described the scratches
and scrapes resulting from the beatings as minor, and he did
not suffer permanent injuries. Jaryal does not articulate
why this analysis is insufficient. Moreover, the agency
reasonably concluded that this harm did not rise to the level
of persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820,
822 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasizing importance of context and
upholding agency’s conclusion that minor beating by family
planning officials that occurred before an arrest by the
police and that caused only minor bruising, required no formal
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medical attention, and had no lasting physical effect did not
rise to the level of persecution); cf. Beskovic v. Gonzales,
467 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that a “minor
beating . . . may rise to the level of persecution if it
occurred in the context of an arrest or detention” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Jaryal argues that the IJ erred by requiring him to
demonstrate permanent injury and hospitalization and relies
on Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2006), to
argue that his physical abuse constitutes persecution. But
Edimo-Doualla held that the absence of permanent injury does
not necessarily preclude a finding of persecution, not that
all physical abuse constitutes persecution. Id. at 283. And
Jaryal’s past harm is not comparable to Edimo-Doualla’s, as
Edimo-Doualla was detained by government authorities,
deprived of food and water, forced to bathe with water mixed
with urine, beaten with a cane and the flat side of a machete,
forced to jump on gravel, beaten with a wire while naked, and
suspended from a beam by his arms. Id. at 279–80; see also
Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 226 (reiterating that the “difference
between harassment and persecution is necessarily one of
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degree . . . assessed with regard to the context in which the
mistreatment occurs” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)(emphasis in original)).
B. Future Persecution
Because Jaryal did not establish past persecution, he
had the burden of demonstrating a well-founded fear of future
persecution, which in part requires showing that his fear is
objectively reasonable. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2);
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).
A fear is objectively reasonable “even if there is only a
slight, though discernible, chance of persecution,” Diallo v.
INS, 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000), but a fear is not
objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the
record and is merely “speculative at best,” Jian Xing Huang
v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).
Jaryal argues that his fear of future harm is objectively
reasonable, but he focuses on whether he will be harmed,
without addressing the agency’s conclusion that he failed to
establish that such harm would rise to the level of
persecution. Jaryal argues that the IJ ignored country-
conditions evidence that similarly situated individuals are
5
persecuted in India, but he does not cite country-conditions
evidence to support that argument. Review of the record has
not revealed evidence that members of his political party,
the Mann Party, are targets of political violence from other
parties. Thus, on this record, the agency did not err in
concluding that Jaryal failed to establish an objectively
reasonable fear of future harm rising to the level of
persecution. 1
The agency’s determination that Jaryal failed to
establish the well-founded fear of future harm rising to the
level of persecution as required for asylum also resolves
Jaryal’s claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief,
which require the same or more severe harm. See Lecaj v.
Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (withholding requirement that “life or freedom
would be threatened”); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2) (“Torture is
an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not
include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment that do not amount to torture.”).
1
Jaryal asserts that the agency should have shifted the burden to the
Government to prove that he does not have a well-founded fear of
persecution. However, the burden shifts to the Government only if the
applicant establishes past persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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